Defense Technology International - April 2008 - (Page 34) COMBAT GROUND SMALL FORCE, BIG NEEDS Distributed operations mandate new gear and concepts U.S. MARINE CORPS BILL SWEETMAN•MINNEAPOLIS The high speed of the V-22 tiltrotor, compared with that of a helicopter, may better suit it to support distributed operations. O ne term that’s now part of the combat lexicon is “distributed operations.” This describes a conventional army’s shift in tactics caused by an adversary that does not assemble into large formations—a hallmark of asymmetrical conflicts. Fighting small, independent groups that assume non-combatant identities at will makes it di cult for industrial armies to win decisive victories, even with their overwhelming force, high technology and intelligence-gathering capabilities. This type of combat may not lend itself to classic special forces operations. As in Mogadishu in 1993, and now in Afghanistan, insurgents use cell phones and other commercial technologies to coalesce quickly into large groups. If opposing forces cannot do the same, they risk being outnumbered. Moreover, the need to protect, house and feed a conventional army leads to the creation of a garrison base, which becomes a target for attack by the shadowy fighters who often appear and disappear on their own terms. Distributed operations—also known as “di used warfare” (see p. 35)—aim to achieve the best of both worlds by creat- ing dispersed and highly mobile forces that aggressively hunt the enemy and can call in backup to rapidly mass on critical nodes. The size of these forces is seen in a requirement for power supplies to support the distributed operations of a 13-person squad that operates autonomously for 10 days before being relieved. The concept, however, comes with a host of challenges in such areas as transportation, resupply, power capabilities and force protection. Transporting forces into and out of an area is often done by helicopter. These operations can’t count on a large, welldefended base at both ends, thus placing a premium on the speed, range and survivability of the aircraft. Low noise, the ability to enter and leave a landing zone quickly and defensive aids contribute to survivability. The Royal Air Force discovered after early operations in Afghanistan that it needed more medium-heavy AgustaWestland Merlin helicopters, and acquired eight of the aircraft that had been ordered by Denmark. Known as HC.3As in RAF service, the Merlins are equipped with a forward-looking infrared sensor in a nose turret and directional infrared countermeasures (Dircm) systems. Support for distributed operations is one reason why the U.S. Marine Corps believes it needs the MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor, which costs more than a helicopter but has higher speed. The service is reluctant to talk about operations in Iraq by VMM-263, the first MV-22 squadron to deploy overseas, but missions have clearly encountered opposition. Unlike the Merlin or the special-operations CV-22, the MV-22 was not delivered with Dircm; however, aircraft in theater have been modified with forward-firing flares, and a Dircm is planned. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) will be a key element of distributed operations, combining mobility with protection (see p. 14). It will also provide power to recharge a large assortment of electronic devices that the distributed operations squad carries; in fact, personal electronics are a vital element of the concept. A squad typically carries night-vision binoculars with built-in laser rangefinding, like the Swiss Vectronic Vector 21; newer versions of the Defense Advanced GPS receiver, with iPod-like controls and moving-map displays; and software-defined radios. AviationWeek.com/dti 34 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL APRIL 2008 http://AviationWeek.com/dti
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