Defense Technology International - December 2007 - (Page 21)

TECH SUPPORT Rand Corp. study ﬁnds technology is more effective than force size PAUL McLEARY•NEW YORK ommanders directing stability and counterinsurgency operations in hostile territory sometimes face a di cult choice: Should they take more troops and more money to parcel out to locals for reconstruction, or take fewer troops and less cash, but a vastly superior communications network, giving platoon- and company-level units better real-time intelligence and the ability to change plans on-the-ﬂy? It seems to be a classic choice, and C gathering technology deployed with them, and how network-centric operations were used to conduct stability and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Neither technology nor force alone tipped the battleﬁeld too far in one direction, the study ﬁnds. “Command leadership, training and [tactics, techniques and procedures, or TTPs] . . . are just as important as networking technologies in improving mission e ectiveness,” it notes. However, the fact that the 101st AirU.S. ARMY Troops of the 101st Airborne at Saddam Hussein’s northern palace in 2003. A Rand study claims a lack of high-tech communications affected the division’s operations in northern Iraq. one the Pentagon wants to have both ways, pouring billions of dollars into networked technology programs, while at the same time increasing the size of the Army and Marine Corps in the next several years. The debate over the importance of force size versus technology has been playing out on a daily basis since the ﬁrst U.S. sorties ﬂew over Afghanistan in 2001. Now it’s the subject of a Rand Corp. study put out by the O ce of Force Transformation. The study, “Networked Forces in Stability Operations: 101st Airborne Division, 3/2 and 1/25 Stryker Brigades in Northern Iraq,” follows the performance of the three units in 2003-05 through the prism of the communication and intelligencewww.aviationweek.com/dti borne—the first to take responsibility for an area it and the two Stryker units would eventually hand o to one another—relied primarily on analog radios and voice-only, line-of-sight communications equipment at the tactical level, led to a much lower degree of situational awareness than the two Stryker Brigade combat teams (SBCTs) had. Though the 101st possessed some FBCB2 (Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below)-Blue Force Tracking systems, it had “very limited real-time information on units below battalion level [and] limited information on enemy forces and the civilian population.” To make up for this, the 101st had much more in the way of resources than the two SBCTs, including $31 million in reconstruction money. Still, in COIN operations, information on the local population is priceless, and the 101st had little. The SBCTs were able to leverage the better information technologies they had to achieve successes on the ground that the 101st couldn’t. The 3/2 SBCT, which came to Iraq with more FBCB2 systems, found that the devices’ “capability to receive and display digital orders, [high-value target] locations and graphics on the move . . . signiﬁcantly improve[d] . . . op tempo and agility,” according to the study. “Digital orders, precise target coordinates and graphics reduced the time for planning and brieﬁng cycles . . . . [The] ability to receive this information in the ﬁeld and on the move further accelerated the dissemination of intelligence and command information.” What’s more, the wide dissemination of the FBCB2 system allowed companylevel units access to geospatial maps and overlays like movement routes, information about infrastructure locations and areas of recent insurgent activity. This platoon-level digitization permitted units to synchronize movements with other units on-the-fly, disrupting the enemy’s rhythm. In the end, of course, technology is only as good as the people who operate it. The 1/25 SBCT ended up having the most success not only due to the satellite and communications improvements with which it deployed, but because its soldiers—unlike those in the 101st or the 3/2—had received training in stability operations. While both SBCTs were able to strike hard and fast due to coordination between units and real-time intelligence gathered through satellite and digital networking capabilities, the 3/2’s use of sweeps were at times counterproductive to the often delicate work of COIN, the Rand authors point out. But this is a risk an army has to assume when deploying units with realtime communication networks that let officers and NCOs coordinate operations without going through the chain of command. The upshot of all this is that in waging counterinsurgency and stability operations, improved communication and intelligence-disseminating technologies go hand-in-hand with training soldiers in what to do with this information. But ﬁrst the technology has to be available. I Read McCleary’s posts on DTI’s weblog, Ares, updated daily: AviationWeek.com/ares 21 DECEMBER 2007 DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL http://AviationWeek.com/ares http://www.aviationweek.com/dti

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Defense Technology International - December 2007 Contents Around the World Science Watch Tech Watch BrahMos: Ramjet Ship Killer r-e-s-p-e-c-t Deja Vu Trump Card Dubai Demos Agile Helos Joint Force Online Charge UGVs Creep, Crawl to Victory Sweet Ride Fast, Lethal Ship Defense Networking Stealth: Why Raptors Can't Talk The Net Cutting Edge First Person In Review Insight

Defense Technology International - December 2007

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