POWER November 2011 - 77

NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY
repository at a new location other than Yucca
Mountain, and the federal government comes
to terms with a particular state and its stakeholders
over siting that repository (two big ifs),
the federal government's financial liability for
past transgressions remains and will continue
to grow, at least until a central repository enters
service. In the words of the CBO, " Even
if such legislation is enacted, federal liabilities
will remain substantial, and payments from
the Judgment Fund to compensate utilities for
storing waste will continue for many years. "
Blue Ribbon Disorder
We also concluded in our earlier report that
the BRC was in the unenviable position of
spending two years preparing a report that will
present truly predictable conclusions: either
politically untenable options or a rehash of the
Yucca Mountain debate. The BRC's draft report,
released on July 29, 2011, confirmed that
assessment. Comments on the draft report are
due no later than October 31, 2011; the final report
is due to be released by January 29, 2012.
The 192-page draft report's predictable suggestions
include forming a new government
organization responsible for the project (not the
DOE) and placing the NWF annual deposits
in a " lock box. " The report is correct when it
concludes that " The overall record of the U.S.
nuclear waste program has been one of broken
promises and unmet commitments " and that
" decades of failed efforts to develop a repository
for spent fuel and high-level waste have
produced frustration and a deep erosion of trust
in the federal government. " The report does not
make any suggestions for how to restore that lost
trust but rather focuses on programmatic and political
solutions for licensing a new repository.
By announcing early in its report that the BRC
was making no comments on the efficacy of the
Yucca Mountain project, this BRC showed that
it had failed to learn from past mistakes.
The draft report properly recognized that " a
new strategy is needed " to address the problem
of locating a long-term repository for SNF, and
we agree with that assessment. However, the
report suggests a " new, consent-based approach
2. Pool storage. Underneath 27 feet of
water sit 12-foot-tall stainless steel racks of
spent nuclear fuel at the top of TVA's Browns
Ferry Unit 1. Courtesy: TVA
for siting future nuclear waste management facilities. "
The report describes this as an " inclusive
process " in which " communities become
engaged in the process. " In essence, the report
assumes that when the opportunity is properly
presented to and vetted by stakeholders, there
will be communities that will embrace construction
of a facility in their state-that is, all
states but Nevada, according to Senator Harry
Reid (D-Nev.). The BRC then explains how it
would bring all the disparate stakeholders to
the table for negotiations: with a " flexible and
substantial incentive program " that will get everyone's
attention. The magnitude of the bribe
was not discussed in the report.
Hardball Politics
Since President Obama pulled the plug on
Yucca Mountain last February, a number of
congressional committees have been picking
over the remains. A number of investigations
are under way with the purpose of determining
if actions taken by various federal
agencies were legally sufficient justification
for cancelling the project. So far, the results
from those investigations are mixed. In no
particular order, the following is a partial list
of ongoing investigations and a summary of
the findings of completed investigations.
The Committee on Energy and Commerce.
This committee of the U.S. House of
Representatives is vested with the broadest
jurisdiction of any congressional authorizing
committee. It oversees multiple cabinet-level
departments and independent agencies, including
the DOE. In spring 2011, its subcommittee
on Environment and the Economy notified
Energy Secretary Steven Chu and Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) Chairman
Gregory Jaczko that it was launching an investigation
into the decision-making process that
led to the termination of the Yucca Mountain
project. Chairman Fred Upton (R-Mich.) and
subcommittee Chairman John Shimkus (R-Ill.)
launched the inquiry after reviewing available
evidence indicating that there was no scientific
or technical basis for the DOE to withdraw the
application required by the NWPA.
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
This House committee has jurisdiction
over civilian radioactive waste management,
including Yucca Mountain. In June 2011, it issued
a 203-page staff report, " Yucca Mountain:
The Administration's Impact on U.S. Nuclear
Waste Management Policy, " which concluded
that there wasn't a single document presented
to the committee by the DOE or the NRC that
supported closing Yucca Mountain.
The 695-page Volume III of the NRC's Safety
Evaluation Report (SER)-the NRC's review
of the DOE's application for construction-was
the most noteworthy document presented during
this investigation. The report is a comprehensive
November 2011 | POWER
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evaluation and analysis of the technical feasibility
of Yucca Mountain with respect to the project's
ability to meet the regulatory thresholds for
approval. A copy was obtained by committee investigators
only after repeated demands and over
the objections of the NRC chairman. As of June
2011, the NRC has still refused to release unredacted
versions of the SER on Yucca Mountain
to the public, leaving the final NRC conclusions
about Yucca Mountain an open question.
Committee reviews of the SER found that
the NRC made more than 1,500 findings related
to the DOE's scientific and technical research
efforts, and agreed 98.5% of the time
with the DOE conclusions regarding the site's
suitability to meet regulatory requirements.
The remaining 1.5% of the findings did not
affect the NRC staff's overall conclusions,
which found that the DOE's Yucca Mountain
license application complies with applicable
NRC safety requirements, including those related
to human health and groundwater protection,
and specific performance objectives
in the NRC regulations. In addition, the SER
determined that there was no significant impact
on the long-term safety of the facility.
In sum, this committee found agreement
among the scientific and technical experts responsible
for reviewing the suitability of " the
most studied piece of land on Earth " and concluded
that nuclear waste can be safely stored at
the Yucca Mountain site for tens of thousands of
years in accordance with NRC requirements.
NRC Inspector General Report. In June
2011, the NRC Inspector General (IG) released
a 46-page report, " NRC Chairman's Unilateral
Decision to Terminate NRC's Review
of DOE Yucca Mountain Repository License
Application (OIG Case No. 11-05). " By July
2010, the NRC professional staff was on track
to complete the SER Volume III review, well
before the scheduled November 2010 publication
date. However, the IG investigators found
that NRC Chairman Jaczko ordered the staff
to slow down or delay their work. In October
2010, Jazcko ordered the staff to stop its work
and close down its review-after a decade of
work and a month before completion.
Jaczko said that his reason for killing the
SER so close to completion was not political
but rather purely budgetary. However, release
of the purely technical NRC report (which
was expected to confirm the science and
technology behind the DOE license application,
showing that there was no technical
reason not to proceed with Yucca Mountain)
would have been politically embarrassing for
President Obama and Senator Reid, given
their promises to cancel to the project.
The IG report concluded that NRC Chairman
Jaczko abused his legal authority by deliberately
withholding information and not
informing other commissioners of his decision
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