Military Officer - November 2006 - (Page 57)

Q&A do that. We’re probably three to four years away from executing the ARFORGEN model with the one-in-ﬁve predictability we need. What percentage of the Army Reserve is being restructured? My rough guess is 15 percent. The Army Reserve of old was a strategic force. All we asked was one weekend a month, two weeks in the summer. Today we’re an operational force, part of the active Army on a daily basis. I keep 20,000 to 25,000 soldiers forward-deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq. I keep 10,000 soldiers mobilized in the U.S. I’ve got 10,000 soldiers providing drill sergeants for training centers at places like Fort Jackson [S.C.] and Fort Leonard Wood [Mo.]. They provide the training support structure for training units getting ready to mobilize at Fort Hood [Texas], Fort Dix [N.J.], and Fort McCoy [Wis.]. I’ve got doctors and nurses in U.S. hospitals backﬁlling active duty forces, treating the wounded coming back. I’ve got forces running garrison operations at installations with mobilization centers — Fort Bliss [Texas], Fort Carson [Colo.], Fort Hood, and Fort McCoy. So I’ve got a huge commitment in the States as well as overseas. To maintain that and build this ARFORGEN cycle, we’ve got to get this rebalancing right. What are some of your other priorities? First is taking care of soldiers. Our key to success is going to be manning this all-volunteer force. I’ll put it in a simplistic, P&G value equation. If I ask you to buy a box of Tide instead of Cheer, you will ask what does it cost me and what do I get for it. You might say this one costs more, but I get a better smell in my clothes. A soldier asks what does it cost me to be in the Army Reserve and what LT. G EN . JAC K C . ST ULTZ , U SA R do I get for it. We used to say it cost a weekend a month and two weeks in the summer. We changed the equation. We’re asking more of the soldier. We have to be sure we provide more back to him [to] improve his quality of life and take care of his family. What “The biggest change is our role of trying to stand up the Iraqi Army, its police, and [its] border police.” do we give the soldier to balance out that new equation? We are providing some things like tuition assistance, TRICARE [Reserve] Select beneﬁts, and GI Bill-type entitlements. While you were leading forces in Kuwait and through the invasion of Iraq, the Army Reserve had mobilization challenges. From your perspective then, what were they, and how would you characterize them today? [They have] improved immensely. The challenges were in dealing with a strategic reserve that we suddenly were turning into an operational force. We were — and still are to a certain extent — dealing with policies and procedures designed for a strategic reserve. The best example is TRICARE and the list of doctors that reserve families had to choose from. Around an active duty installation are a lot of doctors who support the military family. In rural Alabama, however, there were not a lot of TRICARE doctors, because there never needed to be. A lot of lessons were learned. TRICARE streamlined the process, and now we can get a doctor on the system very quickly. Another challenge was, we changed the way we moved forces forward. For a strategic conﬂict, we had a time-phased force deployment. When we got ready for Operation Iraqi Freedom, we went to a requestfor-forces process. We identiﬁed capabilities needed, then outsourced that from the Army Reserve and National Guard, calling all forces up at one time. It put a strain on mobilization centers. We had a lot of soldiers waiting for medical clearances. In the meantime, we went ahead and prosecuted the war. Then, with soldiers still in the pipeline, we said, “OK, we don’t need this capability anymore,” and turned it off. Well, that creates problems. To [a] soldier in a chemical company who left his family, left his employer, and is sitting in a mobilization station, we said, “We don’t need you to come over now.” It has a huge impact on morale. We sent soldiers back home. A year later we said, “Well, maybe we still do need [you] in a different capacity.” So we go back to the soldier and say, “Come forward again.” That created issues and turmoil with that whole predictability model. The support structure out there today is a lot more responsive. A lot of reservists have been called. The challenge is those earlier callups. Consider a 200-man unit in South Carolina. Within that unit I’ve got maybe 100 soldiers available for mobilization, because they weren’t mobilized previously. I’ve got 50 soldiers volunteering to go back a second time. [CONTINUES ON PAGE 82] NOVEMBER 2006 MILITARY OFFICER 57

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Military Officer - November 2006

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