Defense Technology International - June 2008 - (Page 63)

DAVID ESHEL/DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL laser technology matured into a solution instead of investing in a chemical laser and its inherent problems. Is the time it’s taking to develop a means of stopping the Qassam rocket offensive from Gaza a major issue? It is from a political standpoint, which cannot be ignored. But the defense community has to maintain a professional outlook in order to select the most e ective means of coping with the threat on a long-term basis. Although time is critical, it is not the only issue under consideration when national priorities and funding limits are taken into account. Unfortunately, valuable time was lost when several years of indecision and political haggling prevented projects from maturing. We are now paying the price for this delay. However, all projects under development will require approximately the same lead time. Northrop Grumman’s Sky Guard will at best be operational in three years, which is about the same time it will take for solid-state laser technology to mature. This means that a solid-state laser weapon will probably become a reality and o er more operational advantages in size and mobility than chemical lasers, which by then could be obsolete. The obvious decision would be to wait and focus our e orts on solid-state lasers. Israel has other solutions under development. Are these interim measures or a different approach? First of all, let me assure you that Israel has already taken its place in developing solid-state laser technology, and advances in this ﬁeld are regarded as more than technologically feasible within a few years time. But there are also developments in counter-RAM systems. The most advanced of these, which has been selected by the ministry of defense, is Rafael’s “Iron Dome,” which will be operational in three years, and e ective in defending Sederot and other targets around the Gaza Strip. Iron Dome is a mobile counter-RAM weapon. The system is based on Elta’s advanced artillery radar and a battle-management and weapon-control seeker that acquires a target and guides an interceptor to pass it at close proximity and destroy it in mid-ﬂight. The radar, which is operational in the so-called “red alert” Qassam warning system around the Gaza Strip, has proven its worth in deployments during the 2006 Lebanon rocket o ensive, when it was able to discriminate between rockets that were about to impact on critical urban targets and those heading for noncritical open-ﬁeld areas. This reduced the frequent, perturbing alerts to endangered population centers. This radar and more advanced options will also keep the cost discrepancy between the Qassams and sophisticated countermeasures within acceptable limits, as only life-threatening rockets will be intercepted and others, the statistical norm with unguided weapons, largely ignored. Do you regard a combination system employing a solidstate laser and Iron Dome as the preferred long-term solution for counter-RAM defense? I support going both ways, as these technologies will, when they mature, represent the ultimate solution to anti-rocket defense. However, when push comes to shove, it all boils down to money. Without adequate long-term funding priorities, which are imperative in e ective planning, these projects will not deploy in time. I JUNE 2008 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL 63 ISAAC BEN-ISRAEL Member of the Knesset; Professor at Cohn Institute, Tel Aviv University Age: 58 Birthplace: Tel Aviv Education: Studied mathematics, physics and philosophy at Tel Aviv University; received Ph.D. in 1988. Background: Joined Israeli air force in 1967 after high school; served until June 30, 2002; retired as major general. During military career he held posts in operations, intelligence and weapon development units; was head of military R&D in Israel Defense Forces and in ministry of defense. Elected to the Knesset in 2007; chairs home-front readiness committee, sits on foreign affairs and defense committee, science and technology committee, and subcommittee for intelligence and secret services; serves on the board of Israel Aerospace Industries; at Tel Aviv University he is also head of the Morris E. Curiel Center for International Studies and a member of the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies. Lives in Ramat Hasharon with his wife and three sons. was a technical demonstrator and not an operational system. And its ﬁrst-hit capability was still being developed. A few years ago, a joint Israel-U.S. mobile Tactical HighEnergy Laser was planned that might have resulted in a viable weapon system, if given adequate funding. But Israel and the U.S. lost interest when a temporary lull in the Hamas rocket campaign and other national priorities took precedence over anti-rocket defense. Northrop Grumman proposed a small, high-energy chemical laser called Sky Guard as a ground-based interceptor against rocket, artillery and mortar (RAM) threats. Soon after the Second Lebanon War [in 2006], when Israel was in turmoil over its inability to counter the Hezbollah rocket o ensive, Sky Guard o ered a solution to Israel’s defense community in its haste to ﬁeld a rapid response against the threat. After an in-depth examination, it was decided to wait until solid-state AviationWeek.com/dti http://AviationWeek.com/dti

Table of Contents Feed for the Digital Edition of Defense Technology International - June 2008

Defense Technology International - June 2008 Contents Around the World Science Watch Tech Watch Basic Black Self-Defense Fire-Resistant Perfezione Hyperspeed Trial Big Sky Cashing In Digital Links Hang Ten Sea Change Programs Update Two Steps Back Direct Hit Staying Power Potent Stinger Do No Harm Guard Duty The Net Cutting Edge First Person In Review Insight

Defense Technology International - June 2008

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