Consulting-Specifying Engineer - March 2009 - (Page 36) previously buried a few inches deep. The severe spalling affected significant sections of the exterior walls, joists, and columns. The building suffered extensive structural damage, yet did not collapse, primarily because the combustible building materials burned quickly and prevented prolonged exposure of the concrete-framed building’s support structure to high temperatures. That type of prolonged exposure to extreme heat caused the collapse of the steel-framed Twin Towers of the World Trade Center on Sept. 11, 2001. The Joelma Building fire began to subside by 10:30 a.m. after having consumed all available combustible material, and was extinguished at 1:30 p.m. After the fire was extinguished, fire crews, police units, and medical teams searched for dazed survivors who finally were able to climb down from the site of their harrowing ordeal. A search initially revealed that 179 people were killed. Taking a toll Of the 756 people who were in the building, the death toll is generally reported at 188 to 227 people, and the injury total is reported as high as 345. A number of the survivors later died from extensive injuries after enduring months of extremely painful treatment for burns and ensuing infection. Although the Joelma Building did not collapse during or after the fire, some structural components were damaged severely and required substantial repair prior to the building’s reopening. The building was closed for four years for reconstruction and repair. It is now open and occupied, and has been renamed the Praca da Bandeira (Flag Square). Brazil has a national fire code, which is a general document. Specific fire safety regula- tions vary by region and city. Sao Paulo has the most advanced fire code within Brazil. Additional fire safety laws were passed in 1975, 1976, 1978, 1983, 1986, 1994, and 2001 as a result of the Joelma Building fire and other high-rise building fires in Brazil. Annually, more than 17,000 fires have occurred in high-rise structures greater than six stories in the United States alone, so a high-rise structure fire is hardly the unusual event that most people believe it to be. A high-rise building fire can cause many fatalities, even without a structural collapse such as occurred on Sept. 11, 2001. The 1911 Triangle Shirt Waist Factory fire in New York City (146 killed), the 1946 Winecoff Hotel fire in Atlanta (120 killed), and the 1980 MGM Grand Hotel fire in Las Vegas (87 killed) are examples of other high-rise building fires with large loss of life where the structure did not collapse. No gambling on fire ordinances The 19 major features of the 1981 Las Vegas Retrofit Ordinance were: 1. Sprinklers were required for public entertainment assembly areas larger than 5,000 sq ft. Sprinklers were required for rooms and exit corridors in hotel towers more than 55 ft above ground level. Twenty-five percent coverage was required within 15 months of ordinance adoption, 50% coverage was required within 27 months, 75% coverage was required within 40 months, and 100% coverage was required within 48 months. 2. Smoke control was required for high-rise occupancies above 55 ft, including pressurized exit corridors and enclosed, pressurized stairways. 3. Emergency lighting to 1 foot candle was required for exit corridors and stairways. 4. Exit corridors were required to be built from 1-hour fire-resistive materials, and exit stairways were required to be built from fire-resistive materials. 5. Exit doors were required to be either self-closing or automatic closing in response to a signal from a smoke detector. 6. Elevator or utility shafts extending higher than two stories were required to be built from fire-resistive materials. 7. Basement areas larger than 1,500 sq ft or located more than 75 ft from openings were required to be sprinklered. 8. Illuminated exit signs were required. 9. Office buildings taller than two stories, hotels and motels taller than two stories with more than 19 guest rooms, and apartments and condominiums taller than two stories with more than 14 dwelling units were required to install a fire alarm system that did not contain a manual delay. 10. Every hotel/motel guest room and every apartment dwelling unit was required to install a smoke detector. 11. Hotel/motel guest rooms and apartment dwelling units were required to install an air supply that was not connected to the exit corridor. 12. Smoke detectors were required to be installed in the ventilating ducts for hotel/motel guest rooms. The detectors were required to shut down the normal ventilation system, sound a voice alarm, and start the smoke control system. 13. Smoke detectors were required to be installed in elevator lobbies. The detectors were required to prevent the elevator doors from opening on the alarmed floor, automatically return the elevator to the main floor or an alternate floor for further operation under manual control, and close the elevator lobby doors on the alarmed floor. 14. Signs directing guests to use the exit stairs and not the elevator in an emergency were required to be posted on each elevator and the elevator call station on each floor. Signs indicating floor level and direction of emergency exits were required to be posted on each floor. 15. Signs that indicate the stairway number were required to be posted in each stairway. 16. Hotel, office, and residential buildings more than 55 ft above ground level were required to install a public address system. 17. Interior finish materials were required to be limited in combustibility. 18. A central reporting location called the fire command center was required to be installed in all hotel/casinos and malls. 19. Exterior wall openings were required to have flame barriers extending horizontally 30 in. or vertically 36 in. from the floor. 36 Consulting-Specifying Engineer • MARCH 2008
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