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(continued from page 6)

The FAA defines how the model functions
and provides a sample set of risk factors
and values in its Information for Operators
document (InFO 07015), but encourages
individual operators to refine the tool to
better reflect their unique operation needs.
For instance, a flight department that frequently conducts oceanic operations might
rank such operations as less risky due to
their greater amount of experience than a
department that rarely conducts them.
Integrating the system into a flight
department workflow is not without
challenges though. The system requires
additional work be completed prior to
departure, although this may be mitigated
through automated systems which evaluate pilot currency and flight planning or
through a dispatch office. Additionally, for
the system to be effective, flight departments have the added challenge of determining which risk factors to include, the

values to assign to them, and where to set
the risk thresholds to trigger management
review of a flight.
Jim Zawrotny, Director of Safety at Fair
Wind Air Charter in Stuart, Florida, began
evaluating several Flight Risk Assessment
Tools in 2010, eventually developing a tool
in-house to meet the company’s specific
needs. Their risk assessment tool has gone
through several iterations and now consists
of 25 questions which are evaluated by
their dispatchers for each flight.
In Fair Wind’s tool, risk factors fall into
moderate, high, and extremely high risk
categories. Flights including moderate or
high risk items, such as late night operations or flights to designated mountain
airports, must be approved by both the PIC
and a management pilot. Extremely high risk
items, such as three or more high risk items
or oceanic operations at night, requires team
review by the crew and two members of

management. They also monitor the effectiveness of the included items and periodically refine their list of risk factors.
Incorporating Flight Risk Assessment Tools
into a flight department’s daily routine is
where the department’s safety culture is put
to the test. The system requires that flight
department management act as a firewall
to excessively risky operations, so if management review is a rubber stamp because
the boss really needs to get to Vegas, the
effectiveness of a Risk Assessment Tool is
greatly limited. Therefore, incorporating the
Flight Risk Assessment Tools within a Safety
Management System that is agreed upon at all
levels of an organization is essential. FAA Info
07015: faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info
Lee Smith is an ATP and CFII rated pilot
with a background in corporate and Part
135 operations.

ASI ONLINE

ASI Flight Risk Evaluator
Just as corporate Flight Risk Assessment Tools are pertinent to an objective evaluation
of any proposed business flight, pilots can also benefit from taking a more formal
approach in their recreational flying. The Air Safety Institute’s Flight Risk Evaluator is an
innovative tool that lets general aviation pilots input the details of any personal flight to
get an objective assessment of the risks (airsafetyinstitute.org/FRE).

SAFETY SPOTLIGHT

Texting and Flying
Pilot Distraction May Have Factored in 2011 Medevac Fatal
BY ROB FINFROCK

An increasingly common safety issue for
automobile drivers has also found its way
into aircraft cockpits. Citing the distracting
effects from in-flight texting and repeated
cell phone use, the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) recently issued a list
of recommendations to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) addressing the use of
personal electronic devices (PED) during
critical ground and air operations.
Although the Board cited fuel exhaustion
as the probable cause of the August 26,

2011 crash of an Air Methods Eurocopter
AS350 B2 in Missouri that claimed the
lives of four people, it also noted that the
pilot’s attention was repeatedly diverted
at several mission-critical phases of the
accident flight.
“An examination of cell phone records
showed that the pilot had made and
received multiple personal calls and text
messages throughout the afternoon while
the helicopter was being inspected and
prepared for flight, during the flight to the

first hospital, while he was on the helipad
at the hospital making mission-critical
decisions about continuing or delaying the
flight due to the [low] fuel situation, and
during the accident flight,” the NTSB stated in a release following the April 9, 2013
accident hearing.
Those continuing distractions, the
Board added, likely contributed to the
pilot’s initial, erroneous assumption that
he had sufficient fuel to complete the
medevac mission, as well as his failure
(continued on page 8)

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http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/all_infos/media/2007/info07015.pdf http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/all_infos/media/2007/info07015.pdf http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/all_infos/media/2007/info07015.pdf http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/all_infos/media/2007/info07015.pdf http://flash.aopa.org/asf/flightrisk/ http://www.airsafetyinstitute.org/FRE

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