AOPA Pilot Magazine - August 2018 - 24

SAFETY SPOTLIGHT

Hubris and inexperience
A cross-country flight with lasting impact
AT DECISION HEIGHT ON AN ILS APPROACH IN FOG

RICHARD MCSPADDEN

is executive director of the AOPA Air
Safety Institute and
a holds commercial,
MEI, and CFI ratings.

24 | AOPA PILOT August 2018

and freezing rain, runway not in sight, low on fuel, three
wingmen in trail behind me in a similar state, hoping to
hear me break out. How did we get in this spot?
It starts with a U.S. Air Force "Navigation
Proficiency" program, which permitted pilots to fly
to any airport in the country with enough runway and
support equipment, so long as they departed after noon
on Friday and returned before noon on Monday. As a
single lieutenant flying F-15s in the New Mexico desert, I took full advantage of this program. On this trip I
was joined by three other pilots, all lieutenants-a flight
composition normally prohibited on navigation proficiency flights, because the Air Force believed (absurdly,
we thought) that experience would be helpful.
The trouble started on our second leg, from
Panama City, Florida, to Sawyer International Airport,
in Michigan's Upper Peninsula. We launched out of
Panama City in the late afternoon for the 1,000-mile
trip north with a weather briefing that looked sketchy,
but acceptable, and jet stream crosswinds close to 100
knots at altitude. Since I had led the first leg, I was
number four on this leg, the most desired spot on crosscountry flights. We knew fuel would be tight, but we
were legal, and we filed and declared the appropriate
alternate field with no real thought of actually using it.
The alternate was only a legal requirement. We'd plan
on unrestricted climbs up to FL450 and get clearance
direct to Sawyer. Besides, our performance on the first
leg was proof our planning materials were conservative,
and we could outperform the flight plan profile for fuel.
On departure, we were delayed in our climb and
rerouted. Eventually we were cleared to FL450 and
once in the 40s received clearance direct to Sawyer, with
a little less fuel than planned at level-off. The jet stream
wasn't quite as forecast, and we had a slight headwind
component, so we burned a bit more fuel en route
than planned. We could still make Sawyer with barely
enough to make the divert field, so we were "legal."
Approaching 100 miles out, we updated weather for
Sawyer and received discomforting news. The airport
was socked in with prevailing weather below approach
minimums; however, there was a "TEMPO group" (temporary group), which improved over a 30-minute period
near our ETA. We pushed the throttles up to ensure we'd
arrive during this window and burned a little more fuel.
Approaching the initial approach fix, well behind the

BY RICHARD MCSPADDEN
Executive Director
AOPA Air Safety Institute

aircraft because of our discussion about the weather, our
flight lead made an unusual decision to fly the approach
in reverse flight order. He cleared me forward to start
the approach as he and the others began to take spacing
in two-mile intervals. I was caught off guard and was
unprepared for the approach.
I departed the IAF and began the penetration well
behind the airplane. I flew the approach, focusing on the
basics, but without the precision needed in such a challenging situation. Eventually, I reached decision height,
with no runway in sight. I executed a missed approach,
and advised my wingmen on our intra-flight radio, but
added that I flew a bad approach and they might break
out with a good approach.
Low on fuel, just having gone missed approach, with
barely enough fuel to make an alternate field that was also
reporting poor weather, I committed to remain at Sawyer
on vectors and try a second approach. Meanwhile, number three (second on the approach) also reported going
missed and that he too flew a poor approach. He followed
me on vectors for a second attempt. Eventually, number
two broke out and advised upon landing that he broke
out at minimums, and he passed a head's up for ice on the
runway. Number one landed behind him. I came around
for my second pass, completely focused, flying as precisely as I ever had. I broke out just below minimums,
slowed for flare, and then executed a full aero-brake to
handle the icy runway. A few tense minutes later, number three landed behind me.
We paused off the runway and gathered ourselves.
We had piled on so many mistakes in this scenario, we
were lucky to get away with them-and we knew it.
Stubborn commitment to make our destination despite
mounting evidence we should reconsider; late decision
making; calling last-second, unbriefed audibles; getting
behind the airplane; not being mentally prepared to use
our alternate; dismissing the trip as routine. I'm sure you
can name a few more. At the root of it all, though, was our
attitude: hubris, over-confidence, an air of invincibility.
I've never forgotten that flight or the lessons it taught
me, and I've realized that many pilots before and since
weren't as fortunate to emerge from such a scenario.
Go fly and take confidence that you have the judgment to avoid scenarios where "hope" is your strategy
and "luck" will define the outcome.
AOPA
EMAIL richard.mcspadden@aopa.org

AOPA Pilot Magazine - August 2018

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