Droit et Économie - L'avenir de l'Union économique et monétaire : une perspective franco-allemande - 184

184 L'AVENIR DE L'UNION ÉCONOMIQUE ET MONÉTAIRE

with the initial objective to stabilize financial markets82 and, later on, with the
objective to foster economic growth in the ailing Member States (or reduce
the risk of deflation, as the ECB put it). So far, however, the fundamental
flaws in the architecture of EMU have never been repaired: the absence of
a credible and robust debt restructuring system permitting over-indebted
Member States to restructure its debt while not, at the same time, creating
risks for the survival of EMU itself. The existing collective action clauses,
required by Article 12 (3) of the ESM Treaty, do not provide the full answer
to this challenge, as they do not consider liquidity needs in the financial markets. In addition, they do not solve the problem of risk contagion, in particular the fear among market participants that an insolvent Member State could
trigger the financial collapse of other Member States as well and force them
to leave EMU. As the debt crisis demonstrated, the power of the ESM to
contain the turmoil on the financial markets was insufficient. The pressure
caused by the tremendous economic risks of the debt crisis spreading prompted the ECB to intervene in order to ascertain the survival of EMU itself. Its
measures aimed at smoothing the effects of the debt crisis on the financial
markets and, later on, to spur economic growth in the euro area. Alternative
instruments outside the purview of monetary policy that could prevent contagion risks realistically and effectively have not been developed until today.

E. Conclusion
EMU is built on a complex structure of divergent historical experiences. At
the same time, the viability of the system requires that the EU will remain
embedded in an effective peace order, not only on a European, but also on
the international level. The financial crisis of 2008/2009 and the sovereign
debt crisis that followed led to a series of unconventional monetary policy
measures and changed fundamentally the understanding of the role played
by central banks. It was a reaction to the painful insight that the existing
architecture of EMU did neither guarantee a sufficient degree of economic
convergence between the Member States nor ascertain the financial stability of the euro area. Insofar, the measures taken by the ECB closed a lacuna
and complemented other reforms, including the establishment of the ESM.
The long-term effects of the asset purchase programmes implemented by
the Eurosystem are still uncertain, however. On the one hand, they fostered
economic stability in the euro area and calmed down financial markets. On
the other hand, they created new risks by deepening the debtor/creditor
relationship between central banks and national governments which could
threaten the independence and the credibility of the Eurosystem.
82. On the new relevance of the financial stability objective see LASTRA (note 21), p. 89;
OHLER C. (note 38), p. 73-76. For an economic overview DE GRAUWE P. (note 2), p. 194-199.

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