NFPA Journal - September/October 2012 - (Page 56)

lessons of comayagua 4Top, inmates at Comayagua customize their bunks with a variety of combustible materials, including cloth and wood. ATF investigators, pictured below in one of the burned modules, estimated that each module at the time of the fire included approximately 6,288 square feet (584 square meters) of draped cloth and 538 cubic feet (15.2 cubic meters) of mattress padding. By then, however, there was little left to recover. The ATF report found that the fire had consumed virtually every speck of combustible material in Modules 6–10, and firefighters and rescue personnel were met with horrific scenes inside the blackened cells. During the fire, the prisoners in Modules 6, 7, 8, and 10 had retreated to the bathrooms in an attempt to escape the flames, in such numbers that the bodies were stacked four high. Estimates vary, but the number of inmates who died in those modules ranged from 77 in Module 7 to 100 in Module 6. In Module 9, anywhere from 6 to 10 bodies were recovered, including that of a woman. The fact that the fire started toward the front of Module 6, where the exit door is located, and spread to the fronts of the other modules supports the opinion that most of the prisoners moved to the rear of the cells and perished in the bathrooms. No fire deaths were reported outside Modules 6–10. The building housing Modules 1–5 received radiant heat exposure. A building serving as a school for the prison, located to the west of the module buildings, and an administration building, located to the east, sustained thermal damage and arcing damage from melted electrical wires. According to the ATF report, the fire was accidental. ATF concluded that the fire started within or around the top two beds on the fourth column of bunks, counting from the module’s door, against the western wall of Module 6. The cause of the fire is believed to be the unintentional application of an open flame or smoking material to available combustibles, possibly to one of the curtains or other combustible materials surrounding the bunk beds. According to the ATF fire investigation, the fire dynamics are consistent with this scenario. The bunk beds stacked four high in Modules 6, 7, 8, and 10 allowed combustible materials such as mattresses and curtains to be close to or at the smoke layer. This layer would have had high and uniform temperatures, sufficient to ignite mattresses and bedding and to spread from one module to the next through the barred horizontal openings at the top of the interior walls. Module 9 only contained single beds, which supported the medic’s claim that he only saw smoke and no flames. Based on survivor interviews, there were no arguments or fights before the fire. A supposed arson/suicide attempt by an inmate, reported in the local media, was also discounted. At the conclusion of the ATF investigation, 361 fatalities had been reported. Most died at the scene, although a small number who survived and were hospitalized later succumbed to their injuries. The number of injuries associated with the fire is unknown. Big picture: The Latin American prison fire problem While Comayagua may be the deadliest prison fire ever recorded, it is not an isolated incident, either in Honduras or 56 NFPA JOURNAL SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2012 Photographs: Jaime A. Moncada, top; AP/Wide World

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of NFPA Journal - September/October 2012

NFPA Journal - September/October 2012
Contents
First Word
Mail Call
In a Flash
Perspectives
Firewatch
Research
Heads Up
Structural Ops
In Compliance
Buzzwords
Outreach
Electrical Safety
Wildfire Watch
Lessons of Comayagua
After Waldo Canyon
Catastrophic Multiple-Death Fires in 2011
Fire Loss in the United States in 2011
Section Spotlight
Research + Analysis
What’s Hot
Looking Back

NFPA Journal - September/October 2012