Embedded Systems Design Europe - October 2007 - (Page 16)

cover feature • Capable of in-depth analysis and design of sophisticated attacks. • May recruit Class II knowledgeable insiders as part of the attack team. From a software perspective, the certiﬁcation process will evaluate the application programming interface (API) and run a series of tests to assure that the algorithms function correctly and can successfully trap API errors, buffer overruns, and other common software vulnerabilities. However, for any security solution to be effective, some thought must be placed into the area of physical tamper protection. Even the most sophisticated secure microprocessors, FPGAs, Smart Cards, and other security components, still remain vulnerable to certain attack scenarios. This leads to the requirement of maintaining a suitable portion of active circuitry, which remains alive during system down time to sense a potential attempt to extract or steal sensitive information or IP. To accomplish this, such devices must use extremely low power and housed in a tamper reactive package along with suitable interfaces to various sensors used for creating this security fence around circuitry containing sensitive content. It’s important to realize that the strength of an encryption algorithm is no longer the target of an attack, as it’s Common certifications NIST FIPS 140.2 Levels 1–4 • • • • • CSEG ITSEC E1-E6 Common Criteria EAL-1 - EAL-7 EMV 4.1 Levels 1–2 ( Primarily Used In Banking / POS ) ZKA (primarily used in banking /POS) PCI PED ( Primarily Used In Banking / POS PIN Entry ) easier and more beneﬁcial to simply devise clever ways to steal the keys. Hence an increasing amount of attention is being placed on physical hardware protection requirements. As a minimum, a system designer seeking to achieve certiﬁcation should be able to describe the threat protection associated with at least a baseline of common attack scenarios. These include physical attacks (package intrusion, cutting, etching, and ion or laser drilling); reverse engineering; and gaining access to memory. Noninvasive attacks include ionizing radiation and thermal/cryogenic; induced voltage ﬂuctuations and clock disturbance; and differential power analysis. See Table 1 for more speciﬁc certiﬁcations. Let’s now look at some speciﬁc standards bodies and their associated security levels. FIPS-140-2 deﬁnes four levels of security assurance, from lowest to highest, with each building on the previous one. Level 1 means the product properly implements the NIST standardized cryptographic algorithms, including DES (Data Encryption Standard), 3DES (Triple DES), and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). Level 2 means the product has tamper-evident coatings to ensure that any corruption of the device would be noticeable. Level 3 is for cryptographic modules that delete stored keys if they Industry moving towards “Common Criteria” unification • • • • • • • • • Various Protection Profiles, Security Targets & Schemes can exist UK EN45011:1998 ISO-15408 Trusted Computer Group is providing additional protection profiles IBM Trusted Mobile Platform Security ECMA 340 NFC IP1 ECMA 340 NFC IP2 ISO IEC 18092 ISO 7816 detect a physical attack on, say, circuit components. At Level 3, the product must require authenticated access. And Level 4 requires that a product provide protection from attacks that attempt to thwart physical access controls, such as super-cooling. Most security products receive FIPS-140-2 Level 2 or Level 3 certiﬁcation, which is sufﬁcient if augmented by Level 4 physical security if the modules aren’t contained in a controlled environment. Common Criteria (CC) uses a scale called Evaluated Assurance Level (EAL). This is an assessment that says the product meets the functional requirements stated in the Security Target and Protection Proﬁle documents. These documents are prepared by the vendor and evaluated by the CC evaluator. EAL levels range from EAL1 to EAL7. EAL1 means that a product meets basic requirements. And EAL7 means that a product meets requirements for exceptionally secure environments. Most products receive CC certiﬁcation of EAL4 and below. EAL5, 6, and 7 certiﬁcations are extremely stringent. Here, the CC evaluates the development process and theoretical framework and functional tests are performed. It should be noted that a CC EAL rating is meaningless without ﬁrst evaluating the speciﬁc Security Target and Protection Proﬁle documentation under which the equipment was certiﬁed. These documents are generated by the manufacturer of the equipment being submitted and should be carefully scrutinized if deviation exists from well-known security targets. Generally, aspects of active physical security, tamper protection, and response mechanisms are weakly deﬁned. Presently FIPS 140.2 Level 3 and 4 Physical Security are more widely recognized as providing a clearer deﬁnition of speciﬁc requirements regarding the protection of secrets. R.M. Backus (bob.backus@dalsemi. com) is a product deﬁner for Maxim Integrated Products. Table 1 16 OCTOBER 2007 | embedded systems design europe | www.embedded.com/europe 012-013-014-016_ESDE.indd 16 9/10/07 13:03:33 http://www.embedded.com/europe

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Embedded Systems Design Europe - October 2007 Contents Linux Set to Dominate Torvalds Updates Linux Kernel ARM Establishes Smart Card Foundry Program Emerson Buys Motorola's Embedded Comms Group LynuxWroks and TTTech to Cooperate on Avionics MontaVista CEO Looks for Acquisitions in Europe Ready: Multiprocessing Technology Provides Opportunity Automotive to Drive MCU Market New Supporters Join COM Express Group Analyst Weighs TI Versus Xilinx Versus PicoChip Cover Feature: Embedded Systems Security Has Moved to the Forefront Trace Exposes the Toughest Real-Time Bugs Employ a Secure Flavor of Linux Use an MCU's Low-Power Modes in Foreground/Background Systems Transporting Video Over Wireless Networks New Products Advertising Contacts

Embedded Systems Design Europe - October 2007

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