Military Officer - October 2006 - (Page 58) The challenge for the U.S., then, is to encourage China to cooperate in areas where the two states have common security interests. … into the global economy to ensure it remains a member in good standing of the international community. The truth probably lies somewhere between these poles. China does not represent the type of threat posed by the Soviet Union. Unlike Soviet Russia, China is not wedded to an aggressive, expansionist ideology. Whereas the U.S. had no significant commercial relationship with the Soviet Union, it has an enormous economic relationship (and trade deficit) with China. Moreover, both the U.S. and China could have important common security interests in the area of limiting the proliferation of WMDs and combating radical Muslims. Should this prove to be the case, an appropriate analogy would be the alliance formed by Great Britain and the Soviet Union in the wake of Germany’s June 1941 invasion of the USSR. Britain, which had been at war with Germany for two years already, quickly embraced Stalinist Russia as an ally, despite many mutual antagonisms. On the other hand, China could emerge as a major threat to U.S. security in the manner of Germany against 58 MILITARY OFFICER OCTOBER 2006 Britain a century ago. Like Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, China is a rapidly rising power. Also, China is beset by questions of political legitimacy; growing ecological problems; an economy that has enjoyed remarkable growth, but which might be entering a more mature period characterized by slower growth; potentially serious demographic problems that could induce societal instability; a rapidly growing dependence on foreign energy supplies; and outstanding security issues in the form of Taiwan, the Spratley Islands, Tibet, and perhaps portions of the Russian Far East. This could lead to friction between the U.S. and Chinese governments. China presents problems for U.S. forces that are different from those posed by America’s adversaries in other post-Cold War conflicts. For instance, the scale of military effort China can generate far exceeds that of any rogue state. China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities are the most mature of any potential U.S. rival. China’s enormous size (it is the world’s fourth-largest country in area) also gives it great strategic depth — a problem American defense planners have not had to address since the Cold War. There is evidence that China seeks to displace the U.S. as the principal military power in East Asia and establish itself as the region’s hegemonic power. If this were to occur naturally from the evolution of Chinese economic power and a corresponding increase in influence, the U.S. probably would accept such an outcome. However, if Chinese preeminence were achieved through coercion or aggression, this would serve neither U.S. interests in the region nor the stability of the international system and rule of law. The challenge for the U.S., then, is to encourage China to cooperate in areas where the two states have common security interests and to convince the authorities in Beijing that the resolution of its outstanding geopolitical issues should be accomplished within accepted international legal norms. This means creating and maintaining a military balance in East Asia that is favorable to the U.S. and its allies against those kinds of contingencies that might tempt Chinese efforts at coercion or aggression. Because, for a variety of reasons, China is unlikely to challenge the U.S. military symmetrically, the Pentagon’s challenge is to adapt its forces to confront more novel forms of Chinese military power. [Part Two, focusing on DoD’s response to the threats outlined here, will appear in December’s Military Officer.] MO Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. is executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, an independent policy research institute in Washington, D.C., and has served as a member of DoD’s National Defense Panel. Krepinevich is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., and holds MPA and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
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