Premium on Safety - Issue 44, 2022 - 7

BEST PRACTICES
The automation paradox is threefold. First, a perfectly functional
flight control system provides little opportunity for a pilot to
keep up their currency and practice; it basically steals a pilot's
flying time to practice and stay sharp. The autopilot reliably and
tirelessly flies at a level of perfection that makes the pilot unwilling
to hand fly until they are unable. Second, automation can mask
deteriorating pilot skills or even incompetency on the part of the
pilot. This downward, deteriorating spiral continues to the point
where the autopilot is a necessary crutch. Third, when automated
systems fail, they often do so when the flight control pressures
have exceeded control servo capability. A disengaged pilot
inherits the most serious control problem at the worst possible
time. Air France Flight 447 or Colgan Air Flight 3407 are sad
examples of the automation paradox at work. Pilots taking over
manually in a state of confusion. In both cases, unprepared pilots
were poorly equipped to take command. Automation surprise
and mode confusion linked with deteriorated skills had very bad
results.
Tracking an airframe such as the Pilatus PC-12 from its U.S. debut
in 1994 as a basic package hauler to its present dominance as a
top-selling sexy single-engine turboprop is a great metaphor for
how technology has evolved and enabled increased safety as a
benefit. Pilatus transformed public opinion over 30 years all the
while morphing into a technological wonder. With only a single
engine in a world of redundant twin engine aircraft and a high
stall speed, it required a stick shaker/pusher for FAA certification.
The original Pilatus was a VFR package hauler when King Airs
ruled the small charter world. In 1998, the FAA approved the
PC-12 for night and IMC air taxi operations. Through a series of
incremental technological improvements and a phenomenal safety
record, the Pilatus PC-12 gained acceptance for single pilot FAR
Part 135 IFR. The stylish interior didn't hurt but the Honeywell
Apex avionics helped it earn the necessary respect and control.
The Pilatus PC-12 included completely redundant dual electric
systems, with robust embedded computerized engine controls.
Combined with an integrated avionics suite, this eventually
proved that a second pilot up front was unnecessary. The
newest NGX model even features auto-throttles and dualchannel
EPEC (Electronic Propeller and Engine Control),
controlling both engine and propeller.
While the Pilatus PC-12 was proving itself on the line, other safety
studies revealed that one dependable engine, electronically
monitored and controlled, was statistically safer than two engines.
Then data revealed that a comprehensive flight management
system operated by a competent, well-trained captain made
IFR a legal possibility in the clouds. Finally, superior automated
systems made a second officer unnecessary. But how capable
would a single pilot be if all the magic disappeared suddenly? This
only achieved acceptable safety with a very proficient pilot. (See
Young, Fanjoy & Suckow, 2006). All automation and technology
is not uniformly good and wonderful. When it works, the magic
requires a greater level of study for safe operation. And when it
breaks it demands sharp manual flying abilities from the pilots at a
moment's notice.
The Cirrus fleet of single-engine piston, and later turbine aircraft,
was introduced as fully formed technologically advanced aircraft
(TAA) with integrated GPS technology, digital engine management,
and large computerized displays for situational awareness. But
the endless data and workload was initially too much for pilots to
handle. The original Cirrus safety record was surprisingly not that
great. Why? Because it turns out that technology by itself provides
no safety advantage. A robust training program turned things
around for Cirrus, consisting of more extensive initial and recurrent
pilot preparation. Technology has a steep learning curve and
requires frequent recurrent training.
Technologically Advanced Aircraft-mostly Garmin or Avidyneequipped
models-failed to provide a safety margin through simple
technology. Only when the hardware was more carefully synched
with the pilot was a safety advantage finally realized. In both cases,
pilot training and currency did not keep up with technology.
The masking effect of technology dependency is often seen
in owner-flown turboprops and light jets. Owners with less
flight experience and big plans are often heavily dependent on
automation for aircraft control. It can be a toxic combination if
not carefully managed with training and restraint. An excellent
antidote for overachievers is a strong type club that promotes
safety and provides pilots' resources.
A recent TBM safety program analysis revealed a statistical red
zone for accidents below 1,500 feet and within three miles of the
takeoff and landing airports. These areas of flight are primarily
hand flown and were responsible for a great majority of accidents.
Identifying and addressing known risk areas allows both additional
training and alerts pilots to potential threats. The proper mental
state combined with known stabilized configuration parameters
yields a margin and safety. Moving the needle on safety is
everyone's job, and technology is only valuable in the skilled
hands of a proficient, prepared pilot.
-David St. George is a Master Flight Instructor/FAA DPE/ATP
(ME-SE) and Part 135 pilot.
" Technology provides increased 'available safety,' i.e., a potential for increased safety.
However, to actually obtain this available safety, pilots must receive additional training in the
specific systems in their aircraft that will enable them to exploit the opportunities and operate
within the limitations inherent in their TAA systems. " -AOPA Air Safety Institute
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https://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1501&context=jaaer https://download.aopa.org/asf/TAA2007.pdf https://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/aopa/premiumonsafety_2022issue43/index.php#/p/8 https://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/aopa/premiumonsafety_2022issue43/index.php#/p/8

Premium on Safety - Issue 44, 2022

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