Military Officer - April 2008 - (Page 56) in July. I From his headquarters in Baghdad, Iraq, Petraeus in January shared his views on the surge with Tom Philpott, a contributing editor to Military Officer. This interview has been edited for length and, in some cases, clarity. What percentage of the fight now is against al-Qaida versus Sunni insurgents versus Shiite militants? Al-Qaida in Iraq is the most significant enemy of progress in new Iraq. Its members carry out the most horrific attacks, cause the most casualties, damage infrastructure, and aim to reignite the horrific sectarian violence that wracked this country in fall 2006 and into 2007. Although we have done substantial damage to al-Qaida in Iraq in the past year, it remains a very serious threat. It adapts its tactics and reacts to what we do. We are pursuing al-Qaida tenaciously in a way we have not before. There are still safe havens and strongholds to be cleared in the Tigris River Valley and into the city of Mosul. An impressive statistic is a 60percent decline in attacks against coalition and Iraqi Security forces since the surge began. Is that the result of changed attitudes among Shiite militia and Sunni insurgents, or is that your effectiveness against al-Qaida? There are a number of factors. Anbar province has gone from the most dangerous place in Iraq to one of the [most] peaceful, with just a handful of attacks on any given day and few of them resulting in casualties. Attacks in Baghdad and its surrounding belts have been reduced substantially. Attacks by Shi’a militia and extremists are down. But most attacks have shifted more to Multi-National Division — North and are by al-Qaida in Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr imposed 56 MILITARY OFFICER APRIL 2008 to be police. In Baghdad alone, 9,000 have gotten on Ministry of Interior rolls, and 1,700 have completed training and are on the streets. In Anbar, 20,000 more have joined. Even as attacks have declined, we hear of deepening sectarian divisions in Iraq society. Sunnis manning the SOIs, Shi’a-dominant Army patrols Of 80,000 SOIs, more than 15,000 are Shi’a. As in any country, local police will be [made up] of the local population. Where we had al-Qaida, generally, were in Sunni Arab areas, so most SOIs will be Sunni. Iraq has a history of Sunni and Shi’a living together, even intermarrying, [and] Kurds as well. The social fabric also includes Turkmen, Yazidis, Shiite Arabs, Sunni Kurds, [and] Christians. The sectarian violence was something relatively new. That gives some hope that this social fabric torn by the sectarian violence can be stitched back together over time. Has the decline in deaths in Iraq from June 2007 through the fall leveled off, or do you continue to see a drop month after month? It was roughly the same — with ups and downs — from October on. If we could reduce the handful of car bombs and suicide vest attacks, this would become close to a sustainable level of violence. Of course, we would like to drive it down further from the current daily average of about 45 attacks a day. A third to a quarter result in casualties. Is the Iraqi government taking advantage of this decline in violence by making the kind of political progress the surge was intended to allow? No Iraqi leader would say he or she is satisfied with progress in the political arena. But the Council of Representatives has reformed the a ceasefire on his militia forces to help rehabilitate their image, which was tarnished seriously by violence in the holy city of Karbala last fall. Militia elements also were linked to assassination of two governors and two police chiefs in provinces south of Baghdad. If your movement is founded on the idea of serving the Iraqi people, then you cannot be seen as supporting violence against them — or Iraqi leaders. Some militias, so-called Special Group elements, are more beholden to the Iranian Quds Force than to Muqtada al-Sadr. The Quds Force has trained, funded, and equipped them, including with the very lethal explosively formed projectiles. You still need U.S. forces, obviously, in Baghdad and its belts. So do you have enough forces to address violence elsewhere? We constantly are adjusting what we have and where [we have it] in response to the enemy, without jeopardizing gains made in Baghdad, the belts around Baghdad, Anbar province, and other areas. There was an Iraqi surge, too, of more than 100,000 additional police and soldiers in 2007. The Sons of Iraq (SOIs) in Sunni areas added another 80,000. These essentially are neighborhood watch groups we contract to help maintain security in areas we have cleared where there are no Iraqi security forces. Iraqis are training soldiers and police to replace these local citizens eventually. Many, perhaps 25 percent, will transition
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