For the Defense - Vol. 6, Issue 4 - 35

Clause was violated when a West Virginia Supreme
Court justice denied plaintiff's recusal motion
despite having received campaign contributions
from the defendant corporation's board chairman
and principal officer, who were found liable for
damages at trial.7
The U.S. Supreme Court in
Caperton found there was a serious risk of actual
bias where a person with a personal stake in a
case has a significant and disparate influence in
electing the judge presiding over the case, either by
raising funds or by overseeing the judge's election
campaign. The Court found that the judge's failure
to recuse himself violated the Due Process Clause.
In 2014, in response to the Caperton decision, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down new rules
for judicial ethics. Accordingly, Rule 2.11(A)(4) of the
Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct clearly states
grounds for mandatory recusal in circumstances
where a judge had received political campaign
contributions " in an amount that would raise a
reasonable concern " from the opposing party or their
counsel, which includes not only the lawyer, but also
his or her law firm.
Williams v. Pennsylvania
Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided an
issue of judicial recusal that arose in Pennsylvania.
In 1984, Terrance Williams was sentenced to death
for the murder of Amos Norwood.8
The Philadelphia
District Attorney's Office prosecuted Mr. Williams,
under the leadership of then-District Attorney
Ronald Castille. Mr. Williams' co-defendant, Marc
Draper, testified that they had committed the crime
and the jury convicted Mr. Williams of first-degree
murder and robbery. During trial, the prosecutor
directly asked for permission from her supervisors
in the District Attorney's Office to pursue the death
penalty as the desired punishment for Williams,
and in support thereof, the prosecutor prepared
a memorandum that set forth the details of the
crime and the sentencing factors. Then-District
Attorney Castille, wrote " [a]pproved to proceed on
the death penalty " at the bottom of the document.
Mr. Williams was ultimately sentenced to death and
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
judgment in 1990. In 1995, Mr. Williams filed a PostConviction
Relief Act ( " PCRA " ) petition. The PCRA
court denied relief and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, with District Attorney Castille now serving as
Chief Justice, affirmed the decision.
In 2012, Mr. Williams filed another PCRA petition
based on new information provided by Mr. Williams'
co-defendant Draper that Mr. Williams had been
in a sexual relationship with Norwood, which was
the real motive behind Norwood's murder. Draper
asserted that the Commonwealth instructed him
to give false testimony that Mr. Williams killed
Norwood to rob him. The PCRA Court stayed Mr.
Williams' execution and vacated his death sentence.
The PCRA Court found that the trial prosecutor had
suppressed material and exculpatory evidence that
violated the principals set forth in Brady v. Maryland
and engaged in " prosecutorial gamesmanship. " In
response to the PCRA Court's stay of execution,
the Commonwealth submitted an emergency
application to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court-
nearly three decades after Williams' prosecution.
Mr. Williams filed an answer to Pennsylvania's
application and included a motion requesting
that Chief Justice Castille recuse himself from the
proceedings or, should he decline to do so, to refer
the recusal motion to the full court for decision.
" Without providing any explanation, Chief Justice
Castille denied the motion for recusal and the
request for its referral. " Just two days later, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the application
to vacate the stay and ordered the parties to fully
brief the issues raised in the appeal. Subsequently,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unanimously
vacated the PCRA Court's order granting relief for
the penalty phase of the trial and reinstated the
original death sentence.
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Mr.
Williams maintained that due process requires
an objective inquiry into a judge's bias and that
the test for that should be whether an average
judge in Justice Castille's positions would likely
be impartial. Conversely, Pennsylvania argued
that the law required a finding of actual bias,
instead of looking to the potential for bias, citing
Caperton. The U.S. Supreme Court, in a decision
led by Justice Kennedy, held that when a judge
has prior involvement in a case as the prosecutor,
the principles established by the Court in prior
recusal decisions must apply. The Court further
held that under the Due Process Clause, there is
an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge
had prior significant and personal involvement as
a prosecutor in a decisive decision pertaining to
the defendant's case.
The Standard for Recusal - Actual Bias vs. the
Appearance of Objectivity and Impartiality
Pennsylvania's Rule 2.11 mirrors the American
Bar Association's Model Rule 2.11 governing
disqualification.9
Recusal is mandatory if any
of the specifically enumerated grounds for
disqualification exist in a case. Furthermore, Rule
2.11 requires a judge to disqualify himself or
Vol. 6, Issue 4 l For The Defense 35
For the Defense - Vol. 6, Issue 4

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