Premium On Safety - Issue 15, 2014 - 5

SmS CoRNER

Clueless
Crews?

flight Data

What does it mean to a small operator?

By BRUCE LANDSBERG

By CAPTAIN JoHN CoX

Airlines and larger operators have benefited from the use of flight data for years
as a method of capturing, analyzing, and
visualizing how their aircraft operate in
daily operations. In doing so, they have
improved overall safety and operational
efficiency. This data has identified challenging airports, antiquated air traffic
procedures, and maintenance issues.
What about smaller operators; do they
have the tools to enjoy the same benefits? The answer is yes, but there are
some unique challenges.
Many smaller, business aviation operators do not fly enough to build a baseline
of events in a reasonable time. Larger
operators look for more than 1,000
flights as a baseline. For a smaller operator this could take years to establish.
A baseline is now available using other
operators' de-identified data to provide
a comparison for operational trends, but
experienced analysts should be involved
to ensure similarity and usefulness of
aggregated data.
One of flight data monitoring's
(FDM's) most useful features is trending. Comparing flights month over month,
month over previous year, and against a
baseline provides insight into effectiveness of training and the potential of an
increasing risk profile.
Consider unstabilized approaches
as an example. How many unstable
approaches occur within the flight data?
Is the trend up or down from last month?
What airports have the highest number of
unstable approaches? Has any training or
operational mitigation been introduced to
lower the number of unstable approaches? Was it effective? How does the data
compare to the baseline? These are a few
of the questions a high quality flight data
monitoring system can answer.
Flight Safety Foundation recently conducted a study on unstable approaches
and go-arounds. The results showed
that in a high percentage of unstable
approaches where a go-around was

ASI mESSAGE

required, it was not executed and a
landing was made contrary to standard
operating procedure. This implies training
and/or procedural compliance may not
be satisfactory. Further study is needed
and corrective action undertaken. Without
regular monitoring of flight data such
information would be unknown.
For air carriers, Flight Operations
Quality Assurance (FOQA) or Flight Data
Monitoring (FDM), depending on the
amount of data captured, has led to many
operational benefits and training improvements. These benefits have been slower
to arrive in FAR parts 91, 91k, 125,
and 135 operations due to regulatory
reluctance, limited data and the cost of
traditional programs. The regulatory and
cost issues can be mitigated, however,
if smaller operators can leverage data to
adjust their training beyond regulatory
minimums and address actual conditions
facing their operation.
Several leading-edge operators now use
FOQA/FDM data to create unique training
scenarios during one of their two annual
training events. These operators meet
the regulatory requirements such as V1
cuts and engine out precision and nonprecision approaches once a year and they
use the other simulator session to practice
upset prevention and recovery, challenging
airports techniques, decision-making drills,
and other real world challenges. This can
improve a flight department's operation.
Standards are a well-known and proven
enhancement to safe flight operations.
How standardized are smaller flight
departments? Recorded flight data can
help answer that question. If compliance
to standards is less than desired, a review
of the standards may be in order to make
them more user friendly and aligned with
operational challenges. Recorded flight
data is an objective means to evaluate a
flight operation's procedures as well as
compliance with them.
Occasionally flight data illuminates a
need for modifications to air traffic pro(continued on page 6)

How much automation is enough?
When is the line crossed between
having something that's really useful
and doing so much that we have no
idea how it works? What role does
training play?
In the wake of the Asiana accident
one of the NTSB's findings was that
auto-throttle modes were confusing.
Former NTSB Chair Debbie Hersman
noted, "This crew was extremely
experienced. They had a lot of hours,
but they just didn't have the ability
to understand what was happening
in the critical few seconds before the
crash. It wasn't just one person...
there were three experienced people
in the cockpit that didn't understand
what was going on." Really? With
several hundred thousand successful
automated landings completed over
the B777's history, one has to wonder
just how bad the system design was.
Ms. Hersman and I agree that engineers often overthink and overdesign
systems. We diverge about this crew's
capability. Experience and competence are two different attributes.
Two airline accidents that bear
similarity with somewhat clueless
crews are the Colgan Q400 accident
in Buffalo and Air France 447, the
Airbus 330 that stalled over the
South Atlantic. In all cases, a highly
automated aircraft wrested control
away from the crew.
Lest you think I'm just picking on air
carrier pilots, GA pilots demonstrate
a lack of clue far more frequently.
Automation doesn't seem to trap us
often-judgment does. Lack of fuel,
too much weather, too much wind, too
little altitude, not enough runway-you
know the list-don't add to it.
Safe Flights...

Bruce Landsberg
Senior Safety Advisor, Air Safety Institute
5
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