Defense Technology International - November 2007 - (Page 16) DISPATCHES GLOBAL DEEP DENIAL S INTEGRATED CG SYSTEMS ficiencies that would shorten the vessel’s planned 30-year fatigue life and could even jeopardize crew safety. In April, Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen announced he would end Lockheed’s and Northrop’s shared “lead systems integrator” deal and stand up a new acquisitions directorate to handle the major contracting on Deepwater Coast Guard’s Deepwater program to try to reverse a long-term erosion is taking on water of the service’s oversight skills. The Matagorda’s problems were the major factor in Allen’s decision, and he downDAVID AXE•WASHINGTON played issues relating to the National Security Cutters. He said he loppy welds, a too-thin was confident that the cutters, as superstructure skin, overbig as some warships, would turn weight brackets and fastenout fine with the planned fixes. ers and improper engine mount“The Coast Guard and Inteings are some of the flaws in the grated Coast Guard Systems U.S. Coast Guard’s first-in-class [ Northrop-Lockheed team] had National Security Cutter Bertholf, different methods of measursays a former Northrop Gruming fatigue life of a ship,” Abby man contract shipwright. Martin C r u i kshank, who represents Shearington, who has worked on Deepwater, says. “Fatigue life is scores of vessels in his 40 years at the amount of time before you bevarious yards across the country, gin to see cracks in the hull that says Bertholf, launched in Septemrequire the ship to be taken out ber 2006, and her planned seven of service for repair. Some media sisters will not meet Coast Guard are portraying this as a potential performance goals. catastrophic failure. That mea“Those ships will never do what surement is an art and a science.” they were designed to do—they’re The large cutters’ fatigue-life issue, overweight,” Shearington says. she says, “has been muddied by the “There’s going to be a lot of vi123s,” including Matagorda. bration on the ships if they open But the 123s and large cutters up the engines to go fast. So they are not separate animals, DeKort put extra weight on fasteners and contends. He says Deepwater’s funbrackets because of that, but they damental problem is its dot-com-inwent overboard. When they throw spired “system of systems” concept. loose the mooring lines, the damn Widespread commonality in equipship might sink right there—that’s National Security Cutter Bertholf, ment and processes means that a an exaggeration. But the ship is the first-in-class ship, is experiencing flaw in a Deepwater subsystem will not going to last half as long as the a number of construction-related a ect all other subsystems. So, if Coast Guard expects because of the problems. the 123s have electronics faults, so sloppy workmanship,” he says. For those following the ups, downs, got involved and whistleblowers sur- will the National Security Cutters. The Coast Guard never publicly acand more downs, of the Coast Guard’s faced, alleging that the hull problems $25-billion Deepwater program, were only the tip of the iceberg. Deepwa- knowledged problems with the 123s’ launched in 2002, Shearington’s allega- ter’s ambitious electronics, supplied by electronics. DeKort’s allegations, though tions are no surprise. Deepwater aims to Lockheed Martin, were also flawed—at heavily documented, were overshadowed revamp the service’s ship, aircraft and least according to former Lockheed en- by Matagorda’s hull buckling. It took corelectronics inventory over the next 20 gineer Michael DeKort. He and others respondence from Coast Guard Director years. But it’s off to a poor start (DTI blame the Coast Guard and the indus- of Contracts Kevin O’Neill, leaked to DTI January/February, p. 26). In 2005, the try team for sloppy management, poor in August, to confirm that the 123s also Coast Guard’s 123-ft. cutter Matagorda workmanship and a corporate culture had “non-conforming topside equipment”—i.e., electronics. Perhaps most suffered hull buckling on its maiden that dodges accountability. Soon, it was revealed Deepwater’s next troubling, network gear failed to meet voyage following an $8-million overhaul at Halter-Bollinger JV shipyard, a major class of vessels, the 400-ft. Nation- the National Security Agency’s “TemNorthrop Grumman subcontractor in al Security Cutters, had structural prob- pest” standard for information security. Louisiana. Matagorda was the first of lems that require expensive post-com- In other words, a determined enemy eight 110-ft. cutters being stretched 13 missioning rework. Shearington’s gripes could “overhear” messages passed becorroborate—and add to—information tween the 123s and other ships. Since ft. and modernized under Deepwater. Inspections revealed that all eight leaked to The New York Times last year. the National Security Cutters use much rebuilt cutters had hull problems. The A 2004 memo from Assistant Comman- of the same Tempest gear, they too will shipyard denied the charge. Congress dant Erroll Brown detailed structural de- be vulnerable, DeKort says. DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL NOVEMBER 2007 www.aviationweek.com/dti 16 http://www.aviationweek.com/dti
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