NFPA Journal - September/October 2012 - (Page 55)

nvestigators at the scene the day 4I after the Comayagua prison fire. An NFPA code analysis of the Comayagua prison NFPA codes apply the total-concept approach to life safety, complete with a defendin-place strategy, for all detention and correctional facilities. As the Comayagua fire illustrated, people in the prison are incapable of self-preservation because of security restrictions. The facility in Comayagua, therefore, would be classified by NFPA as a Use Condition V–Contained (NFPA 101: 23.1.4.1.5), where free movement was restricted from the modules and staff controlled the manual release of each door. An existing correctional facility such as the one in Comayagua, with Type II (000) construction, would require some of the following life safety and fire protection features: • Sprinkler protection The residential modules are not permitted without sprinkler protection (NFPA 101: 23.1.6.1). • Smoke detection The residential modules require an automatic smoke detection system (NFPA 101: 2.3.4.4). • Fire alarm system The required fire alarm system must provide automatic occupant notification (NFPA 101: 23.3.4). • Combustible contents Adequate controls are needed to limit the quantity and combustibility of the fuels available to burn to reduce the probability of room flashover (NFPA 101: A.23.7.4).; combustible decorations are prohibited unless they are flameretardant (NFPA 101: 23.7.4.4); privacy curtains are required to meet the flame propagation performance criteria contained in NFPA 701, Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Flame Propagation of Textiles and Films; mattresses, although not strictly required, are recommended to be evaluated with regard to fire hazards, and guidance for this purpose is provided in ASTM F1870, Standard Guide for Selection of Fire Test Methods for the Assessment of Upholstered Furnishings in Detention and Correctional Facilities. • Mattresses Newly introduced mattresses in detention and correctional occupancies must meet certain criteria based on federal standard 16 CFR 1632, Standard for the Flammability of Mattresses and Mattress Pads (FF 4–72). A second test standard, ASTM E 1537, Standard Test Method for Fire Testing of Upholstered Furniture, is also applicable when the mattress is used in an unsprinklered building. • Separation between modules Room-to-room separation is required to be smoke-resistant (NFPA 101: Table 23.3.8). As we confirmed during our visit to the fire scene, the prison had an abundant supply of combustibles but lacked sprinklers, smoke detection, a fire alarm system, and smoke protection between the modules. It is likely that sprinkler protection, while not the solution to all of the fire protection problems facing the prison at Comayagua, would have significantly reduced the number of fire deaths. —J.M. could not contain the fire in Module 7, either, and the blaze continued its progression into the next module. The commotion inside the cells as the fire rapidly spread alerted what many witnesses describe as a “medic”—this person may also have been an inmate who lived in the prison infirmary, according to the ATF report. The medic had access to keys to the module doors, and he ran to the fire scene to release the trapped prisoners. According to the ATF report, as he made his way to Module 6, he did not see flames coming from Modules 7–10, but he did see smoke. He arrived at Module 6, where he saw substantial flames, and lost time looking for the right cell key. He described the heat as being incredibly intense and as being above him, radiating downward. He found the correct key and unlocked the cell, and three inmates ran from the building. The medic ran to Module 7 and opened the door. Three inmates exited, and several others escaped through a hole they’d managed to tear in the sheet-metal roof. The medic reported seeing flames in the upper portion of Module 7. He ran to Module 8, where he also saw flames, and opened the door, with two inmates exiting. He saw heavy smoke but no fire at Module 9, and continued past it to Module 10, where he saw flames. He opened the door, and four inmates ran out. He returned to Module 9, where a small but unknown number of inmates exited through the open door. He also saw inmates leave through the roof. He then proceeded to open Modules 2, 3, 4, and 5, located in the building facing the structure that housed Modules 6–10. He reported no smoke or flame in these modules. Module 1 had been opened by an inmate who had gotten out and retrieved a weight-lifting bar from the gym, which he used to pry the lock from the cell door. The responding units from the local fire department arrived at the prison at approximately 11 p.m., but were held for about six minutes, as documented in the ATF report, before they were allowed entry. Although it is unclear why the responding units were held, it is probable that they were detained until the released prisoners could be secured. When the responding firefighters reached the modules, all the cell doors were open. Two hand lines were used to start extinguishment, one on Module 6 and the other on Module 10, working towards the middle of the building. Extinguishment was achieved within a few minutes. While the fire’s start time is not clear, the blaze may have lasted as little as 20 minutes from ignition to full extinguishment. Photograph: STR/AFP/Getty Images via Newscom SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2012 NFPA JOURNAL 55

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of NFPA Journal - September/October 2012

NFPA Journal - September/October 2012
Contents
First Word
Mail Call
In a Flash
Perspectives
Firewatch
Research
Heads Up
Structural Ops
In Compliance
Buzzwords
Outreach
Electrical Safety
Wildfire Watch
Lessons of Comayagua
After Waldo Canyon
Catastrophic Multiple-Death Fires in 2011
Fire Loss in the United States in 2011
Section Spotlight
Research + Analysis
What’s Hot
Looking Back

NFPA Journal - September/October 2012