Theatre Design & Technology - Feb 1972 - 9

bringing out all the performers who would otherwise have been trapped in their dressing rooms
several stories above the stage. On its last trip,
the lift was actually on fire. 27
Smoke vents, of the kind Steele MacKaye had
recommended, properly installed, and functioning
according to design, might well have reduced the
loss of life at the Iroquois fire. Chicago ordinances
of March 28, 1898, in effect at the time of the
Iroquois disaster, required an automatic sprinkler
system over the stage, smoke vents of onethirtieth the total area of the stage, portable fire
extinguishers or hand pumps, as well as axes and
fire hooks in the fly galleries and rigging lofts.28 In
1903, not one theatre in ten was equipped with
smoke vents. The Iroquois vents, in fact, were only
partly finished at the time of the fire, and all of
them had been battened down to prevent melting
snow from leaking into the theatre. Smoke vents
at the Iroquois could not possibly have been made
to operate when they were needed. In contrast,
vents were open in the auditorium, causing a flow
of air which pulled smoke and flames from the
stage into the house. 29
The verdict of the coroner's inquest into the
Iroquois fire said in part:
City laws were not complied with relating to building ordinances. regulating fire alarm boxes. fire
apparatus. dampers or flues on and over the stage
and fly galleries. We also find a distinct violation of
ordinance governing fireproofing of scenery and all
woodwork on or about the stage. Asbestos curtain
totally destroyed. wholly inadequate considering the
highly inflammable nature of all stage fittings. and
owing to the fact that the same was hung on
wooden battens. 30

Architect Louis Guenzel wrote a careful account
of the Iroquois fire at the request of his friend Dr.
Walter Wever, the German Consul in Chicago.
Kaiser Willhelm II was especially concerned for
the safety of Berlin theatres and had ordered inquiries by the German government into the Iroquois disaster. Many years later, Guenzel had his
account translated and published in English. The
report gave details of the theatre as it was just before and just after the fire. Considerable attention
was given to the asbestos fire curtain, only a few
shreds of which could be found in the wreckage. 31
The general public had been encouraged to put
great faith in that curtain.
Asbestos cloth, as a matter of fact, is only a
moderately effective shield against heat or flame.
This was most sensationally demonstrated at the
burning of the Iroquois Theatre. Failure of the asbestos cloth curtain at the Iroquois indicated that

THEATER DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGY

FEBRUARY, 1972

the material weakened so rapidly under the heat of
an ordinary fire that a curtain made of asbestos
cloth alone could not be considered a reliable
screen for the proscenium opening of a theatre.
After even a brief exposure to heat, the asbestos
was so weakened that it cou Id be torn easily by
falling objects or by a strong draft of air. More
specifically, "the asbestos cord was affected by
heat very much as the canvas was, and lost nearly
all of its strength after a brief exposure to dull
red heat, or even to heat a little below." Asbestos
begins to glow dull red at about 1,1 OO°F. A stage
packed full of burning scenery can be expected to
reach a temperature of about 1,472 ° F. Fused
glass in the skylights at the Iroquois indicated that
temperatures of about 1,650°F. had been reached
there. 32
The immediate result of the Iroquois disaster was
a general tighteni ng of enforcement of fire regulations all over the United States. Little was added
to the fire-safety ordinances in most cases. The
laws were adequate; they needed only to be put
to work. In Chicago, in at least one instance, the
shift was toward a less stringent law:
The Chicago Building Law required automatic
sprinklers over the stage; until after the Iroquois.
no one had ever been put in. Then. in an effort to
perfect the enforcement of the law. they cut out its
requirement for sprinklers over the stage-"33

The Iroquois fire provided a prime example of
the fleeting public interest in theatre disasters.
One has only to read through the newspaper accounts of the fire to realize that general concern
had fallen off to a great extent after a month and
had disappeared almost entirely six weeks after
the event. Newspapers played the Iroquois story
mainly for its sensational value: facts were handled
with a minimum of regard for accuracy. It is hardly
to be expected that any lasting progress in the
establishment of safety precautions in theatres
should come from such a welter, and in fact, none
did. The Chicago Code of 1911 no longer required automatic sprinklers over the stage, although they continued to be called for in paint
rooms, property storage, etc. The required area of
the smoke vent, on the other hand, had been increased to one-twenti eth of the tota I area of the
stage. 34
On March 4, 1904, indictments were brought
against Wi II J. Davis, former manager of the Iroquois Theatre; William Laughlin, Deputy Building
Inspector of Chicago; and George Williams, City
Building Commissioner. Davis was charged with involuntary manslaughter, and the others with neglect of duty. 35

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