POWER September 2012 - 28

Steven F. Greenwald
I
Jeffrey P. Gray
Daylight Saving: Energy
Policy or Placebo?
By Steven F. Greenwald and Jeffrey P. Gray
n December 1973, President Richard Nixon explained to the
American people his administration's critical initiative to confront
the " energy crisis " du jour (precipitated by the 1973-74
Arab oil embargo): " Many [energy savings measures] require inconvenience
and sacrifice. But daylight saving time . . . will
mean only a minimum of inconvenience and will involve equal
participation by all. Unlike many of our other initiatives to deal
with the energy crisis and to accomplish the goal of self-sufficiency
in energy . . . these savings will not require research, new
technology, diplomacy, or exploration. "
In the almost four decades since President Nixon resurrected
daylight saving as a critical component of national energy policy,
our populace has clung to the hope that such a " no cost/no sacrifice "
silver bullet would rescue us from each succeeding energy
crisis. The nation accordingly ignored President Jimmy Carter's
admonition that confronting our energy exigencies required great
sacrifices approaching the " moral equivalent of war. "
In contrast, advocates of " no cost/no sacrifice " energy policies
have successfully promoted repetitive expansions of the
period for daylight saving over competing energy reduction strategies
that impose costs and promise no quick fix. Even if daylight
saving represented a viable program in the past century, energy
policies designed to avoid investment and retain existing technologies
are simply no longer credible.
Historical Background
Benjamin Franklin is credited as the first to identify the potential fuel
savings associated with adjusting the clock. Germany introduced the
first large-scale daylight saving program during World War I with the
intent to divert coal from artificial lighting uses to the war effort.
In 1918, U.S. federal law standardized the start and end dates
for daylight saving. During World War II, Congress mandated daylight
saving throughout the 50 states. Following the end of the
war, other than 1973 and 1974, the daylight saving time period
was 26 or 27 weeks. Beginning in 1988, federal legislation
extended the period to 29 or 30 weeks. A 1975 federal study
concluded that these measures reduced overall electric consumption
by 1%. In a 1976 report to Congress, " Review and Technical
Evaluation of the DOT Daylight Saving Time Study, " the National
Bureau of Standards found no significant energy savings.
Energy Policy Act of 2005: Same Old, Same Old
From the early 1980s until the initial years of this century, oil
prices remained around $25 a barrel. However, prices began a
run-up in mid-2003, reaching $60 a barrel by summer 2005. Congress
passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT) to respond
this " second energy crisis. " Prices ultimately peaked at just under
$150 in mid-2008, before declining due to the financial crisis
and associated global recession.
The various policy options available to Congress to counter
these price escalations included increasing Corporate Average
28
Fuel Economy standards, directing greater investment in energy
efficiency hardware, and funding further research in conservation
technologies. Congress, however, essentially " dropped back 30
years " and punted on these " investment/technology " options.
It reverted to President Nixon's political acumen to prioritize a
policy promising " no cost/no inconvenience. "
Thus, the cornerstone of EPACT's energy-savings measure was
to yet again extend the daylight saving period. Our clocks now
" spring ahead " on the second Sunday in March and " fall back " on
the first Sunday in November. This 34-week period observed by
most of the United States likely represents the world's longest
daylight saving period, exceeding the period in European nations
by three or four weeks.
Energy Policy or Legislative Placebo?
At one level, EPACT's expansion of daylight saving time could be
viewed as a success: Almost no government funds were spent. The
Department of Energy (DOE) also claims the extension reduced energy
consumption. The DOE savings, however, are less than 0.5%
and, moreover, only during the additional weeks of daylight saving in
March and October. Critics challenged the validity of even this nearnegligible
energy reduction and argued further that on an annual
basis this transitory savings is probably statistically insignificant.
Furthermore, the fundamental debate over whether daylight saving
time saves total energy consumption at all times and in all localities
remains; critics contend that having more daylight hours increases air
conditioning electric load and " leisure " gas consumption.
We need not quibble whether 34 weeks is better than 30 weeks.
EPACT warrants criticism for its knee-jerk and near-exclusive reliance
on expanding the period for daylight saving as the leading
measure to reduce electricity consumption. Our nearly half-century
experience responding to energy crises demonstrates that
national energy policy must be developed with the understanding
that there are no quick fixes and that success demands public and
private investment, measured risk-taking (not all of which proves
successful), and technological advances.
Energy policy must be crafted based on current facts and circumstances.
President Nixon's reliance on daylight saving made
sense-increasing daylight hours in the 1970s represented the easily
attainable " low-hanging fruit " of energy efficiency. However, EPACT
expanded daylight saving only because " it worked before " and to
avoid the political awkwardness of pursuing meaningful energy measures.
Congress will again mislead the populace if it suggests further
daylight saving or any other " no cost/no sacrifice " pseudo-options
remain available. Daylight saving should be assessed on its comparative
social and economic costs and benefits. As a means to reduce
energy consumption, daylight saving, particularly any further expansion
of its duration, must be dismissed as a distracting placebo. ■
-Steven F. Greenwald (stevegreenwald@dwt.com) and
Jeffrey P. Gray (jeffgray@dwt.com) are partners in Davis
Wright Tremaine's Energy Practices Group.
www.powermag.com
POWER | September 2012
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POWER September 2012

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