Premium On Safety - Issue 10, 2013 - (Page 3)

Who Needs Paper Home Depot’s flight department uses Jeppesen charts, so they decided to use the Jeppesen Mobile FD app for charting. However, since the Jeppesen app does not support XM or ADS-B downlink weather, they also installed ForeFlight for its downlink weather interface. By comparison, another Part 91 flight department meets the same requirement by simply using the aircraft’s onboard wireless internet connection to download current weather data. Having to deal with battery management is another reality of going paperless in the cockpit. Apple states that the battery of an iPad provides 10 hours of use, and a twoman crew under FAR Part 135 is limited to 10 hours of flight time, so crews must be mindful of battery limitations. AC 120-76B states that in order to remove paper data (continued from page 2) from the cockpit, there must be two operational EFBs in the cockpit so that there will always be aeronautical data available. Some flight departments use auxiliary power plugs for charging and others keep supplemental batteries in the cockpit. Regardless of FAA approval requirements, any operator should undergo an evaluation period in which all of these operational details are worked out, while paper charts are still available. Once FAA authorization is granted to a Part 135 or Part 91K operator, any changes also require approval. However, Part 91 operators have the ability to easily modify workflows that aren’t working, and quickly adapt to new or updated applications that might better meet their needs without a lengthy approval process. The manager of the iPad transition at a Fortune 500 flight department has found that one of the most significant benefits of deploying the iPad as an EFB is that it allows aircraft with older avionics packages lacking on-board charts to functionally compete with those with the latest technology, and the implementation cost is minimal. A natural comparison to the transition from paper charts to a paperless cockpit is the transition from steam gauges to glass cockpits. It is a natural technological progression, and part of a professional pilot’s craft is to adapt to such changes. Lee Smith is an ATP and CFII certificated pilot with a background in corporate and Part 135 operations. BEST PRACTICES The Accident Number By STEVE WIToWSKI US Accidents 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 All Business Jet Accidents/Fatal Accidents 25/5 23/5 8/1 10/1 14/0 17/5 All Business Turboprop Accidents/Fatal Accidents 30/13 44/18 36/7 38/6 44/13 21/4 Source: BCA Jan 2013; Operational Safety, Going Forward A five year study (2007-2011) of business aviation aircraft accidents conducted by Business and Commercial Aviation writers revealed or validated some interesting information. First, it’s clear over the span of study that improvement is a reality, and the combination of various factors (aircraft design, electronics, crew training, IS-BAO, and safety management) are having a positive influence. Although there is variance, or ups and downs from year to year, the overall acci- dent trend continues to move lower. Although it is impossible to point out all accident causal factors with absolute certainty, trends do provide some insight into prevailing characteristics. First, 50 percent of business jet accidents occur during the landing phase. Their analysis of these accidents indicated many continue to be the result of an unstabilized approach, with lack of speed control, floated landing, and delayed use of reversers and brakes. The numbers pointed to this conclusion: excess speed above Vref significantly increases the probability of an accident. The analysis also identified several interesting trend items. Accidents associated with maintenance personnel errors represented 23 percent and 18 percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively. This trend indicates an increase and might continue in a negative direction as maintenance technician experience collectively decreases and aircraft systems become increasingly complex. Regarding pilot experience, it seems the numbers point to increased accidents for pilots with less than 5,000 hours and most significantly those with 300 hours or less in aircraft model. Accident involvement for pilots with more than 300 hours in model showed a measurable drop off (improvement). This result parallels a previous Boeing jetliner accident study that showed 82 percent of all accidents involved a pilot with less than 280 hours in aircraft type. Among turboprops accident rates declined once a pilot reached approximately 250 hours in aircraft type. Ok, numbers like these are interesting, but how can the typical business aviation opera(continued on page 4) 3

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of Premium On Safety - Issue 10, 2013

Premium On Safety - Issue 10, 2013
Contents
Best Practices: The Accident Number
Accident Prevention: Putting It All on the Line
ASI Message: Push the Buttons—Capiche?
Flight Vis: Wildlife Awareness
ASI Online: Heads Up! Improving Runway Safety

Premium On Safety - Issue 10, 2013