AOPA Pilot Magazine - November 2010 - 30

SAFETYPILOT

BY BRUCE LANDSBERG
PRESIDENT, AOPA FOUNDATION

Non sequiturs in the politics of safety

ust in case you slept through high-school Latin, a non sequitur is a thought that does not logically follow what has just been said. A recent law passed

The Colgan FO had 2,244 total flight hours and 774 in the Q400—well above any legislated requirement. The AOPA Air Safety Institute reviewed U.S. air carrier accidents over the past 10 years: None was found in which the FO’s flight time or qualifications were causal or a factor. The victims’ families were apparently advised that future accidents could be prevented with significantly higher FO requirements and that there ought to be a law. There was no factual support, but by Congress, House Rule 5900, mandates that the might it have something to do with the absurdly low wages of FOs at the regional airlines? Labor FAA require new pilots hired by the airlines to have As of October 1, has been generally powerless to stop the race to at least 1,500 hours total flight time and an ATP certhe safety arm tificate. This is a classic case of good intentions that the bottom that has affected wages throughout the of AOPA is the will likely have greatly unintended consequences. industry. Many regional airlines start their FOs at AOPA Air Safety The law grew out of the tragic Colgan Q400 accia salary below $25,000 a year—because there are Institute. dent in Buffalo, New York, in 2009 where the NTSB more qualified applicants than slots. determined “that the probable cause of this accident From an airline management’s view, why pay was the captain’s inappropriate response to the activation of the more when crew seats can be filled with acceptable bodies for stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the less? Greed or good business? Why would a young person comairplane did not recover. Contributing to the accident were (1) ing out of an aviation college or flight academy, with possibly the flight crew’s failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the $150,000 in debt, work as an indentured servant? It’s caused a rising position of the low-speed cue, (2) the flight crew’s failure number of potentially good pilots and their parents to question to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) the captain’s failure the wisdom of an airline career. How sad! Economic reality and to effectively manage the flight, and (4) Colgan Air’s inadequate gravity are the bane of aviation. Side effects include commutprocedures for airspeed selection and management during ing pilots who can’t afford to live near their domiciles, divorces, approaches in icing conditions.” personal and airline bankruptcy, and all manner of societal Crew fatigue because of extensive commuting; a captain with mayhem. Perhaps that’s where some congressional attena weak training record, both before and after he came to the tion might be addressed. There are places where government airline; Colgan’s poorly implemented training to rapidly tran- re-regulation may have to play a stabilizing role. sition crews into new aircraft types; and a lack of appropriate More than 3,000 airline pilots are on furlough at this writoversight by the FAA for transitioning pilots round out my list. ing, including quite a number of FOs who either don’t have the Nowhere in any of this are the first officer’s flight-hour quali- requisite flight time or the ATP Could they be legislated out of . fications mentioned as a cause or a factor, yet a law has passed the cockpit if not grandfathered? If potential new hires are unfit addressing a nonissue. This non sequitur was caused by the just because they don’t meet an arbitrary hourly requirement, understandable grief and outrage of the families who lost loved then how could these furloughed low-timers possibly be justiones on the flight. They somehow were led to believe that the fied as safe? It’s a rhetorical question, and you know the answer. FO was underqualified and she was a proximate cause. Pilots should be hired and trained by solid criteria, not arbiThe FO played a role in this accident by not properly moni- trary numbers. There must be some apprenticeship time that’s toring the captain, who was flying the aircraft; selecting the only available in airline operations. It’s completely unrealistic to wrong reference airspeed for icing conditions; and not follow- expect new pilots to get much “real-world experience” in icing, ing procedure once the aircraft stalled. Yet, the captain’s lack thunderstorms, and airline operations in crewed turbine equipof cockpit discipline prior to the accident and his completely ment without being in an airliner. Few can afford that kind of inappropriate response to a stall were the primary causes. training. The infamous aviation Catch 22 is badly compounded: The Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) defended the crew’s We’d love to hire you but you don’t have enough experience; you actions: “The FAA Principal Operations Inspector described can’t get the experience until you get hired. Colgan as a reactive versus proactive organization. The orgaIf the airlines take economic training shortcuts that result in nizational culture at Colgan was primarily punitive.” ALPA safety issues, the FAA already has authority to shut them down. cited questionable simulator fidelity and incomplete manuals The FAA has been tasked to come up with a response to Conand training on the aircraft stick shaker and stall recovery. That gress. We cannot give the Colgan families what was taken from seems appropriate to the discussion at hand, but conversation them. However, we do owe them a real and logical solution, not morphed into a need for higher hiring requirements for FOs. a non sequitur. 30 • NOVEMBER
2010

AOPA PILOT •

AOPA Pilot Magazine - November 2010

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of AOPA Pilot Magazine - November 2010