Defense Technology International - July 2007 - (Page 42)

WARFARE ASYMMETRIC national priority—especially since Israel faces threats to its very existence—SFO was not debated by the Knesset or by the National Security Council prior to or during the war. This sparked public outrage and has provoked continuing political turmoil with release of the Winograd Commission report. SFO gained credibility with the IDF during the Intifada of 2000-06. As ﬁghting progressed and IDF land forces achieved only marginal success in operations against Palestinian terror groups, a tactical doctrine was devised in which the air force became more involved in the ﬁghting. Airborne standoff ﬁrepower eventually dominated the urban doctrine broke down. The ability to seize ground and destroy the enemy through maneuver operations and conventional ground forces was lacking. Less than one week after the initial standoff offensive against Hezbollah’s long- and medium-range rockets, the air force ran out of targets because land forces, which had been held back from contact, could not produce real-time combat intelligence on short-range rocket-launch sites. Firepower was wasted on marginal targets, which had no effect on the battle. Hezbollah launched rockets until the United Nations-brokered ceaseﬁre went into effect on Aug. 14. Hezbollah did not ﬁght like urban guerilNOAM ESHEL/DUI The layout of this Israeli digital army command post is similar to those from which operations were directed in Lebanon. battleﬁeld in Gaza, eliminating nearly 90% of the terrorist leadership and reducing the “kill chain” to 1 min. Halutz, as former air force commander and later chief of operations, was the main proponent of this new warfare. Under his leadership, ground forces became secondary in counter-terrorist ﬁghting, especially in the Gaza Strip. And because such operations resulted in signiﬁcantly fewer casualties among Israeli troops, SFO won over planners and politicians and raised national morale. Little wonder then that IDF leadership became enamored of the high-tech gadgetry that makes SFO effective. The prospect of using precision armaments, guided from long-range positions to attack and destroy an enemy, was seen as an overwhelming advantage by military decision-makers. With SFO there would be no need to plan complex ground operations or risk heavy casualties in direct-force confrontations. In July 2006, however, after a short opening phase that worked brilliantly, the SFO 42 las. Though a non-state force, it acquired a huge arsenal of rockets that were effective weapons of terror against Israel. It is ironic that IDF’s Northern Command planned a classic operation in which a large offensive would quickly gain the high ground over the strategic Litani River, north and south of which Hezbollah had deployed short-range rockets. Once the IDF controlled this area, it could neutralize the rocket arsenal with an acceptable casualty rate. By using the right mix of land and air standoff ﬁrepower and ground maneuver, combined with a massive insertion of special forces into the rear zone, some experts claim the war could have been won decisively. It’s worthwhile to note that when units operated under traditional combat doctrine, they attained objectives almost without casualties. For example, a battalion-sized team cut through the Wadi Saluki region of northern Israel and reached the fortiﬁed villages of Randouriyeh and Kantara, both on high ground overlooking the Litani Gorge, in less than 2 hr., forcing Hezbollah to ﬂee. The team was recalled, though, with devastating results. The next attack encountered a stronger enemy force equipped with the latest Kornet and Metis-M anti-tank guided missiles that wreaked havoc on IDF armor. (Both weapons were made by Russia and shipped to Syria, which presumably supplied them to Hezbollah.) In a recent postwar study, Ron Tira, a former air force intelligence ofﬁcer, aired his views on the limitations of SFO. So far, his analysis comes closer than any other to concluding that standoff ﬁrepower operations are inherently incapable of success, even on their own terms, and no amount of tweaking will make them strategically effective. Tira argues that the misconception shared by supporters and planners is that in the face of SFO, the enemy will maintain its force structure and capabilities. In reality, the enemy—especially an asymmetric force like Hezbollah—learns and adapts to circumstances, rebuilds its force, develops new abilities and tries to thwart its adversary’s plans. Moreover, the transition from a balanced force with varied capabilities to one that emphasizes standoff ﬁre makes it easy for an enemy to understand and deal with the relatively one-dimensional nature of SFO. If the enemy perceives that it is likely to face a system of sensors and attack by GPS-guided and electro-optic weaponry, it will develop relevant countermeasures. But if an enemy faces a diverse adversary with balanced capabilities, its response will have to be far more complex, if it can respond at all. SFO is a factor when regular armies confront each other. Massive standoff ﬁrepower with precision weapons can stop an armored offensive long before it threatens a defending force. In areas with electronic earlywarning stations like Mt. Hermon, near Israel’s border with Syria, aggressive moves taken by an enemy force would be detected well in advance of visual contact. It is under these conditions that standoff ﬁrepower is devastating. SFO, in fact, succeeded brilliantly during the ﬁrst stages of the U.S. military’s Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, when the bulk of Iraqi armor was destroyed long before the attacking coalition forces crossed far into Iraq. The lesson of the Second Lebanon War and other conﬂicts is that SFO is an effective tactic, not a guiding strategy. It is asymmetric in principle and capable of changing the dynamic of a confrontation with industrial armies or non-state forces. Yet it remains only one component of a military power mix and not the linchpin holding together all other operations. I Read Eshel’s posts on DTI’s weblog, Ares, updated daily: aresblog.net www.aviationweek.com/dti DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL JULY/AUGUST 2007 http://aresblog.net http://www.aviationweek.com/dti

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Defense Technology International - July 2007

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