Military Officer - December 2007 - (Page 56) An unmanned ground vehicle climbs a rock wall. and we took some tough cuts, as I’ve explained. But further cuts would force us to sacrifice capability. We’ve looked at capabilities we might have to cut, and we can see down the road we’d rue the day we made those cuts. What other financial challenges have you faced that could have affected modernization? We went to Congress and explained that our stuff coming back from combat is just worn out. Systems, vehicles were showing a year’s worth of wear for every month in theater. We triage in theater, and then once units return, we have been running 20 brigades a year through the Army Materiel Command’s repair facilities. But we give this equipment new and improved capabilities — better sights and armor, for example. This “reset” phase costs $13 billion to $14 billion a year. Congress has understood the need and has given us the funds we’ve requested to accomplish this. What happens to your modernization plan when you are thrown a curve ball, such as an unanticipated expense like MRAP? Actually, we’ve been using MRAP for three years for special needs, engineers, and explosive ordnance disposal. Destroying IEDs is a prime example of what we’ve been using MRAP for. It has been a part of our strategy. But what you’re seeing is an evolution of the battlefield. We will take this specialized vehicle and put our soldiers in it to help protect them Two soldiers with an explosive ordnance disposal team prepare to detonate an explosive. Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker. Four years ago he decided to proceed with the Army’s transformation to a modular force as we were fighting the war. The first to go was the 3rd Infantry Division. As units returned from Iraq and changed their formation, we started bringing in the new equipment that makes the modular formation more effective, and we have continued to spiral in new equipment. I marvel at this ability to change an organization while in the crucible of war. FCS has been hit by some pretty significant cuts. How have they affected modernization efforts? We have a number of systems, and we have had to look at them over the past year in view of the fiscal landscape. We made some difficult decisions. For example, we said we could get by with fewer UAVs. We could do that because we are getting more out of the UAV than we originally thought we 56 MILITARY OFFICER DECEMBER 2007 could. We also looked at redundancy with unmanned ground vehicles — big and small. We had a legitimate need for both, but we said, “Let’s keep the smaller one.” These unmanned systems see the bad guys before our soldiers do. Inherent to FCS, we don’t want the soldier to be the bullet catcher. With the smaller vehicle we were able to preserve the basic idea of robotics. All in all, yes, we compromised, but we preserved the essence of FCS. What if Congress asked you to cut again? What if you don’t receive the funding you have requested for the program? If the Army were asked to make further cuts in FCS, it would amount to being asked to make potentially serious cuts that will go right into system design and the network. This would cause concern. But what works in our favor, I think, is we’re honest. We understood the fiscal picture, PHOTOS: LEFT, KIM KOMENICH/SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE/CORBIS; RIGHT, STEVE HARDING/US ARMY
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