Chemical Processing - September 2007 - (Page 37)

Process safety management efforts typically start by accepting the existence and magnitude of the hazards. So, efforts concentrate on reducing the risk associated with those hazards by using passive, active and procedural strategies to provide “layers of protection.” The “layer of protection” concept is based on a simple premise. Given enough protective features and countermeasures, the prospect is sufficiently low that all will fail simultaneously when a process upset occurs which might lead to an undesired event that the risk is judged to be tolerable. This approach can be highly effective, and its application has resulted in significant improvement in the safety record of the chemical industry. But there are disadvantages: • The process hazard remains and some combination of failures of the layers of protection may result in an incident. • Every protective system or procedure layer can potentially fail because equipment isn’t perfect, people make mistakes, and management systems for maintenance can deteriorate over time. The likelihood of failure can increase if the protective systems aren’t properly maintained and operated throughout the life of the plant. Indeed, long-term maintenance of management systems to ensure the reliability of protective systems may represent the biggest challenge for process safety in the chemical industry. Investigation reports after many serious incidents have identified the failures of management systems to ensure mechanical integrity, operating procedure integrity and personnel training, for example, as major contributing causes. • Because the hazard still exists, there’s always a danger that some unanticipated route or mechanism could cause a potential impact. Nature may be more creative in inventing ways a hazardous event can occur than experts are in identifying them. Accidents can happen by mechanisms that were unanticipated or poorly understood. • The layers of protection can be expensive to build and maintain throughout the life of the process. Factors include initial capital expense; operating, safety-training and maintenance costs; and diversion of scarce and valuable technical resources to maintain and operate the layers of protection. A powerful alternative Inherently safer design (ISD) approaches hazards differently. It focuses on eliminating or significantly decreasing them. (A process with reduced hazards is described as inherently safer, rather than inherently safe, because no technology is completely without risk.) Where feasible, ISD provides more robust and reliable risk management and, in many cases, potentially can make the processing technology simpler and more economical. www.chemicalprocessing.com Updated ISd reference The Center for Chemical Process Safety in currently developing the 2nd Edition of “Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle Approach” [1], with publication anticipated around the end of 2007. It will incorporate the latest developments and literature on ISD and will greatly enhance the checklists and tools for helping identify ISD options for new and existing processes and plants. In general, ISD looks at how single events (chemical accidents) affect people, the environment, property and business. In a chemical plant, this usually means the immediate impacts of fire, explosion and the release of toxic materials. Often, however, an ISD also will reduce risk from long-term exposure to chemicals or environmental impacts from handling of toxic materials. ISD aims to build safety into the process instead of adding it on. A hazard is eliminated, not controlled, and the means by which the hazard is removed is so fundamental to the design that it cannot be changed or defeated without altering the process. For example, replacing a combustible and toxic solvent with one that is noncombustible and non-toxic, perhaps water, would make a process inherently safer with respect to fire and toxicity hazards. However, it’s highly unlikely that any technology for any process will ever be inherently safer with respect to all possible hazards. Here, for instance, while the old solvent operates at atmospheric pressure, the new one may require running at elevated pressure and thus may be inherently less safe for high pressure hazards. Inherently safer design focuses on eliminating or significantly decreasing hazards. The Center for Chemical Process Safety’s “Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: A Life Cycle Approach” [1] categorizes strategies for designing inherently safer processes into four groups: • Minimize. Use small quantities of hazardous materials and decrease the size of equipment operating under hazardous conditions such as high temperature or pressure; • Substitute. Switch to less hazardous materials, chemistry and processes; • Moderate. Reduce hazards by dilution, refrigeration and process alternatives that operate at less hazardous conditions; and • Simplify. Eliminate unnecessary complexity and design “user friendly” plants. September 2007 • 37 http://www.chemicalprocessing.com

Table of Contents Feed for the Digital Edition of Chemical Processing - September 2007

Contents From the Editor Field Notes In Process Energy Saver Compliance Advisor Succeed at Simulation Rethink Your Approach to Process Safety Avoid Blending Blunders Get the Right Cartridge or Bag Filter Wireless Proponents Take HART Membrane Boasts Material Benefits Process Puzzler Plant InSites Chem Show Product Preview ISA Product Preview Equipment & Services Product Spotlight/Classifieds Ad Index End Point

Chemical Processing - September 2007

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