Louisiana Cultural Vistas - Fall 2007 - (Page 63)

HISTORIC NEW ORLEANS COLLECTION headed the Northern Democrat ticket. The state ballots were not uniform. None of the states that eventually formed the Confederacy allowed Abraham Lincoln on the ballot, with the sole exception of Virginia. Texas combined the votes for the Constitutional Union Party with those of the Northern Democrats. The four socalled “border” slave states — Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri — each allowed Lincoln on the ballot, but he did not perform well in any of them. South Carolina refused to even hold the election, telegraphing its intention to withdraw from the Union if Lincoln won. As Election Day approached, the three factions in Louisiana flirting with secession vigorously jockeyed for position. If Breckinridge won with a mandate, secession was almost assured. When the final vote tallies in Louisiana were released, Abraham Lincoln posted no votes since he was not on the ballot. Stephen Douglas garnered 7,625 votes or 15.1 percent of total votes cast, John Breckinridge posted 22,681 votes or 44.9 percent of total votes cast, and John Bell received 20,204 votes or 40 percent of total votes cast. It appeared that compromise and negotiation, and perhaps cooler heads, might prevail. They did, but not for long. Thomas Overton Moore, Louisiana’s popular governor had been a voice of reason and compromise, even stating prior Editorial cartoons of the pre-Civil War era depicted growing Southern solidarity for secession. to the election that he would not recommend secession. Shortly after Lincoln’s election, Moore flipped his position at the urging of his mentor, John Slidell. He aligned with the Secessionists and began a different tactic that eventually ended in a referendum to be held shortly after the New Year. The South was abuzz with the promises of independence from the fireeaters, and no one really believed there would be a protracted war over Southern secession. Those that spoke of it, both the North and South, believed it would be a short affair. No one foresaw the horrors to come. The pro-secession press throughout the South was the most vociferous. Sermons from the pulpits in the region preached states rights and the Biblical authority of slavery. Even so, the combined strengths of the Cooperationists and the Conditional A panoramic view printed in Harper’s Weekly in 1861 includes the gothic state capitol rising above the Mississippi River. Unionists should have defeated the Radical Secessionists. On November 19, 1860, Moore called for a special session of the legislature to consider the state’s options. When the legislature convened at the capitol in Baton Rouge on December 10, Moore told the assembly that he believed that it would be impossible for Louisiana to remain under the government of a “Black Republican President.” The legislature was in no mood for appeasement at that point and wanted, at the very least, a formal vote to be held. Moore gave them the chance. The governor and the legislature then cooperated in a rapid series of procedural elements that set the stage Fall 2007/LOUISIANA ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES 63

Table of Contents Feed for the Digital Edition of Louisiana Cultural Vistas - Fall 2007

Contents Friends & Letters Editor’s Column Louisiana Endowment for the Humanities Big Charity: A History of New Orleans’ Public Hospital Historic New Orleans Collection Making Groceries: A History of New Orleans Markets New Orleans’ Faubourg Tremé: Rooted in Tradition Jazz Notes Louisiana Association of Museums Chinatown New Orleans Louisiana Foodways A Question of Secession Louisiana Architecture Louisiana State Museum The Unnatural History of Cypress Parish Terra Incognita Bookstand Sound Advice Forum

Louisiana Cultural Vistas - Fall 2007

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