Military Officer - August 2008 - (Page 53)

“The enemy is not going to change its designs. … This has global implications. We’re seeing the shifting of some cultural tectonic plates.” as a joint activity of [DoD]. It must interface with Ofﬁce of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, Northern Command, and the regional combatant commanders around the world. It doesn’t undermine our requirements to train, organize, and equip the Army Guard and Air Guard, but it does address other missions there wasn’t visibility on. The Army and Air Force aren’t interested in those missions, [so they] didn’t apply resources to it. So the change gives the National Guard Bureau legitimacy for joint programs beyond those two services. How does this impact your role? It complicates it. I now not only have a relationship with the chiefs of staff and service secretaries of the Army and Air Force but also with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the secretary of defense. But it helps us be understood. It recognizes the new reality of what the Guard is required to do in peace and war. It recognizes our joint contribution to all the combatant commanders around the world as opposed to just training, organizing, and equipping for the Army and Air Force. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, chaired by Arnold Punaro, concluded that reserve components have become everyday operational forces. No question. But the commission noted it happened with no debate in Congress or at the Pentagon. Therefore, it lacks the structure and compensation system it needs to thrive. It was a transformation born of operational necessity. It was not a conscious decision or a road-mapped plan. You cannot have the Army or Air Force without the Guard. That has been recognized. Now we’re running to catch up with policy, law, regulation, resources, equipping strategies, beneﬁts, and entitlements. All of those things were built in 1947 and have to be revisited. I don’t agree with everything in the Punaro report. But everybody agrees with most of it. They have identiﬁed symptoms of problems. How to treat those problems is worthy of serious dialogue and debate. Some of the most dramatic recommendations by the commission focus on compensation — for example, changes to retirement and drill pay. Do you embrace what the commission recommends to modernize reserve compensation? I wouldn’t give a blanket endorsement, but in general, yes. They have deﬁned the right direction we ought to be going in, for the Guard and the ﬁve other reserve components. Because the Guard and Reserve [are used] more and more, there must be some signiﬁcant modiﬁcations to compensation. Operational tempo is very high, and this conﬂict [against terrorism] will last a generation. The enemy is not going to change its designs, which are far bigger than in Iraq. This has global implications. We’re seeing the shifting of some cultural tectonic plates. We cannot ignore it. Is there one lesson from the Punaro report military and defense leaders must learn? Yeah, it’s the absolute compelling and overwhelming cost-effectiveness of Guard and Reserve capability. This nation gets a world-class, ’round-the-clock response capability — land, air, and maritime forces — at a fraction of what it would cost to maintain that on active duty. That’s a fundamental truth revealed in the report, and [one that is] extremely important to future defense secretaries and service chiefs. To be able to afford modernizing the force, they have to optimize human resources. The most economical way to do that is to leverage the capability of the citizen-soldier. What the commission put together directs decision-makers to those policies, laws, and strategies needed for increased reliance on the Guard and Reserve. They make a strong argument for increasing the size of those forces, too, to deliver capability cheaper for the American people. Also, reserve components bring to a ﬁght a dimension that nobody else can: When you call out the Guard and Reserve, you call out America. That is immensely powerful. Assuming your vision for a larger Guard is accepted, do you have the compensation incentives you need to support an expanded force taking on more operational missions? We don’t have all the tools we need. The commission points that out very clearly. AUGUST 2008 MILITARY OFFICER 53

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Military Officer - August 2008 Contents MOAA Online From the Editor From the President Your Views MOAA Directory Rapid Fire Washington Scene Chapters in Action Financial Forum Ask the Doctor MOAA Member Services Cover Story: A Stronger Voice Virtual Combat Mental Floss Steady as She Goes Pages of History Faces of MOAA Member Books Information Exchange Advertising Index MOAA Calendar Sounding Taps MOAA Scholarship Donors Encore

Military Officer - August 2008

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