Premium on Safety - Issue 34, 2019 - 10

ASI MESSAGE

Perception and Reality
Meaningful analysis after a crash takes time
On June 10, 2019, a
helicopter flying in poor
weather with a single
pilot on board crashed
on the roof of a New York
City skyscraper during
what appears to be an
emergency-landing attempt.
No one else was injured,
although nearby residents
were shaken. New Yorkers are understandably anxious about
aircraft crashes inside the city.
Predictably, politicians arrived on scene and with scant
information called for further restrictions on aviation. Such
calls have become commonplace after an aviation accident,
but since they stem from incomplete, sometimes inaccurate
information, the demands are often misguided.
Our elected officials are in a tough spot. As representatives
of a public used to quick answers, politicians must rapidly
demonstrate they are informed and engaged. They are
expected to provide immediate response to assure public
safety. To an extent, the smooth order of our society depends
on such assurances from our elected leaders during a crisis.
The demands of the public-prodding politicians to move
quickly, sometimes ahead of the facts-don't synchronize
with the methodical and comprehensive investigations the
NTSB and FAA undertake to determine cause, and to provide
recommendations that mitigate risks and recurrence of a
similar accident. That demanding and painstaking work takes
far longer than the public is willing to wait for reassurance.
Aviation accidents are typically dramatic events. They don't
occur very often as compared to automobile, boating,
bicycling, or other transportation and recreation modes. They
also rouse a suppressed skepticism many have of aviation
and a fear of airplanes falling from the sky-even though,
on average, fewer than two people a year on the ground are
harmed from an aircraft accident. Compare that to some 5,000
pedestrians killed by automobiles each year.
Still, aviation accidents are juicy items for media outlets. They
gain attention, which helps sell papers or gain viewership. The
drama stimulates public curiosity, but quick news cycles run
counter to deep and informed understanding of the accident
and meaningful remediations. By the time the NTSB report is
released, usually some 18 months after the accident, the public
has long since accepted initial reactions and moved on, with an
adjusted perception of aviation.

Meanwhile, aviation, and specifically general aviation, quietly
continues advancing an impressive safety record. The 630,000
registered pilots in the United States produce some 25 million
GA flight hours per year with less than one fatal accident per
100,000 hours. In 2008, the FAA set an ambitious 10-year
goal of reducing fatal GA accidents by 10 percent over 10
years. Industry, associations, government, and individual pilots
worked together and exceeded the goal.
The attitude among leaders in GA is that even one fatal
accident is too many. Thus, after every NTSB investigation, we
analyze the causes and factors that contributed to the accident
in order to focus reforms in training, equipment, procedures,
and culture. These analyses can be brutally candid. Such
candor and transparency are part of why GA has been so
successful in reducing the fatal accident rate by more than 50
percent since the mid-1990s.
Early reporting from the June 10 New York City crash alleges
potentially troubling decisions on the part of the pilot, who
was not certified to fly IFR. Pressed for time, after delaying
for weather and reportedly making statements about only
needing a few minutes to go a short distance, he departed in
low, ragged ceilings with visibility just over a mile. Pressure
to go, known as "get-there-itis," is often present in fatal GA
accidents. Flying in instrument meteorological conditions
with only a VFR qualification is too often an ingredient in GA
fatalities. The NTSB will eventually determine if these high-risk
elements contributed to the New York City accident.
The June 10 crash was newsworthy in part because of its
rarity. The hundreds of thousands of safe GA operations over
New York City every year don't make the news. The 34th
Street heliport alone, where the mishap pilot departed, has an
average of 50 operations a day.
Every aspect of that tragic flight is being analyzed to
determine how to prevent similar accidents in the future. In the
meantime, industry leaders must arm politicians and regulators
with information that establishes context and help them
resist pressure for quick, placating remedies that may not
meaningfully affect public safety-which could damage a $2
billion industry that's a cherished part of our national identity.

RICHARD G. MCSPADDEN, JR.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AOPA AIR
SAFETY INSTITUTE

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Premium on Safety - Issue 34, 2019

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Premium on Safety - Issue 34, 2019 - Contents
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