AOPA Pilot Magazine - September 2017 - 14

LETTERS

PROFICIENT PILOT

Decisions, decisions

BY BARRY SCHIFF

Could you defend your choice?
WHEN TAKING OFF in a lightplane, the pilot typically

BARRY SCHIFF

has logged 28,000
flight hours, flown
356 different types
of aircraft, and
written 1,800
magazine articles.

pushes the throttle to the firewall and uses all available
horsepower (within allowable limits). Airline pilots
also used to take off using maximum-allowable thrust,
but operating economics have changed that. Instead of
using "full power," those who fly heavy iron are encouraged to take off using reduced thrust to save fuel and
reduce wear and tear on turbine engines. In effect, pilots
pretend that the ambient air temperature is warmer
than it really is and reduce takeoff thrust to approximate
the reduced performance that would be experienced on
a hot day using maximum thrust.
There are times, however, when using reduced
thrust is not allowed, such as during wind-shear conditions or when the runway is contaminated with rain,
snow, ice, or slush. A reduced-thrust takeoff increases
takeoff distance, and runway contamination increases
stopping distance (in case of an aborted takeoff ). The
combination of both reduced thrust and a contaminated
runway could require more concrete than is available.
I recall taxiing in a Lockheed L-1011 at a snail's
pace in a long procession of aircraft toward the departure end of Runway 30L at St. Louis during the 1990s.
My first officer was making the calculations needed to
complete our takeoff performance chart. His attention
alternated between the chart and the damp runway to
our left, uncertain whether to use reduced thrust for
takeoff. Looking in my direction, he asked, "I can't figure it out. Should we use reduced or maximum thrust?"
I answered with a question: "What would you say
at the hearing?"
Randy (not his real name) looked at me quizzically.
"What are you talking about? What hearing?"
We were still at the tail end of the takeoff queue, so
there was plenty of time for discussion.
"Let's assume," I began, "that we had an engine failure just before V1 and had to abort the takeoff. Assume
also that we didn't stop within the confines of the runway and wound up burying the nosewheel in the dirt.
The NTSB would conduct a hearing to investigate the
incident. Right?"
"Of course," he replied.
"One member of the inquisition undoubtedly
would ask why reduced thrust was used when the
runway was contaminated. We would reply that the
runway was only damp, not really wet. He would then
ask, 'Do you mean that you thought you could stop

just as quickly on a damp runway as when the surface
is absolutely dry?' Honesty would compel us to concede that any moisture on the runway adversely affects
braking, and that we probably should not have used
reduced thrust. The result could be a sizeable fine and
time on the beach without pay."
Randy returned to his work sheet and calculated
our takeoff performance on the basis of using maximum thrust.
This method of aeronautical decision making can
be applied to almost any operation about which a pilot
might have doubt, including those involving general
aviation. To make the right decision, all the pilot has to
do is ask himself how he would explain his actions at
the hearing. Could he justify his actions during such an
investigation? If not, the decision was probably wrong.
Assume a pilot is flying into progressively deteriorating weather. The decision to continue is an ongoing
process. If he envisions having to justify his decisions
at a hearing, the pilot might decide earlier that conditions really do not warrant continuing the flight.
Another example involves a pilot running low on
fuel. He believes he has enough fuel to reach his destination, but a growing and gnawing doubt makes
him wonder if he should land short of his destination.
Accident records are replete with the results of those
who ignore such gut feelings and continue anyway. All
such a pilot has to do is imagine the potential consequences and having to justify his actions at the hearing
(and possibly to his Maker).
There are five hazardous attitudes most likely to
result in our making poor decisions, and their antidotes are shown in parentheses:
* Antiauthority, the "don't tell me" syndrome.
(Follow the rules; they are usually right.)
* Impulsiveness, feeling the need to do something
quickly. (Take your time; think before acting.)
* Invulnerability, believing that "it won't happen to
me." (Acknowledge that it really can happen to you.)
* Machoism, the "I can do it" syndrome. (Don't take
chances unless you can afford the consequences.)
* Resignation, the "what's the use?" syndrome. (You
are never helpless; what you do can make a difference.)
Anticipate the questions that might be asked at a
hearing so that you'll never have to attend one. AOPA
WEB

www.barryschiff.com

As a fan of Barry Schiff, I always read his
articles. I especially enjoyed this month's topic
("Proficient Pilot: Decisions, Decisions") as it's
something I always cover with my students
when we discuss aeronautical decision making.
My version of "Could you defend your choice"
is, "What would other pilots say when they
read the NTSB report about this?"

Jerry Plante
AOPA 3391582
Bourne, Massachusetts

18 | AOPA PILOT July 2017

flying résumé, I didn't ask about
it for a very long time. But he
hand-flew that old Bonanza
to ATP standards all the way
to Dallas and back (no autopilot on board). He explained his
logic to me, and it didn't stay with
me, but it worked for him.
Years later I was talking to
him about flying twins. The
old "dead foot, dead engine"
was confusing to me-at a time
I didn't need to be confused.
He told me, "Don't think about
that-just match the throttles
to your feet." Son-of-a-gun, no
more confusion in identifying
the offending engine.
Two lessons Hirschman's article reminded me of: 1) If it works,
don't fix it; and 2) Some habits are
worth keeping. (And, we don't all
have to do it exactly the same-
keep what works for you.)
Bob Stringer
AOPA 1404816
Duncanville, Texas

HANGAR TALK

Fees chase away

Senior Photographer CHRIS ROSE has flown on hundreds of air-to-air photo shoots, but
the challenge of photographing the Spirit of St. Louis replica in the skies over the Hudson River Valley of New York was unique ("DOING THE LINDY HOP," page 50). Not only
was Rose photographing a subject airplane that had no radios, but Ken Cassens, the
pilot in the Spirit, had no forward visibility. Rose was in a historic aircraft himself-a New
Standard biplane-also with no communication, just hand signals and yelling back and
forth to pilot Clay Hammond. "It was backwards from the way it usually works," Rose
says. "The photo plane had to move around the subject plane. In a typical air-to-air, the
subject plane pilot always has his eyes on the photo platform, but [Cassens is] peering out a side window just to see me." Prior to the shoot, Rose researched other photos
of the replica but could find none. "It's such an iconic aircraft, now I understand why-
it was tricky and it may be the most difficult aircraft I've ever photographed," he says.
"But the New Standard was a surprisingly good platform to shoot from."

14 | AOPA PILOT September 2017

I've been flying into Rancho
Murieta, California (RIU), over
40 years for fun, fuel, friends and
events. This week I was reminded
of the cost cancer infecting general aviation with Rancho's newly
implemented $25 landing fee for
small singles. General aviation
is not about sterilized transportation. It's about brotherhood
and the beauty of freedom. That
brings people to small airports.
Fees chase away the beauty...and
the biz.
John Tillison
AOPA 573954
Sacramento, CA

We welcome your comments.
Editor, AOPA Pilot, 421 Aviation
Way, Frederick, Maryland 21701
or email (pilot@aopa.org). Letters may be edited for length
and style before publication.

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of AOPA Pilot Magazine - September 2017