Defense Technology International - April 2008 - (Page 19) LESSON LEARNED Israel rethinks warfighting tactics post-Winograd Report DAVID ESHEL•TEL AVIV srael’s political and military leaderThe United Nations-brokered ceaseship are to blame for planning and fire left Hezbollah bloodied and with operational failures that led to a much of its infrastructure destroyed. stalemate in the Second Lebanon War. But the organization was intact and able So concludes the Winograd Commit- to claim a huge public relations victory tee, which released its final report on the precisely because it had not been eradi2006 conflict in March. The report iden- cated. Moreover, the incident that trigtifies factors that plagued decision-mak- gered the war, Hezbollah’s abduction of ing in the government and the military. two Israeli soldiers, is unresolved—both Chief among them were going to war remain captive. without a strategy for victory, conductIn summing up the report at a news ing an air offensive without adequate conference in Jerusalem, Chairman ground support at the beginning of the Eliyahu Winograd said Israel “canwar, failure to call up reserve forces un- not survive” unless its enemies and til almost three weeks into the conflict citizens “believe that it has political (fighting lasted 33 days), and demoral- leadership, military capabilities and helico_178x121_DTI_uk 11/03/08 11:48 Page 1 ization throughout the ranks. social strength that will enable it to I prevent enemies from realizing their goals.” The political leadership is responsible for giving the military directives on waging war to meet strategic aims. To aid the leadership in this area, a crisis management team should be created. In Israel this is the role of the national security council, which was not involved in war planning. The lack of clear directives caused most of the failures in the war. Nevertheless, analysts consider the war a much-needed wakeup call for Israel. And the military is taking the lessons of the war to heart. It abandoned the doctrine that stressed precision standoff firepower over maneuver warfare, arguably the biggest mistake Israel made in the conflict (DTI July/August 2007, p. 41). The Israel Defense Forces has always been primarily a land army. Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, an air force officer who was chief of staff during the war, wanted to reorganize the IDF into a three-service force, with a virtually independent army, air force and navy. Many army officers opposed this, fearing it would affect cohesion and planning. The so-called Halutz Doctrine backfired www.nexter-group.fr Better Stronger Nexter HELICOPTER SYSTEMS: NO COMPROMISE 19 Photo: Eurocopter http://www.nexter-group.fr http://AviationWeek.com/dti
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