AOPA Pilot Magazine - January 2014 - 20

SAFETY PILOT

Reflections from the
'Leading Edge'

BRUCE LANDSBERG
President, AOPA Foundation

A backward look and predictions confirmed
THIS MONTH'S COLUMN had its genesis in my blog,
"Leading Edge," a little more than two years ago. It was
a tough Thanksgiving weekend that saw many fatal accidents. I ignored the usual caveat that we ought not to be
speculating too publicly, too soon, but the preliminary
investigations did not bode well for pilot decision-making. Here's how it played out.
From the blog: Medical flight with five people on
board crashes in Illinois. There were three fatalities.
The flight from Georgia to Illinois had only a few miles
to go to its destination. Strong northwest winds apparently slowed the groundspeed of the Piper Navajo. The
pilot told air traffic control moments before the accident, "We are out of fuel and we are coasting." The
NTSB noted there was no fuel in the tanks or on the
ground. Fuel exhaustion?

Friends within the FAA and NTSB have privately
acknowledged that "We can't fix stupid."

BRUCE LANDSBERG

is president
of the AOPA
Foundation, which
funds the work
of the Air Safety
Institute.

20 | AOPA PILOT January 2014

Probable cause: "The pilot's inadequate preflight
planning and in-flight decision-making, which resulted
in a loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion during
approach," according to the NTSB.
The blog: Turbo Commander 690 on a beautiful
VFR night slams into a mountain with six fatalities.
There is speculation about configuration of Phoenix
Class B airspace and the pilot's attempting to stay below
it to avoid ATC. Controlled flight into mountainous terrain at night while VFR?
Probable cause: The NTSB notes, "Mountainous
terrain rises to 4,500 feet less than 1 nm east of the
5,000-foot Class B airspace, and the terrain rises to a
maximum elevation of 5,057 feet about three and onehalf miles east." The regulations require that turbine
aircraft, such as the Commander with six or more passenger seats, must be equipped with terrain avoidance
warning equipment. Such was not the case.
The blog: A VFR pilot (according to the flying club
manager) is returning his daughter in a Cirrus SR20 to
college along with another daughter and a friend. Four
fatalities. VFR into IMC? No IFR flight plan has been
located at this writing.
Probable cause: "The noninstrument-rated pilot's
decision to continue flight in instrument meteorological

conditions, which resulted in the pilot's spatial disorientation and loss of control of the airplane."
The blog: Both the AOPA Foundation and the industry have been in an ongoing discussion with the FAA and
NTSB on how to address GA mishaps like these. Were
these systemic failures or individual failures? Is it possible that any of the pilots did not know the risks involved?
Have we in the industry not done a good enough job of
explaining the risks? Fuel is needed for engines and the
rules require a reserve. VFR at night runs the risk of not
seeing mountains; there is no rule for avoiding mountains per se, but you won't be happy with the results.
Flying in the clouds is extremely hazardous unless
you've been trained to do it-there are minimums for
VFR flight. Is it possible that despite all the warnings,
people become complacent-or ignore them, certain
that they can somehow succeed?
Some think more regulation is the answer. In two
cases a violation of Part 91 seems highly likely. In the
Phoenix accident, should we make it against the rules
to challenge a mountain? Friends within the FAA and
NTSB have privately acknowledged that "We can't fix
stupid," but by the nature of their positions they must
continue to try. Learning from past mistakes really is
the best way not to become a statistic. Teaching decision-making to all pilots seems like an easy nonanswer
because the absorption capacity and risk tolerance varies so greatly.
Is technology the answer? Fuel flow transducers are
capable of predicting to the cup when the engines will
go silent. Synthetic vision and TAWS predict impact in
time to avoid it, and autopilots are capable of keeping
aircraft under control when the pilot can't.
Can we change human nature? Can we make the aircraft foolproof? Does everyone need the same level of
oversight-and at what cost to personal freedom? While
political correctness may dictate one answer, does reality provide another? The poll on my blog at the time
noted 14 percent thought teaching judgment to all pilots
will solve this, 70 percent thought we should continue
to push ongoing education and accept that there will be
losses, and 10 percent thought we should stage interventions when someone is about to go over the edge.
What do you think?
AOPA
WEB blog.aopa.org/leadingedge

http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge

AOPA Pilot Magazine - January 2014

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of AOPA Pilot Magazine - January 2014