April 2023 - Parks & Recreation - 30

LAW REVIEW
Reasonable Suspicion
Having found " the seizure was only
an investigatory stop, " the federal
district found the Fourth Amendment
would only require the City
to " show that the officers had reasonable
suspicion that the suspect
had violated the law. " The court
defined
" reasonable
suspicion "
within the context of a Fourth
Amendment seizure as follows:
While reasonable suspicion is
a less demanding standard than
probable cause and requires a
showing considerably less than
preponderance of the evidence, the
Fourth Amendment requires at
least a minimal level of objective
justification for making the stop.
An officer must articulate more
than an inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or 'hunch' of
criminal activity.
In this particular instance, the
court found: " The undisputed facts
show that the officers had a reasonable
suspicion that Grant had violated
both the disorderly conduct
and solicitation ordinances. "
Probable Cause
Even if Grant's seizure constituted
a custodial arrest, the federal district
court found " the officers had
probable cause to arrest Grant for
disorderly conduct and violation
of the city ordinance regarding
solicitation. " As described by the
court, probable cause for an arrest
would exist under the following
circumstances:
[W]hen there are facts and circumstances
within the officer's
knowledge that are sufficient to
warrant a prudent person, or one
of reasonable caution, in believing,
in the circumstances shown,
that the suspect has committed,
30 Parks & Recreation | APRIL 2 0 2 3
is committing, or is about to
commit an offense.
Also, in determining whether
probable cause to justify an arrest,
the court would examine whether
the particular facts establish the
elements of the crime at issue. Accordingly,
the court would initially
determine whether the officers had
probable cause to arrest Grant for
violating the solicitation ordinance.
Solicitation Violations
As cited by the court, Philadelphia
City Ordinance Code § 10-611(4)
(b) prohibited individuals to " solicit
money for any purpose on the public
sidewalk in any manner, within an
eight-foot radius of any building
entrance, or within an eight-foot
radius of any vending cart. " In this
particular instance, Grant did not
dispute the fact that he " stationed
himself within [seven] to 10 feet of
the nearest vendor. "
Because Grant admittedly
" stood either within or just outside
of the prohibited distance required
by the statute, " the court
found " a reasonable officer at
that moment could conclude that
he was within the prohibited distance
from a vendor " :
Probable cause does not require
the officers to use a tape measure.
Plaintiff also concedes that he had
a collection basket at his feet with
a dollar in the corner and money
inside. A reasonable officer could
conclude from these facts that
Plaintiff was impermissibly engaged
in solicitation within eight
feet of a vendor.
As a result, the federal district
court held " the police had probable
cause that Plaintiff was violating
the City's solicitation ordinance. "
Grant had insisted he did not
| PARK S ANDRECRE AT ION . OR G
engage in solicitation because " his
subjective intent was not monetary. "
Grant, however, did concede
he had a basket with a folded dollar
inside if " someone wanted to
put money inside. " Under such
circumstances, the court found " a
reasonable
officer
observing
the
basket at the scene could conclude
that he was soliciting. "
In the alternative, Grant had
argued the solicitation ordinance
" only applies to sidewalks and
does not apply to public parks. "
The court, however, noted Grant's
conduct " took place on a paved
right of way for exclusive pedestrian
use within Love Park, " with
the pavement extending " directly
from the side of the road. " Accordingly,
in the opinion of the
federal district court: " A reasonable
officer could conclude that
the section of Love Park near the
LOVE sign is simply an extension
of the sidewalks, as there is no
clear demarcation between sidewalk
and park. "
Moreover, the
court noted Grant had not cited
any legal
authority
to " suggest
that the ordinance defines 'public
sidewalk' to exclude a walking
space exclusively for pedestrian
use within a public park " :
Indeed, there is no formal definition
in the statute or binding
legal authority determining the
proper scope of the term " public
sidewalk " in this ordinance. See
§ 10-611. Phila., PA., Code § 10611.
Whether or not the location
where Plaintiff stood was legally
a " public sidewalk " covered by
the statute, it was objectively reasonable
for the officers to conclude
that it was.
As a result, the federal district
court held " the officers had proba
April 2023 - Parks & Recreation

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