AOPA Pilot Magazine - December 2014 - 81

The captain's training record was poor
before he got hired by the airline, and
not stellar afterward. One is occasionally
allowed a bad day, but not consistently. In
commercial aviation, the training and standardization programs are there to train,
retrain, and ultimately remove those individuals who cannot consistently meet high
standards. Colgan didn't manage that well.
For GA pilots, if you're having difficulty
flying well, take action! Invest in quality
training to consistently meet at least private pilot standards. If that doesn't work,
maybe it's time to give up the aeronautical chain saw.
The crew apparently did not understand the effects of the Ice Ref speed switch
and apparently only Bombardier knew
that the Q400 did not have a tail stall issue.
NASA's tail stall video, while not considered
a factor by NTSB, needs to be understood
in the context of the aircraft you are flying.
Fatigue was not mentioned as a factor, but then-NTSB Chairman Deborah
Hersman noted that in her remarks. I

agree. While the airlines allow their crews
to commute, they also put the burden on
the crewmembers to present ready for
flight. Human nature being what it is,
periodically somebody is going to show
up exhausted. To deal with at least part of
the fatigue problem, the commuting quandary should be addressed. According to the
NTSB, more than two-thirds of Colgan
pilots based in Newark commuted, either
because of lifestyle or affordability. Not
many accidents have been directly tied to
fatigue-but it's an overlooked link in too
many, in my opinion.
The victims' families somehow got
the idea that the first officer was a major
contributor to the accident and that lowtime first officers were a significant risk.
Tremendous pressure was put on Congress
to force the FAA to raise the standards
for first officers, with emphasis on total
flight time as well as type of training. As
a result, the FAA significantly increased
the requirements-and cost-for one to
become an airline first officer.

The first officer was not mentioned
as a proximate cause, and in any case, she
would have far exceeded the newly implemented requirements for both time and
type of training. The AOPA Air Safety
Institute reviewed airline accidents for 10
years preceding Colgan 3407 and found no
involvement of first officers. In the hundreds of thousands of flight legs flown since
Colgan, until the new rule went into effect
this August, there were no accidents attributable to first officers.
One effect of the new rule was to
decrease the supply of crewmembers, which
led to service being cut at some smaller airports. It ultimately may have an effect on
wages, which by any standard are absurdly
low. That issue should be addressed on its
merits, and not through the subterfuge of
flight experience requirements.
AOPA
BRUCE LANDSBERG is the former president

of the AOPA Foundation, which funds the
work of the Air Safety Institute (www.
aopa.org/airsafetyinstitute).

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AOPA Pilot Magazine - December 2014

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of AOPA Pilot Magazine - December 2014