Droit et Économie - L'avenir de l'Union économique et monétaire : une perspective franco-allemande - 175

THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKING IN EMU 175

decisions. In addition, the economic phenomena the ECB faces when
implementing its tasks are complex and require a broad economic judgement. However, as Articles 263 and 267 TFEU make it clear, the measures
taken by the ECB are also subject to legal scrutiny by the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU), even when the Court is prepared to respect
the discretion enjoyed by the ECB and to apply a rather lose form of judicial
control.46 In Germany, the Bundesverfassungsgericht hinted at the close relationship between the independence of the ECB, its limited powers according to the principle of conferral, the fundamental principle of democracy
and, accordingly, the need to review its decisions strictly under the legal
standards imposed by the Treaties.47 The reasoning applied in favour of a
strict legal review is that its independence exempts the ECB from parliamentary control but not from the control exercised by the competent
courts. In addition, the Bundesverfassungsgericht argued that the democratic principle would require a restrictive interpretation of the ECB's mandate
in order to compensate for its reduced level of democratic legitimation.48

B. Peculiarities of Monetary Policy
Against this background, it seems that the conflicts on the powers of the
ECB, which occurred in recent years, can be framed as methodological
conflicts on how to interpret primary law, even if its provisions grant
broad discretion to the ECB. Accordingly, a vast majority of academic
authors focused on the roles played by the Bundesverfassungsgericht as
well as the Court of Justice and discussed whether a course of judicial activism or judicial restraint should be pursued towards the ECB.49 However,
the problems go deeper and insofar, some observations should be made.
Courts normally take an outside perspective on the subject of the dispute
brought before them. In this paper, however, I want to offer an inside-perspective on the conditions of monetary policy as a starting point for a slightly
different kind of legal analysis that could be applied in judicial proceedings.
By putting the lawyer in the shoes of a central banker, the time horizon
changes and requires an ex-ante perspective on the subject of a monetary
46. So far, the Gauweiler case is the leading decision, CJEU (note 30), para 68.
47. Bundesverfassungsgericht, OMT case, judgement of 21 June 2016, Decisions of the Federal
Constitutional Court, vol. 142, p. 123 et sequ, para. 185-189.
48. Bundesverfassungsgericht (note 47), para 189.
49. See e.g. HINAREJOS A., "Gauweiler and the Outright Monetary Transactions Programme",
11 European Constitutional Law Review (2015), p. 563 et s.; MAYER, « Zurück zur Rechtsgemeinschaft: Das OMT-Urteil des EuGH », NJW 2015, p. 1999 et s.; PAYANDEH, « The OMT Judgement
of the Federal Constitutional Court », 13 European Constitutional Law Review (2017), p. 400
et s.; WENDEL, « Kompetenzrechtliche Grenzgänge; Karlsruhes Ultra-vires-Vorlage an den
EuGH », ZaöRV 2014, p. 615 et s.

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