CSE Pure Power - Summer 2008 - (Page 12)

❯❯ PURE POWER // SUMMER 2008 12 cover story the generator starts and comes on line. In Figure 1, a failure of the automatic transfer switch (ATS) puts the UPS module on batteries—without any input power. For a facility that has personnel on-site 24/7, providing a means to either manually transfer the switch under no load (which most ATS have built-in) or bypassing the switch would solve this single point of failure. For an unmanned site, redundant components would be required. These kinds of failures can be identiﬁed by a fault tree analysis or a failure modes and effects analysis. Emergency and normal electrical equipment should be installed separately, at different locations, and as far apart as feasible. Beware of co-locating essential or redundant feeders with other major utilities. Some types of facilities—where tornadoes or blasts rank high on the regional risk assessment—need redundant electrical distribution to critical areas. Central utility shafts may be subject to damage. One qualitative method of evaluating the architectural, utility, and site layout aspects of this part of the risk assessment is found in the “Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist” developed by the Department of Veterans Affairs and described in detail in a FEMA manual.5 The reference takes the user through a consistent security evaluation of designs at various levels. There are other methods, such as those used by USACE in the evaluation of the utility systems for prospective C4ISR facilities (see Risk assessment: determining location, at right).6 Keep in mind that if a DCOA remains embedded within an existing general occupancy building, the COPS for the DCOA will have to be protected from changes to the mechanical and electrical infrastructure associated with the general occupancy parts of the building. STEP 2: Risk assessment: determining location Determination of location in the risk assessment of critical operations power systems (COPS) can be difﬁcult for emergency management agencies that have many informed (and vocal) stakeholders in land/space issues. We illustrate below how the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers designs its designated critical operations areas (DCOAs). The location of a civilian DCOA will depend heavily upon whether meeting Article 708 requires a new stand-alone facility, or whether a DCOA within an existing building can be “hardened” to the requirements. Getting this decision right may be the most costly aspect of meeting 708 requirements. The interior ﬂoor plans below illustrate how the limited vulnerability concept is used to describe a building structure designed to detect potential terrorist threats, isolate resulting damage, and promote survival of personnel affected by an event, while propagating continued parallel mission activity. It relies on compartmentalizing the construction of the DCOA facility into multiple zones, each of which is separated from the other zones by barriers adequate to withstand the range of potential threats. Site-speciﬁc factors will determine how the COPS engine-generator and fuel supply would be positioned with respect to the secure perimeter. Exit Zone 1 Corridor Zone 2 Mech/ Elec Zone 1 Mech/ Elec Stairs Exit Zone 3 Corridor Stairs Stairs Zone 5 Lower Command Center (Electronic Support) Stairs Zone 3 Lower Support Zone 4 Lower Support Corridor Corridor Zone 4 Zone 2 Zone 4 Zone 2 Exit Corridor Stairs Stairs Zone 1 Lower Support Zone 2 Lower Support Stairs Corridor Stairs Corridor Corridor Stairs Stairs Mech/ Elec Mech/ Elec Exit Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 1 Corridor First Floor Roof (HVAC Equipment) Zone 1 Zone 1 Upper Support Entry Corridor Zone 2 Stairs Stairs Zone 3 Stairs Stairs Zone 5 Upper Command Center (Personnel) Stairs Stairs Zone 2 Upper Support First Floor Roof (HVAC Equipment) Stairs Stairs Zone 4 Upper Support First Floor Roof (HVAC Equipment) Stairs Stairs First Floor Roof (HVAC Equipment) Zone 3 Upper Support Corridor Corridor DETERMINE REQUIRED AVAILABILITY Availability is the percentage of time the system is in operation or is available for www.purepowermagazine.com Zone 3 Zone 4 http://www.purepowermagazine.com

Table of Contents Feed for the Digital Edition of CSE Pure Power - Summer 2008

CSE Pure Power - Summer 2008 Contents In the News Industry Roundup Risk Assessments for COPS Grounding Requires More Power Systems to Protect Healthcare Important Changes Coming in NFPA 70E A Look at Arc-Resistant Switchgear Agencies and Associations New Products Ad Index

CSE Pure Power - Summer 2008

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