Marine Log - August 2007 - (Page 27) PORTSECURITY The Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach have the top number of container ship calls in the U.S. NUCLEAR SECURITY THREAT REMAINS W ithin five years, all containers being transported by ship to the U.S. will have to be screened for radioactive materials before they enter an American port under the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 recently signed into law by President Bush. Before the President had signed the bill, speaker of the House, Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D.-Calif.) said, “ this bill closes loopholes and weaknesses that terrorists seek to exploit and that leave Americans vulnerable. Added Pelosi, “By securing loose nuclear material abroad, this bill will help prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.” However, opponents of 100% scanning of cargo containers say that it would be impractical and hurt the flow of trade. Additionally, opponents also pointed out that the scanning technology is by no means failsafe. For example, this past March, Earl Agron, vice president of security for APL, one of the world’s largest container lines, said he opposed 100% scanning of cargo containers before entering U.S. ports. “There isn’t enough money, manpower or technology to make the proposal feasible,” he said. The legislation also contains loophole language that would allow the Department of Homeland Security Secretary to grant two-year extensions to specific ports indefinitely for a variety of reasons including the determination that implementing such a radiation scanning system would “significantly impact trade.” While the law aims to close the vulnerability gap in the supply chain and make it more difficult for terrorists to smuggle in a “dirty bomb” or weapon of mass destruction, a recent report from the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) suggests that they might be able to retain radioactive materials in the U.S. The report documents some startling testimony Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Kutz told Senate subcommittee members that GAO investigators were able to obtain a genuine radioactive materials license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) merely by creating bogus businesses that existed only on paper. “Given that terrorists have expressed an interest in obtaining nuclear material,” testified Kurtz, “the Congress and the American people expect licensing programs for these materials to be secure. However, in 2003, we reported that weaknesses in the licensing program could allow terrorists to obtain radioactive materials. We recommended that NRC close this vulnerability by modifying its licensing process. Among other things, we recommended that NRC modify its process for issuing specific licenses to ensure that sealed radioactive sources cannot be purchased before NRC’s verification—through inspection or other means—that the materials will be used as intended. NRC agreed with this recommendation and referred the issue to a working group composed of NRC and state representatives to coordinate NRC’s response. In December 2005, the working group delivered its recommendations to NRC senior management. In December 2006, NRC issued new guidance to agreement states and NRC regional offices meant to strengthen the radioactive materials licensing process. Although these are important steps forward, the Subcommittee remained concerned about whether, almost six years after September 11, 2001, terrorists could still exploit weaknesses in the government’s licensing process and obtain radioactive material. To determine whether NRC actions to address our 2003 recomcontinued on page 32 AUGUST 2007 MARINE LOG 27 www.marinelog.com http://www.marinelog.com
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