AOPA Pilot Magazine - April 2011 - 30

SAFETYPILOT

BY BRUCE LANDSBERG
PRESIDENT, AOPA FOUNDATION

How much data should we collect?

n a recent Air Safety eJournal, my mostly weekly blog, I cited a study released by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety

accurate—it’s a fair point and my bet is that they’re probably more accurate in capturing details than some eyewitnesses, especially when measuring flight parameters before impact. Let’s come back to Steve’s point that government is constantly collecting data and sometimes an overzealous enforcer decides the data is a great way to nail hapless pilots who infract one of hundreds of touting the benefits of red light cameras (http://blog. FARs. Yodice Associates, AOPA’s legal counsel and aopa.org/asfblog). The Washington Post noted that manager of AOPA’s Legal Services Plan, said there has traffic fatalities were down 26 percent over a fivenot yet been a case when FDM data has been used. year period in D.C., significantly more than cities FAR 91.609(g) provides some protection relative to Bruce Landsberg that didn’t employ such enforcement. D.C.’s traffic cockpit voice recorders. “There have been pilots who flies aircraft fine revenues were up by $7.2 million in one year have used or tried to use their own data to defend equipped with with 85,000 citations issued. The D.C. chief of police against the FAA’s allegations,” Kathy Yodice told me. FDM but has yet redeployed 100 traffic officers to crime fighting and “Sometimes they download the track to show their to see any of his data. It could be noted that “T-bone” crashes were down, along with reasonable reliance on the equipment’s current interesting. fatalities. Rear-end collisions had increased slightly and functioning data, and sometimes they show a but caused fewer injuries. Not everyone, however, repair that needed to be done on the equipment to is quite as enthused about the cameras as the chief. show their reliance on malfunctioning (unbeknown) The tie to aviation is that most glass-cockpit aircraft have data.” Could that be extended to FDM? The Fifth Amendment basic flight data monitoring (FDM). Airliners have been wired to the U.S. Constitution protects us from self-incrimination in for decades, and now light aircraft are being similarly monitored. criminal cases but not in civil activity, where the vast majority FDMs typically record airspeed, altitude, attitude, power set- of aviation enforcement and litigation lies. If your car is less than 20 years old chances are you’ve got an tings, and heading. Sophisticated ones may also gather data on engine internal parameters and aircraft configuration. The event-data monitor that tracks the automotive equivalent of the NTSB likes them because accident investigation is enhanced. FDM. A number of states have enacted legislation to protect I hypothesized that since the FDM was an unbiased observer, the data from general snooping, but when there is an accident it might make it a bit more difficult for enterprising attorneys or a court order, it is allowed into the hands of the authorities. to blame manufacturers for pilot blunders. The converse is also There are some legal guidelines, and these devices have not true when the equipment actually does fail. The poll on my blog been found unconstitutional. The FAA maintains the Aviation Safety Information Analysis revealed 52 percent were against FDM and 44 percent had no particular objection. and Sharing system (ASIAS) “to promote the open exchange From Steve: “I do not mind being watched when the pur- of safety information in order to continuously improve aviapose is to increase safety by providing data for determining tion safety. ASIAS enables users to perform integrated quires facts regarding an incident. Unfortunately, government has a across multiple databases, search an extensive warehouse of habit of introducing things, ostensibly for these purposes, which safety data, and display pertinent elements in an array of usebecome a means for misusing its authority for the purpose of ful formats. A phased approach continues to be followed in the increasing its revenues and/or its already far too intrusive med- construction of this system. Additional data sources and capadling in our lives. Being required to make such data available, bilities will be available as the system evolves in response both absent some triggering incident involving damage to aircraft or to expanded access to shared data and to technological innovainjury to someone, is an invitation for such misuse.” tion.” Nothing is said about enforcement—either way. Hmm. From Tom: “No one has a right to know when, where, or how Embry-Riddle and the University of North Dakota have you travel.” Yet transponders make that point largely moot. Web- equipped their training fleets with FDM. The airlines and their sites such as FlightAware follow us on IFR flight plans unless pilots have been dealing with reams of automated data that flag the tail number is blocked. The downside is that when flying any number of out-of-tolerance issues. Special programs were in the public airspace the public can see you. The upside is the put in place to protect pilots and to ensure that the data are used potential for midair collisions using passive or active cockpit for safety rather than enforcement purposes. Seems like there devices is significantly reduced. should be a similar policy for GA. One of my Washington assignAt a recent safety seminar I asked the crowd their thoughts ments is working with the FAA’s Office of Accident Investigation and, as with the blog, the responses were varied. One pilot and Data Collection, owner of ASIAS. The topic is on our agenda. commented that there was an assumption that FDMs are Tell me what you think (bruce.landsberg@aopa.org). 30 • APRIL 2011

AOPA PILOT •

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AOPA Pilot Magazine - April 2011

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of AOPA Pilot Magazine - April 2011