Flight Training - April 2014 - 50

ADVANCED PILOT»

ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

Lost in transition
Accidents in advanced instruction
» By David Jack Kenny

EXPERIENCED INSTRUCTORS MAY be
surprised-or may not!-to learn that
their worst enemies aren't student
pilots. More than 60 percent of all
fatal accidents in fixed-wing training
take place during advanced instruction-flights on which the "student"
already holds some pilot certificate
in the airplane category. Advanced
instruction also accounts for more
than half of fatal training accidents in
helicopters.
Even more surprising, instruction
toward some future checkride-
seaplane, instrument, commercial,
multiengine, or CFI-is not the major
problem. Less than 40 percent of
advanced fixed-wing accidents occur

while pursuing any of these curricula.
Thirty percent come during various
kinds of recurrent training (flight
reviews, IPCs, line checks, and nonspecific refresher flights), slightly
more than twice the share while seeking high-performance, complex, or
(mostly) tailwheel endorsements.
Of all the different types of
advanced instruction, however, the
one that wrecks the single largest
number of airplanes is make-andmodel transition training. New-model
checkouts account for more than onesixth of all advanced instructional
accidents, and more fatalities than
anything except instrument training.
What makes them so perilous? In

NEW-MODEL CHECKOUTS ACCOUNT FOR MORE
THAN ONE-SIXTH OF ALL ADVANCED INSTRUCTIONAL
ACCIDENTS.
50 /

FLIGHTTRAINING.AOPA.ORG

theory, having someone
who knows how to fly
other models learn from
someone who knows how
to fly this one doesn't present obvious risks. In the
real world, though, both
ends of that equation can
break down. Some instructors' lack of familiarity
with the aircraft almost
certainly played a role:
The CFI who attempted
a no-flaps takeoff from a
1,840-foot grass strip in
a 180-horsepower Piper
Arrow had just two hours
in the make and model.
Students' basic airmanship
can also leave something
to be desired, as with the
new partner in a Piper
Comanche who came up
90 feet short of the threshold attempting a simulated
engine-out.
The Comanche accident illustrates
two other recurrent themes: Instructors who are too slow to intervene,
and emergency practice gone wrong.
A fatal spin during a Bonanza checkout was precipitated by an instructor
who liked to teach the "impossible
turn" by pulling the throttle at 900
feet agl. Apparently he was able to
make it work until the day it didn't.
More typical-and fortunately less
catastrophic-was the case of the pilot
getting acquainted with an Aeronca
Chief. An unstabilized approach
caused him to touch down too
fast, shimmying from side to side,
while his instructor apparently didn't
do enough to prevent the ensuing
ground loop.
Commercial pilot David Jack Kenny is the Air
Safety Institute's statistician.
http://FLIGHTTRAINING.AOPA.ORG
Flight Training - April 2014

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