Droit et Économie - L'avenir de l'Union économique et monétaire : une perspective franco-allemande - 123

A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ECONOMY MAPPING 123

ante democratic legitimacy of the legislative package, but also securing a role
for the European Parliament in holding the main European actors answerable
for their action in the context of the multilateral surveillance, macroeconomic
imbalances and excessive deficit procedure by means of the so-called Economic Dialogue.51 To be sure, given the lack of any substantive instruments at
the disposal of the European Parliament to sanction the behaviour of the
European Council, the Council or the Eurogroup, and considering the rather
blunt sword of the motion of censure against the European Commission as a
collective body pursuant to Article 245 TFEU, these exchanges of views should
not be mistaken for a full-fledged democratic accountability mechanism.52
Even the ESM Treaty as the permanent successor to the temporary European
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism and European Financial Stability Facility,
which were hastily set up at the height of the crisis, is arguably aimed at reinforcing the existing system. After all, its declared aim is not only to 'foster
solidarity', but also promote 'fiscal responsibility' within EMU.53 ESM
Member States that are 'experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing
problems' can receive financial assistance, namely in the shape of stability support, 'if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a
whole and of its Member States.'54 Yet, this assistance is subject to economic
conditions, which can range, as stated in Article 12(1) of the ESM Treaty,
'from a macro-economic adjustment programme to continuous respect of
pre-established eligibility conditions' and must be 'fully consistent with the
measures of economic policy coordination' and any decisions and recommendations taken in this context. In fact, in Pringle the ECJ has made clear
that strict conditionality of financial assistance is necessary 'to ensure that the
activities of the ESM are compatible with, inter alia, Article 125 TFEU and the
coordinating measures adopted by the Union.55 These macroeconomic
adjustment programs that include the economic policy conditions that a

51.

52.

53.

54.
55.

venice_wp/styles/FBF-website/documents/Research%20Report/2015/RR-2015_01-digital.
pdf> (accessed 15 February 2018) ; RITTBERGER B., "Integration without Representation? The
European Parliament and the reform of Economic Governance in the EU », (2014) JCMS,
1174-1183.
For an analysis of the legal framework on the economic dialogue see FASONE C., "European
Economic Governance and Parliamentary Representation. What Place for the European Parliament? », (2014) European Law Journal, 164-185, 175 et s.
Differently Rittberger (op. cit. supra, note 49), at 1180, stating that "the EP has been successful
in establishing the so-called Economic Dialogue with the goal to enhance parliamentary
accountability of executive action".
T/ESM 2012-LT/en 1. For more details on the background and main features of the ESM see
OHLER C., "The European Stability Mechanism: The Long Road to Financial Stability in the
Euro Area", 54 German Y.B. Int'l L. 47 (2011), 47-74.
Preamble No. 5 and Art. 12 ESM Treaty.
C‑370/12, Pringle, EU:C:2012:756, para. 111. See also Art. 136(3) TFEU.

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