Defense Technology International - July 2007 - (Page 41)

WARFARE ASYMMETRIC NOAM ESHEL/DUI NO ROOM FOR MANEUVER Reliance on standoff ﬁrepower may have cost IDF victory in Lebanon DAVID ESHEL•TEL AVIV he indecisive end to last year’s Second Lebanon War is causing the Israel Defense Force to question changes to combat doctrine under its last two chiefs of staff, changes that placed a priority on precision standoff ﬁrepower over maneuver warfare, affecting force structure and operational concepts. Although commanders said they intended to maintain classic maneuver skills alongside standoff ﬁrepower, the balance has not prevailed. One year after the conﬂict erupted on July 12, 2006, debate continues over the effectiveness of Israel’s strategy and tactics, especially in light of the IDF’s embrace of standoff ﬁrepower. Many experts contend the IDF squandered an opportunity to destroy Hezbollah in southern Lebanon by sticking to a battle plan that relied too heavily on stand- Experts say greater use of off ﬁrepower. Findings from the Winograd ground-based maneuver tactics, Commission war report, released in April, such as these being practiced and from the government and parts of the by a Merkava tank crew, might military, have been critical of IDF operations. have destroyed Hezbollah Most observers say the war ended in a stale- in the Second Lebanon War. mate for Israel and did nothing to change the pre-war status quo. Some in government and speed communications systems integrated into broadband networks has revolutionthe military even view it as a defeat. The lessons of the Second Lebanon War, ized warfare and aided development of like those of the Six-Day War in 1967, will be standoff ﬁrepower. In the Second Lebanon analyzed by conventional militaries—and by War, however, the use of standoff ﬁrepower the non-state forces they increasingly face—as as the main tactic backﬁred, with serious commanders seek to determine how best to consequences for Israel and for regional meld advanced technology and conventional stability. The post-war IDF, under the new assets into an effective strategic package. leadership of Lt. Gen. Gaby Ashkenazi, is The IDF has adopted much of the Revolution in Military Affairs concept developed by U.S. planners, especially the notion of “decentralized warfare.” This concept, known in Israel as “dynamic molecules,” calls for saturation of the combat zone with small, highly mobile teams that gather intelligence, conduct reconnaissance and attack enemy positions. Teams can also direct standoff ﬁre and pilot unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The development of advanced Saturating a combat zone with mobile electronic sensors, long-range teams keeps an enemy engaged. precision weapons and highwww.aviationweek.com/dti T consequently restructuring and retraining itself in ways that favor equilibrium between standoff ﬁrepower operations (SFO) and classic warﬁghting capabilities. In a recent conference hosted by the Israel Air Force, under the auspices of the Fisher Brothers Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies in Herzelia, senior air and land forces ofﬁcers presented their views on SFO and maneuver warfare. Despite efforts by air force ofﬁcers to afﬁrm the value of standoff ﬁrepower as a dominant tactic, the practice was mostly a failure in Lebanon. Israel did not attain the declared objective of freeing its abducted soldiers or stopping Hezbollah’s Katyusha rocket offensive. The new concept of “diffused warfare” was not tested, nor was a classic ground offensive launched. Many experts contend that the only way to expel Hezbollah and keep it out of southern Lebanon would have been with a large-scale maneuver operation on the ground. Such an operation was, in fact, used in 1982 during the First Lebanon War to stop the Palestine Liberation Organization from ﬁring on northern Israel—an objective that was achieved within 48 hr. One notable conference critic of SFO as a key tactic was retired Maj. Gen. Yacob Amidror, former head of IDF military intelligence. “In asymmetric warfare as in classic combat operations, ﬁre is meant to support battleﬁeld maneuvers—a battleﬁeld cannot be secured by ﬁre alone,” he said. Nevertheless, there were successes with standoff firepower. During the ﬁrst few days of the war, the air force solved the problem that hampered U.S. pilots during Operation Desert Storm in 1991—locating and destroying mobile missile launchers. Unfortunately, in keeping with his air force background, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, then chief of staff, planned to conduct the entire campaign from the air. When Hezbollah kept firing short-range rockets into Israel, he had no ground plan to eliminate the threat. Although a strategic issue of ELBIT JULY/AUGUST 2007 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL 41 http://www.aviationweek.com/dti

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Defense Technology International - July 2007

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