Consulting-Specifying Engineer - June 2008 - (Page 34)

////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// expansion that includes two more chillers, four more generators, another boiler and additional pumps—all without replacing the existing mechanical and electrical infrastructure. The plant serves a campus that includes the hospital, a new medical office building, and the plant itself. The campus distribution is designed with numerous connection points to expand and accommodate future loads as they are added on the campus. “Designed to operate as an island” is a common phrase in healthcare engineering. It refers to the need for a hospital to be able to function by itself for an extended period of time. Hospitals have gone without power for two weeks or more after a hurricane. All Children’s learned from others’ experience and decided to have a total of 150,000 gal. of diesel fuel storage belowgrade, suitable for generator operation at 100% for seven days. However, All Children’s did not want the disaster preparedness to end with the central energy plant; it applied the same philosophy to the hospital design itself. The building has two normal service entrances, which serve the A side and B side, with the A side emergency power fed from the B side for redundancy. HVAC equipment, rather than being located on the roof, is all housed within the hospital building where it is protected from debris impact, allowing the air-handling units to maintain operation during and after a disaster. All Children’s disaster preparedness gives the facility full functionality during a catastrophe. And if a disaster should strike, it will enable them to focus on patient care, not on the power. Hawaii: Queen’s Medical Center On Oct. 15, 2006, Hawaii was struck by an earthquake centered just offshore and measuring 6.7 on the Richter scale. At Queen’s Medical Center, Honolulu, power was out for 12 hours, leaving the state’s primary trauma center without enough power to operate at 100% capacity. “Although our emergency power system operated flawlessly, we quickly learned how difficult it is to run a hospital only on emergency power,” said Todd Kanja, PE, director of engineering services. The hospital’s five emergency generators enabled code-required critical loads such as lights, ventilators, and other critical care and life support functions to continue operating. But there wasn’t enough power for adequate air conditioning, which prevented use of computerized tomography, magnetic resonance imaging scanners, and major operating room equipment. Overall, it was a vivid reminder FUTURE 2,000 kW 2,000 kW, 0.8PF, 60 Hz FUTURE 2,000 kW 4,160 V, 3Ф, 3 W 4,160 V, 3Ф, 3 W 4,160 V, 3Ф, 3 W GENERATOR “GB-4” GENERATOR “GB-3” GENERATOR “GB-6” GB-4 GB-3 GB-6 “GB-EDP” FUTURE DISTRIBUTION SECTION (250 MVA) 4,160 V, 3Ф, 3 W 3,000 AMPS 86 SPACE 600:5 600:5 50/51 50G/51G 1200AF 86 52 450AT 50/51 50G/51G 600:5 600:5 86 SPACE 600:5 600:5 50/51 50G/51G FUTURE FUTURE 1200AF SPACE 86 52 450AT 50/51 50G/51G GND 600:5 600:5 1200AF 86 52 SPARE 50/51 50G/51G 600:5 600:5 1200AF 86 52 420AT 50/51 50G/51G 600:5 600:5 MASTER CONTROLLER HOSPITAL 4,160 V EMERGENCY SERVICE 2B 4,160 V CHILLER EMERGENCY SERVICE FUTURE 2,000 kW 2,000 kW, 0.8PF, 60 Hz 2,000 kW, 0.8PF, 60 Hz 4,160 V, 3Ф, 3 W 4,160 V, 3Ф, 3 W 4,160 V, 3Ф, 3 W GENERATOR “GB-1” GENERATOR “GB-5” GENERATOR “GB-2” GB-5 GB-2 GB-1 86 SPACE 600:5 600:5 1200AF 86 52 450AT 50/51 50G/51G 600:5 600:5 86 1200AF 52 450AT 600:5 600:5 50/51 50G/51G 50/51 50G/51G FUTURE DISTRIBUTION SECTION 3000AF TIE SWITCH 1200AF 86 52 300AT 50/51 50G/51G 1200AF 86 52 SPARE 600:5 600:5 1200AF 86 52 420AT SPACE 50/51 50G/51G 600:5 600:5 FUTURE FUTURE 50/51 600:5 600:5 50G/51G #4/0 (600V) HOSPITAL 4,160 V EMERGENCY SERVICE 2B SS-EDP 3CHB (65,000 A/C) 277/480 V, , 3Ф, 4 W 2,000 AMPS SECONDARY DISTRIBUTION SECTION #4 SECONDARY MAIN SECTION #3 2000AF 1600AT TRANSFORMER SECTION #2 SS 1,000 kVA 4.16 kV – 277/480 V #3/0 600AR NF HVL SWITCH SECTION #1 150 150 250 400 1200 FIRE PUMP ATS-CR3B ATS-GEQB ATS-EQ2B ATS-NEQ3B CEP CRITICAL BRANCH CEP GENERATOR EQUIPMENT BRANCH CEP EQUIPMENT BRANCH CEP NON-ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT BRANCH Figure 1: At All Children’s Hospital in St. Petersburg, Fla., emergency power is split into A and B sides. The one-line diagram shows the B side, with built-in future capacity. Source all figures: TLC Engineering 34 Consulting-Specifying Engineer • JUNE 2008

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Consulting-Specifying Engineer - June 2008 Contents Viewpoint Letters News M/E Roundtable No Gambling Allowed on Smoke Control in Las Vegas Be Prepared: Hospital Protections for Catastrophic Events Ready for Retail Commissioning Documents: Necessary Evil Codes & Standards Codes & Standards Case Study Equipment Lifecycles New Products Advertiser Index Green Space

Consulting-Specifying Engineer - June 2008

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