Droit et Économie - L'avenir de l'Union économique et monétaire : une perspective franco-allemande - 170

170 L'AVENIR DE L'UNION ÉCONOMIQUE ET MONÉTAIRE

monetary sovereignty16 - which was considered as a price to be paid - at
least indirectly - for German re-unification.17 In return for the price paid,
there was a strong political desire to maintain as much as possible of the
German model within EMU.18 These contradicting perceptions exist until
today and were reinforced by the financial crisis of 2008/2009 and the sovereign debt crisis that followed.

§ 2. Deeper Roots of EMU
However, when looking deeper, political conditions at the time the Member States negotiated the Treaty of Maastricht were much more complex.
The plans to realize an economic and monetary union went back to the
late 1960s and early 70s resulting in the Werner Report which suggested a
flexible three-stage process for the introduction of a common currency.19
The decisive step towards full monetary integration was made during the
European Council summit in Hannover on 27/28 June 1988. In their declaration, the Heads of State or Government confirmed the objective of progressive realization of economic and monetary union. They decided to
entrust to a Committee chaired by Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission, "the task of studying and proposing concrete stages leading towards this union". The Delors Report was presented less than one
year later, on 17 April 1989, and became the blueprint for EMU under the
Treaty of Maastricht. It is notable that a similar development took place
with respect to the Statute of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). It was drafted in mutual
consent by the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community and reflected political
compromises between all of them.20 At the same time, in late 1991 and
early 1992, economic conditions were still benign and key features of
EMU, the independence of central banks and price stability as primary

16. This was at the core of the constitutional complaints against the Maastricht Treaty which were
decided by the Bundesverfassungsgericht on 12 October 1993, see Decisions of the Federal
Constitutional Court, vol. 89, p. 155; for a critical analysis of the economic risks of EMU as
viewed by one of the complainants see NÖLLING W., Unser Geld (1993), p. 168 et s.
17. For an in depth-analysis see RÖDDER A., 21.0. Eine kurze Geschichte der Gegenwart (2016),
p. 289-290.
18. See e.g. ISSING O. (note 9), p. 7; RUFFERT M., Europäische Währungspolitik als Herausforderung für
das Recht, Zentrum für Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht, Universität Bonn, Nr. 214 (2015), p. 16.
19. On the Werner Plan and its political failure see HERRMANN (note 2), p. 203-206.
20. For an early overview see GOODHART C., "A European Central Bank", in: MULLINEAUX (ed.),
European Banking (1992), p. 12-43.

Droit et Économie - L'avenir de l'Union économique et monétaire : une perspective franco-allemande

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