IEEE Technology and Society Magazine - June 2021 - 42

Opinion
Finally, if the app is justified by the gravity of the
current situation and if it poses important limitations
to individual rights, it should be adopted as a temporary
solution. This means that there has to be an
explicit " sunset clause, " i.e., an explicit statement of
the moment, or the conditions, for deciding to discontinue
the app.
Jeremy Pitt (JP): In the U.K., we've had two versions
of the NHS test and trace app. The first version
failed for at least four reasons. First, because they
were trying to apply a technology that hadn't been
used in this way before-that was the use of Bluetooth.
So, there was unfamiliarity and inexperience.
Second, there was this sense of " not invented here, "
so they ignored the existing infrastructure on which
to build a solution. Third, they went for a centralized
solution, rather than, for example, storing information
on the phone. Fourth and finally, to my mind,
they ignored the human element of this upon relying
on self-diagnosis rather than robust testing. From an
engineering point of view, this amounts to not understanding
the nature of the human beings involved in
the technological loop.
In the second iteration, they addressed a number
of these problems, but are still relying on Bluetooth,
which remains an unproven technology for doing
this kind of thing. This reduced the focus down to
the unit of encounters, which meant trying to work
out infection risk from the signal strength and the
length of exposure to that signal strength. But these
are only two of many factors; there is also the density
in the location, and the ventilation in the location,
and many other factors that we don't actually know
about how the virus is transmitted.
This gives us three problems: One is the risk of
false positives. A second problem is the risk of false
negatives, and as Mariarosaria points out these are
absolutely crucial to know that the technology is
working as it should. Third, this app should not be
seen as a " silver bullet " solution, but as just one tool
in our toolbox. Location tracking via an app has to
be complemented with robust and reliable testing
methodologies; it has to be complementary to public
health messaging about social distancing and
mask wearing; and it has to be complemented by
human-led contact tracing, which is what happens
after you've identified the contact. And ultimately,
you cannot see this process as being punitive. Having
detected that someone has been exposed, you've
asked them to self-isolate, but after that the state has
42
got to provide them with the appropriate financial
support, the appropriate emotional support, and the
appropriate logistical support to ensure that the time
they spend in isolation is actually effective. Without
these social supports, any test and trace technology
is going to be ineffective.
Looking further ahead to subsequent iterations,
public trust is not going to be invested in the widespread
adoption of contact-tracing apps, which will
be needed to cope with new outbreaks caused by
virus mutations, if updates are blocked because of
privacy violations [2].
SW: Your remarks resonate with my own field of
law, where we are keenly aware of the discrepancy
between the law in books and law in practice, and it
seems the same thing occurs with technology! Each
of you has mentioned the importance of the human
element, in public attitudes and support towards the
adoption of this kind of technology, with its effectiveness
in real-life affected by contextual factors. Would
you elaborate a bit more on the social or pragmatic
factors affecting the acceptance and effectiveness of
these test and trace mechanisms?
MT: One important point involves a key word that
is sometimes abused in the public discourse, and
that is " trust. " There can be an assumption that citizens
trust the technology and trust the government,
and that's true, but only up to a point. We forget that
trust is something that has to be earned, rather than
just obtained by default. When a government issues
a digital track and tracing technology, it is leveraging
a great deal of trust from its citizens, and especially
in democratic countries, leveraging that trust cannot
come without accompanying " guard rails " -such as
explicit transparent governance of the technology.
In the case of the first version of the app in the
U.K., this was not the case, because as Jeremy
pointed out, there was a focus on a centralized
approach with refusal to rely on solutions already
used in the EU. There was a lack of transparency on
how these data were going to be managed, with a
top-down approach, deaf to the values, and respect
that public opinion was pushing for. That contributed
to the failure of the app.
There is a second element, which is the digital
divide. Jeremy mentioned that we look at technology
as a " silver bullet " ; what we call a " digital solutions
technology " is a mere tool-it does not work without
a strategy. Track and trace was a great opportunity,
but you need to account for a country like the U.K.
IEEE Technology and Society Magazine
IEEE Technology and Society Magazine - June 2021

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