AOPA Pilot Magazine - April 2019 - 89

IN 1991, the FAA issued Advisory Circular
60-22, "Aeronautical Decision Making." It
presented 12 years of study and testing, and
brought concepts such as risk management,
systematic decision making, and cockpit
resource management to general aviation.
It also identified five attitudes found over
and over again in poor judgment chains
and accidents, described as anti-authority
(Don't tell me), impulsivity (Do something
quickly), invulnerability (It won't happen
to me), macho (I can do it), and resignation
(What's the use?). For each dangerous attitude, pilots were instructed to think or say a
specific sentence to themselves, as an "antidote." The study found that this procedure
improved pilot performance over time, and
reduced hazardous patterns that led to bad
decisions. It was triumphantly published,
became part of the human factors curriculum, and the FAA left it at that.
In two and a half decades, nothing about
it has changed, not even the words. The AC
material is printed in the Pilot's Handbook of
Aeronautical Knowledge, in every pilot textbook from student to CFI, and in airman
certification standards-in many of these,
the original language is copied verbatim.
Unfortunately, this approach doesn't
work for general aviation. Once read, it is
usually pushed aside while pilots pursue
more tangible skills. Even if a vigilant pilot
wanted to research the complexities of attitude further, where can you go for greater
understanding when our training hasn't
advanced since the 1990s? Two problems
have to be solved before knowledge of hazardous attitudes can make us safer pilots:
The prescribed procedure doesn't work
well in the GA cockpit, and standard teaching of hazardous attitudes is ineffective.
"Identify the thought as hazardous
and apply the appropriate antidote" is the
core of attitude training, and one reason it
isn't used much in GA could be the key to
improving it. Reading the original advisory
circular, there is a strong implication that
this procedure was developed and proven
in the learning environment. Human performance researchers are identifying a
"learning zone" and a "performance zone,"
and showing how they have different goals,
different requirements, and different applications in life.

In flying, they are fairly easy to grasp-
when we are getting initial training or a
flight review, the circumstances and goals
of the flight usually are very different than
our everyday flying will be post-certificate. In flying's learning zone-primarily
dual instruction-the focus is on improving skills, going out of comfort zones, and
simulating rare and unexpected events, all
with the benefit of another experienced
aviator providing backup and perspective.
In the performance zone we are focused
on executing plans, demonstrating skills,
and minimizing mistakes, such as quickly
getting to the next airport for the $100 hamburger and touching down on the numbers.
The hazardous attitude assessment
procedure demands that we step back
from ourselves and consider our thoughts,
critically asking if we are unconsciously
showing a bias toward bad decisions. There
are so many reasons why a pilot would fail
to use this procedure: Self-reflection can
be uncomfortable and demanding; few
people want to identify something about
themselves or their behavior as wrong;
objectivity about yourself is extremely hard
to achieve; and we may simply be too busy
flying the airplane. In a multi-pilot cockpit, one pilot could provide feedback to the
other if questionable attitudes and decisions
start developing, but asking the single pilot
to be both the actor and the evaluator seems
like an unrealistic burden. The thoughtantidote procedure could work well with an
objective observer acting as a coach, but the
only way it could translate outside the learning zone is if it were so deeply integrated
and practiced as to become automatic. If the
majority of our flying hours happen in the
performance zone, then the flights when we
would most need this procedure would be
the times we would be least likely to use it.
So, if the procedure for handling hazardous attitudes isn't really being used, and
the tools available don't really adapt to who
you are, what do we do? The uncomfortable
answer is that there may not be one perfect
solution. There may not be one procedure
that we can teach, and test, and apply, and
go forth confident that we will always get it
right. Human factors are messy, and don't
lend themselves to assessment and improvement as easily as concrete skills. It is easier
www.aopa.org/pilot AOPA PILOT | 89

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AOPA Pilot Magazine - April 2019

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of AOPA Pilot Magazine - April 2019
