JED - February 2018 - 28

The Journal of Electronic Defense | February 2018


tested electromagnetic spectrum (EMS)
dominance and air superiority. Following the withdrawal of US forces from
forward bases in Europe and a retrenchment from the Middle East, emboldened
adversaries, long forgotten, have begun
more aggressive efforts to undermine
US security interests. From the annexation of Crimea by Russia to the blatant
support of terrorist organizations in
Yemen by Iran, adversaries are testing
out new technologies and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) which
challenge the way the US has been conducting war for the better part of the
last two decades.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the disparity between adversary
nations' ability to challenge US dominance in both the EMS and air space.
Specifically, this article takes to task
the current view the US Army has regarding EW operations and how it affects our ability to conduct operations
in contested environments. The article
then discusses "a way ahead" for the
Army to rapidly address these capability gaps. Methods and TTPs tested by
the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team,
2nd Infantry Division (2-2 SBCT) both
during home-station training (HST) and
at the National Training Center (NTC) in
Fort Irwin, CA, demonstrate a way of addressing the EW capability gap.

Given the ubiquity of Russian military equipment across the world, it
is only fitting to begin the disparity
discussion with how the Russian Federation employs cyber and EW capabilities. Current Russian doctrine focuses
on what is (among other names) called
New Generation Warfare. The specifics
and vastness in scope of how their Information Related Capabilities (IRCs) are
incorporated is beyond the purview of
this article. However, they regularly use
Cyberspace Operations (CO) and EW in a
complimentary fashion.
During numerous engagements in
the Donbas Oblast of Ukraine, Russian
forces have fused CO, EW, and kinetic
action to generate devastating effects
against Ukrainian forces. On one occasion, Ukrainian forces were marshalling
outside of a city when suddenly all of

their primary communications systems
ceased functioning. Shortly thereafter,
the whirring of a drone was heard overhead. No later than 10 minutes following
the drone reconnaissance, rocket-fire
rained down on the marshalling area
resulting in over two battalions' worth
of combat power being destroyed. After
the carnage ended, surviving Ukrainian
soldiers received text messages on their
cell phones asking "How did you enjoy
the artillery fire?"
To accomplish these feats, the Russian military has been investing heavily in upgraded jamming capabilities
through the state-owned Concern
Radio-Electronic Technologies (KRET)
laboratories. New systems such as the
Vitebsk, Krasuhka, and Moskva have
been fielded and tested both during
large-scale military exercises and in
combat, according to Samuel Bendett of
the Center for Naval Analyses. The Russian military has entire formations of
EW equipment, each with subsections
focused on specific portions of the EMS
with enormous amounts of power. From
High Frequency through Ku- and Kaband frequencies, these systems focus
power on the specific need of the Tactical Group. They can jam artillery fuses,
GPS systems (both L1 and L2; inherently
affecting all systems which rely on GPS
for timing), satellite communications,
and the most advanced radar systems,
such as the SPY-1 of the US Navy.
To augment their EW capability, Russia relies largely on patriotic hacking
groups. Unlike conventional weapons
or even EW weapons, cyberspace gives
these groups plausible deniability. The
Russian government can deny they had
anything to do with the actions even
if they are traced to systems in Russia
because it's nearly impossible to prove
the hackers are members of, or acting on
behalf of, the government. Further this
use of cyber actors to create havoc in
NATO nations doesn't necessarily cause
an invocation of Article 5 of the NATO
charter, thus allowing a permissive offensive cyber campaign with no guaranteed alliance response.

These examples of just how one
capable threat actor is taking to task

American military doctrine beg the
question: What is the Army doing to
counter these threats in the face of increased state-actor aggression? Through
its Multi-Domain Battle concept, the
Army is looking into making changes
to how it fights, but this is a nascent
concept currently in development. The
Army only has two programs of record
for EW, the DUKE and EW Planning and
Management Tool (EWPMT). The Army is
beginning to field EWPMT, but this is a
fairly new solution that offers a basic
capability. More functionality must be
provided through additional capability
drops. Part of the problem is the glacial
speed of the acquisitions process, the
geological timescale in which cultural
shifts in the way of warfighting thinking changes, and the general lack of
specific technical knowledge regarding
the employment of Incident Response
Capabilities (IRC) enablers in war. However, enterprising Electronic Warfare
Officers (EWOs) and IRC personnel have
been leaning forward to overcome these
capability gaps in effective and creative
The US Army's 1st Infantry Division,
3rd Infantry Division, and the 82nd Airborne Division are some of the units that
have successfully developed EW Weapons Teams (EWWTs) (See JED, September
2017 and October 2017). Each division's
team has a uniqueness that addresses
unit organization and specific environments in which they are expected to operate. None of these divisions had yet
to fully "mechanize" the EWWT concept.
Enter 2-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team
(SBCT), who with the assistance of Digital Receiver Technology, Inc., tested the
EWWT concept for a Stryker Brigade.

The initial testing occurred during
the BCT's "Bayonet Focus" training exercise, orchestrated by the 7th Infantry
Division during June of 2017 at Yakima
Training Center (YTC) in Washington
state. This concept was extremely limited in scope due to resourcing constraints, but it proved to be a very
effective test run. The BCT consolidated
three (3) EW Sergeants (E5 29Ex3) to be
OPCON to the BCT CEMA Element. The
team used one (1) M998 equipped with


JED - February 2018

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of JED - February 2018

The View From Here
Conferences Calendar
Courses Calendar
From the President
The Monitor
World Report
Big Challenges Ahead as DOD Tries to Address EMSO Implementation
Tactical CEMA for the Mechanized Force
New Products
EW 101
AOC News
Index of Advertisers
JED Quick Look
JED - February 2018 - intro
JED - February 2018 - cover1
JED - February 2018 - cover2
JED - February 2018 - 3
JED - February 2018 - 4
JED - February 2018 - 5
JED - February 2018 - The View From Here
JED - February 2018 - 7
JED - February 2018 - Conferences Calendar
JED - February 2018 - 9
JED - February 2018 - Courses Calendar
JED - February 2018 - 11
JED - February 2018 - From the President
JED - February 2018 - 13
JED - February 2018 - 14
JED - February 2018 - The Monitor
JED - February 2018 - 16
JED - February 2018 - 17
JED - February 2018 - 18
JED - February 2018 - 19
JED - February 2018 - World Report
JED - February 2018 - 21
JED - February 2018 - Big Challenges Ahead as DOD Tries to Address EMSO Implementation
JED - February 2018 - 23
JED - February 2018 - 24
JED - February 2018 - 25
JED - February 2018 - 26
JED - February 2018 - insert1
JED - February 2018 - insert2
JED - February 2018 - Tactical CEMA for the Mechanized Force
JED - February 2018 - 28
JED - February 2018 - 29
JED - February 2018 - 30
JED - February 2018 - New Products
JED - February 2018 - EW 101
JED - February 2018 - 33
JED - February 2018 - AOC News
JED - February 2018 - 35
JED - February 2018 - 36
JED - February 2018 - Index of Advertisers
JED - February 2018 - JED Quick Look
JED - February 2018 - cover3
JED - February 2018 - cover4