JED - April 2009 - (Page 6)

the view from he re KOSOVO, APRIL 2009 • Vol. 32, No. 4 10 YEARS LATER his month, JED looks at the future of the lethal suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) mission in an article by Glenn Goodman. Since its beginnings during the Vietnam War, the lethal SEAD mission has mainly relied on two essential components – rapid emitter location and precision response. Those two components have evolved significantly in the decades since Vietnam. Today’s SEAD aircraft use networked ESM systems that can perform precision emitter targeting in a matter of seconds. On the response side, the victim radar can be taken out with an anti-radiation missile (ARM) or a GPS-guided weapon, such as a JSOW or a JDAM. In the coming years, every F-22 and every JSF will be, in effect, a Wild Weasel – a stealthy one that can attack hostile radars with minimal risk. Radar operators won’t know if the targets they see are legitimate (F-16s, F-18s, etc.) or decoys (MALD, ITALD, etc.). The odds are that they won’t be on the air long enough to figure it out. I have no doubt that radar manufacturers will eventually develop technologies and tactics to close the gap opened by emerging lethal SEAD capabilities. But for the next decade or two, I would not underwrite any life insurance policies for enemy radar operators. The strange thing is that 10 years ago this month, the US was in the midst of learning some very tough lessons about lethal SEAD. At the time, NATO was conducting air strikes against targets in Serbia (what was left of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) during the Kosovo Conflict. You’ll recall that the Serb radar operators mostly stayed off the air throughout the conflict. The net effect was that NATO was unable to destroy most of the Serb air defenses during the first weeks of the operation for lack of opportunity. With many of the Serb radars and SAM batteries still operational (or at least not destroyed), NATO commanders realized that they could not effectively advance the air campaign from the SEAD phase to the strike phase. There were not enough EW capabilities (lethal SEAD aircraft, support jamming aircraft and advanced self-protection systems) to allow large-scale air strikes in a potentially dangerous threat environment. As the result, the air campaign lacked the necessary “punch” that NATO commanders had planned and the operation dragged on for 10 weeks. The importance of SEAD (both lethal and non-lethal) is perhaps the most enduring EW lesson from the Kosovo Conflict. After the war, the US Air Force boosted its lethal SEAD fleet by creating more F-16CJ aircraft and giving them new targeting capabilities. The US Navy became more serious about developing the Advanced AntiRadiation Guided Missile (AARGM), and it re-affirmed its decision to modernize its support jamming fleet. These are all positive developments for EW. Unfortunately, another lesson stemming from Kosovo is re-learned too often. That lesson is, EW is poorly understood by most senior military leaders, and it is poorly resourced as a result. I’d like to see the day when we can stop learning that lesson. EDITORIAL STAFF Editor: John Knowles Managing Editor: Elaine Richardson Senior Editor: Glenn Goodman Assistant Editor: Marianne Kunkel Technical Editor: Ollie Holt Washington Editor: Kernan Chaisson Contributing Writers: Dave Adamy, Dr. David Rockwell Marketing & Research Coordinator: Allie Hansen Sales Administration: Esther Biggs EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD T 6 | April 2009 The Journal of Electronic Defense Mr. Roy Azevedo Deputy, Tactical Airborne Systems, and Manager, EW, Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems Mr. Chris Bernhardt President, ITT Electronic Systems Maj Gen Bruno Berthet Délégation Générale pour l’Armement (DGA), French MOD Col Laurie Buckhout Chief, EW Division, Army Asymmetric Warfare Office, USA Lt Col Dean Ebert Warfighter Integration, Aviation Weapons Requirements Branch, HQ USMC Col Tim Freeman Commander, 542nd Combat Sustainment Wing, AFMC, USAF Mr. Gabriele Gambarara General Manager, Elettronica S.p.A. Mr. Tony Grieco Former Deputy for Electronic Warfare, OSD Mr. Itzchak Gat CEO, Elisra Mr. Ron Hahn Deputy Director, Joint EW Center, US Strategic Command Mr. Walt Havenstein President and CEO, BAE Systems Inc. Mr. Jay Kistler Technical Director, Air Warfare OUSD (AT&L), OSD Capt Steve Kochman Commander, EA-6B Program Office (PMA-234), NAVAIR, USN Maj Gen William Lord Commander, Air Force Cyber Command (Provisional), USAF Capt Paul Overstreet Commander, ATAPS Program Office (PMA-272), NAVAIR, USN Rep. Joe Pitts (Honorary Member) US Congress, Founding Member, EW Working Group Mr. Kerry Rowe President and COO, Argon ST Col Robert Schwarze Chief, EW and Cyber Warfare Requirements (A5RE), Air Staff, USAF Wg Cdr P.J. Wallace Commander, RAF Spadeadam PRODUCTION STAFF Layout & Design: Barry Senyk Advertising Art: Glenn Domingo Contact the Editor: (978) 509-1450, Contact the Sales Team Leader: (800) 369-6220, ext. 3385, or (352) 333-3385 Subscription Information: Please contact Glorianne O’Neilin at (703) 549-1600 or e-mail The Journal of Electronic Defense is published for the AOC by Naylor, LLC 5950 NW 1st Place Gainesville, FL 32607 Phone: (800) 369-6220 • Fax: (352) 331-3525 ©2009 Association of Old Crows/Naylor, LLC. All rights reserved. The contents of this publication may not be reproduced by any means, in whole or in part, without the prior written authorization of the publisher. Editorial: The articles and editorials appearing in this magazine do not represent an official AOC position, except for the official notices printed in the “Association News” section or unless specifically identified as an AOC position. – John Knowles PUBLISHED APRIL 2009/JED-M0409/8398

Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of JED - April 2009

JED - April 2009
The View From Here
From the President
The Monitor
Washington Report
World Report
Lethal SEAD
Airborne SIGINT Forecast
RF Power Sources for IED Jammers
Roost Profile
EW 101
AOC News
JED Sales Offices
Index of Advertisers
JED Quick Look

JED - April 2009