Cadalyst - June 2008 - (Page 26)

25yearssoftware By David Weisberg Tracking a CAD Giant A 25-year perspective on how Autodesk came to shape and eventually dominate - the CAD industry. o understand why Autodesk succeeded in a competitive industl)! when others failed, it's necessary to understand the forces shaping the CAD marketplace In the early 1980s. During that time, the CAD industl)! was dominated by five players: Applicon, Auto-Irol Technology, Calma, Computervision, and Intergraph. They were primarily systems-manufacturing companies that generated the major portion of their revenue by selling computer hardware, graphics terminals, digitizers, plotters, and printers. Often, software was viewed as just something that helped to sell more hardware. The systems these companies developed were built around minicomputers, which typically supported four to eight graphic terminals and usually sold for more than $100,000 per seat. Because they were so expensive, customers installed them in CAD departments, where full-time operators served the needs of the design and engineering teams. Often, these departments operated for two and even three shifts per day to maximize T Sales and support were rather consistent among the vendors. The companies handled sales directly because they thought that the systems they sold were too complicated to be distributed by independent resellers. Service was provided on a monthly fee basis for which users received both technical support and periodic software upgrades. In addition, third-party software developers were discouraged in that the information needed to write such software was tightly controlled. Product packaging from AutoCAD 80 to AutoCAD R14. (Courtesy of Autodesk) Meeting of the Minds In 1981, the CAD industl)! was an approximately $800 million industl)! that sold somewhat more than 2,000 systems incorporating roughly 7,000 graphic terminals. The personal computer industry was in its infancy, and none of the major CAD vendors was paying any attention to the Pc. This was the environment in which John Walker and Dan Drake invited 14 friends to meet at Walker's house to discuss establishing some type of software business. One of those invited to the meeting was Mike Riddle, who had been developing a basic drafting package. By early 1982, a total of 16 individuals had committed to starting a company that would publish personal computer software programs. The 16 people chipped in a total of $59,000 to start what is now Autodesk. Today, the company has a market capitalization of more than $7 billion. Most people don't realize that Autodesk did not set out to be a CAD company. Shortly after the company was started, Walker wrote a document he called "Information Letter # 1." In it, he listed 14 programs on which the founders were working or had the capability to develop. Most of these were what we would refer to today as Some of Autodesk's founding fathers (from left to right): Rudolf KOnzli, Mike Ford, Dan Drake, Mauri Laitinen, Greg Lutz, David Kalish, Lars Moureau, Richard Handyside, Kern Sibbald, Hal Royaltey, Duff Kurland, John Walker, and Keith Marcelius. (Courtesy of Autodesk) the return on their investment. The early 1980s saw the turnkey CAD vendors in the midst of a transition from storage-tube display terminals to raster displays, Including a new generation of color monitors. Much of their engineering efforts focused on improving graphic performance because customers were creating increasingly complex drawings. They all offered three-dimensional software, but most customers were still using these systems for pure drafting tasks. Everyone was experimenting with 501· ids modeling, but no commercially viable products were available. 26 system utilities, such as a file-management program called Cardfile. Only one program targeted computerized drafting: that was Riddle's package, which was initially called Interact. In return for royalty payments, Riddle signed a nonexclusive licensing agreement with Autodesk for Interact. It's possible that Walker was willing to accept this software on a nonexclusive royalty basis because he underestimated its market potential. We do know that he expressed concern over the fact that the software required a hard disk or at least double-density double-sided B-inch floppy disks, both of which were fairly expensive at the time. Ultiwww.cadalyst.com cadalyst June 2008 http://www.cadalyst.com

Table of Contents Feed for the Digital Edition of Cadalyst - June 2008

Cadalyst - June 2008 Contents Editor's Window CAD Central Tech Trends: Community Building in Progress A Quarter Century of Cadalyst Tracking a CAD Giant The Highs and Lows of CAD Hardware Industry Insights — Looking Ahead Cadalyst Lab Reviews: HP xw4600 Workstation with LP3065 30” LCD Monitor NVIDIA Quadro FX 3700 — Graphics Card LaCie 324 — LCD Monitor CAD Manager: Making Standards Stick MCAD Modeling: Rational vs. Irrational Decisions AEC Insight: Data Collection in AEC CAD Cartoon Issue Indexes Hot Tip Harry: Just a Few CAD Renovations

Cadalyst - June 2008

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