Marine Log - April 2008 - (Page 4)

Nick Blenkey Senior Editorial Consultant Second Thoughts Navy shipbuilding plans under fire I n last month’s coverage of naval shipbuilding, we concentrated largely on the Navy’s budget request for FY 2009. No sooner had the issue gone to press then the other shoe dropped. At a March 14 hearing on the FY 2009 Budget Request for Ship Construction before the House Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, it became clear that the Navy’s shipbuilding plans are in for a rough ride. Calling the current shipbuilding plan for a 313-ship fleet “pure fantasy,” the Chairman of the panel, Rep. Gene Taylor called the plan “totally unaffordable.” “As I analyze the shipbuilding plan,” said Taylor, “I see four programs that are building ships on time and on budget. Those are the LPD 17 class amphibious assault ships, the Arleigh Burke class destroyers, the Virginia Class submarines, and the T-AKE Dry Cargo Ammunition Ship.” Despite these programs’ being on time and on budget, Taylor noted that the Navy’s plans were to: · Cancel the LPD 17 before the minimum Marine Corps requirement of 11 ships is achieved; · Cancel the DDG 51 Burke destroyers in favor of a brand new ship with 10 major technological innovations that may end up costing five times what an Arleigh Burke costs; · Continue to delay construction of two submarines a year until 2011; and · Cancel the last two ships of the TAKE class. Taylor said he had asked the Commander of the Pacific Fleet if he would rather have two DDG 1000s or five DDG 51s. “He told me he wanted the DDG 51s,” said Taylor. “This proves to me that the Navy in Washington does not always listen to the Navy which actually operates the fleet.” Taylor said that instead of being asked to fund programs that are building ships on time and at projected cost, “we are asked to fund programs which are not.” As an example he cited the Littoral Combat Ship or LCS, which, he said, “will go into the textbooks to train future acquisition officials on how not to run a program.” Turning to the DDG 1000 [“the most expensive surface warships ever built”], Taylor said a cost overrun of only 10% for the first two ships would be close to $700 million dollars, but that “with all the new technologies that must work for this ship to sail, a cost overrun of 20% or even 30% is not out of the question.” Significantly, Congressional skepticism about the Navy’s shipbuilding plan appears to be bipartisan. The panel’s ranking Republican, Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (D-Md.) noted that “if we were to accept the budget request at face value, the LPD-17 production line would be shut down. This would mean that nearly 20% of the Marine Corps’ requirement for amphibious lift would remain unfulfilled. As a nation, are we willing to accept that risk? Conversely, if we are forced to restart production after Fiscal Year 2009, it is patently obvious that the cost of the ship will increase. The cost will increase not only for the LPD-17 line, but for future platforms that could be constructed using the LPD-17 hull form. I, for one, do not want this committee to be complicit in intentionally increasing the cost of shipbuilding. “The best news in the shipbuilding plan,” said Bartlett, “is that the budget request moves up two per year construction of the Virginia class submarine to Fiscal Year 2011—a year sooner than previously planned. “Unfortunately,” he said, “the rest of the news is rather bleak. From FY 2008 to 2009, the Navy has reduced the number of ships to be procured by approximately 25 percent—one quarter of the ships the Navy planned to build last year are gone. The long term shipbuilding plan still speaks to a 313-ship Navy, as does the Chief of Naval Operations, but it’s time we started facing facts. “The Navy will never get there without either top line relief or a significant change in the mix of platforms,” he said. “For example, is it wise to buy destroyers that at best will cost $3 billion a copy, and more likely $5 billion a piece if the Congressional Budget Office is right, while we shut down stable, more affordable production lines, such as the DDG-51 line? How much risk are you buying down with only seven DDG 1000s, at a cost of $21 - $35 billion, when you could likely have at least 14, upgraded DDG-51s for that same amount?” nblenkey@sbpub.com 4 MARINE LOG APRIL 2008 www.marinelog.com http://www.fincatierimarinesystems.com http://www.fincatierimarinesystems.com http://www.marinelog.com

Table of Contents Feed for the Digital Edition of Marine Log - April 2008

Marine Log - April 2008 Contents Editorial Second Thoughts Update Inside Washington Offshore Vessels Evolve to Meet Subsea Demands Picking the Right Floaters for Deepwater Tugs: The Good Times Roll, But for How Long? Interactive TV at Sea Jo-Kell's Suzan Kelly Tugs & Barges Exhibitors Preview Beyond Imagination Tech News Newsmakers Contracts Events Website Directory Infodirect ML Marketplace Last Page

Marine Log - April 2008

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