Defense Technology International - January/February 2008 - (Page 16) DISPATCHES GLOBAL FLAME OUT The Future Gripen has a new, more powerful engine and more internal fuel. Eurofighter cedes Scandinavia to JSF and Gripen, but JSF may have an edge BILL SWEETMAN•MINNEAPOLIS t the end of 2007, Eurofighter pulled out of competitions to supply combat aircraft to Norway and Denmark, leaving the Lockheed Martin F-35A Joint Strike Fighter and the Future Gripen to fight it out, despite the fact that both nations plan to order as many as 48 jets each, late this year or early in 2009. The decision was a sharp turn in the contest but not a complete surprise. Until 2005, Norway and Denmark had been seen as sure wins for JSF. They were the European launch customers for the F-16, along with Belgium and the Netherlands. Their air forces have a long history with the F-16, including the successful MidLife Update program (which was largely funded by the U.S. Air Force), and local industry did well from o set programs. Both have taken part in JSF systems development and demonstration. The countries flew U.S. fighters before the F-16, so generations of Norwegian and Danish pilots and maintainers have grown up with stronger connections to USAF—through training, exchanges and joint exercises—than to European air forces. Eurofighter and Gripen executives are only half joking when they say the prospect of training in Sweden or the U.K., versus the wide-open, warm, cheap U.S., was a negative selling point in the pilot community. No JSF briefing ever referred to the nations’ requirements as competitions. In the case of the Netherlands, that’s still the case: Government briefers use 16 A Lockheed Martin charts in their presentations. Even in the other two countries, Eurofighter and Gripen people saw their roles as bargaining wedges to pry better terms out of the JSF program. But from 2006-07, Norway and Denmark solidified their requirements, making sure that the need for an F-16 replacement, regardless of type, was accepted by consensus across political parties. Denmark went through two request for information (RFI) stages and the fighter requirement has been independently examined by government accountants. Norway’s Project 7600 for a new fighter is underway. Both are prosperous countries—particularly oil-wealthy Norway— and price is not the only concern. Meanwhile, European competitors had sharpened their bids. Typhoon was emerging from a long and di cult development. It was only in late 2004 that Eurofighter could declare victory on some unpleasant stability and control issues; and it was 2006 before the four nations in the Eurofighter consortium came to an agreement on the process for developing the fighter’s air-to-ground capability. Gripen, too, has gained momentum, entering service with export operators. The JAS 39C/D, the new NATO-deployable version of the fighter, with a new electronic warfare system and one of the sleekest fighter cockpits, is established in service and made its debut at Red Flag Alaska in the summer of 2006. The Swedish air force says other pilots call the Gripens “velociraptors” because of their data-link-driven tactics, delivering coordinated attacks from widely-spaced formations. Uncertainty over the Swedish air force’s Gripen fleet was resolved in September with a final decision to standardize on a smaller (100-aircraft) force of C/D Gripens, including 31 produced by rebuilding older A/Bs. At the same time, the Swedish government agreed to fund a demonstrator for the Future Gripen, the basis for the team’s o er to Norway and Denmark, with an advanced electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, more power and more internal fuel, o setting the fact that the Gripen is still the pint-size contender, literally half the size of its rivals. As the technical risks diminished, Eurofighter and Gripen could advertise a valuable feature: a fixed price. The JSF team is not allowed, under U.S. law, to offer a fixed price. The price for export cannot be lower than the price that the U.S. government pays; and that price cannot be fixed until the contract is signed, which won’t happen until the year in which work starts, approximately two years ahead of delivery. The result is that there will be no fixed price until the contract is signed for the first full-rate, multiyear production batch, in Fiscal Year 2013. But Norway maneuvered around this problem by classifying its final offer stage as a “request for binding information” rather than a request for proposals, which under Norway’s rules must include a fixed price. JSF supporters argue that what matters is best value overall—and that even at the high end of expected costs, JSF is a good deal. “With the falling dollar it gets cheaper every day,” says Col. Robert Geerdes, team leader for the Netherlands’ fighter replacement program. There is another pricing issue: European customers want to finish replacing their F-16s by 2020. This means that deliveries need to start in 2014-15, so JSFs will come from the earlier and more expensive production batches. The third and fourth low-rate initial production batches “are twice the average price,” says Geerdes, and the Netherlands is in favor of all customers making early commitments, in return for a concession on price from the U.S. “We’re not trying to influence anyone to make decisions, but we are trying to remove an incentive to move aircraft to the right, which makes aircraft more expensive for everybody.” www.aviationweek.com/dti GRIPEN INTERNATIONAL CONCEPT DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2008 http://www.aviationweek.com/dti
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