IO Journal - May 2010 - (Page 29)
Stovicek, Bart, “Strategic Communication: A Department of Defense Approach”, US Army War College, 30 March 2007. Trent, Stony, Captain, USA and Doty III, James, Captain, USA, “Marketing: An Overlooked Aspect of Information Operations”, Military Review, July-August 2005.
1 2 Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century, xi. Traditional kinetic and understood tactical non-kinetic battlefield weapons employment reflects operations such as Exercise RED FLAG/VIRTUAL FLAG or USAF Weapons School Integration and Mission Employment Phases activities. “Students at the U.S. Army War College are senior leaders with about 20 years of military or government experience. Most have had multiple tours of duty in Iraq and/or Afghanistan. And so anecdotally, when I ask these students whether they “get it” regarding the importance of information as a significant warfighting enabler they almost unanimously state that they understand that the information environment is critically important. But when I drill down to the next level of detail I find that with each tour in a theater of war it took them on average, four months to emplace processes to proactively exploit that environment. That tells me that that the military leadership has not culturally inculcated information as a critical warfighting function…and so a forcing function needs to occur until that happens within a common planning process embraced by all.” Murphy, “Forcing Cultural Change: The Information Endstate”. Ibid. Tactical and operational execution and planning while assigned to 621st Air Control Squadron at Osan AB, Republic of Korea, 552nd Air Control Wing at Tinker AFB and 961st Airborne Air Control Squadron, Kadena AB, Japan. Wide range of live and simulation exercises with involvement from operator, planner, tester, instructor, and evaluator. Participation as operator and/or supplemental planner in Operations NORTHERN WATCH, SOUTHERN WATCH, NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM, and others. A theme is an overarching concept or intention, designed for broad application, while a message is a narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, “Established Policy and Guidance” in Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication, 12 and Loney, “Drafting a New Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication.” Robert “Bob” Potter, Col, USAF (Ret.), electronic correspondence 15 December 2009. “...focused Air Force efforts to understand and build strategic relationships with key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USAF strategic interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated and integrated programs, plans, themes, messages, and synchronized products.” Karns, “Strategy and Communication: The Need for a Fused and Synchronized Strategic Capability,” 16. Smith, “Communicating for Effect: Operationalizing and Analyzing Weapons of Mass Influence”, 5 and Cook, “The Proper Role of Professional Military Advice in Contemporary Uses of Force,” 24-28. Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations, 17 Sep 2006, Incorporating Change 2, Final Coordination 02 Oct 2008, xviii. As reflected in Effects Based Operations (EBO) concept. Mann, Endersby, Searle, “Thinking Effects Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations, CADRE Paper No. 15”. Ibid., 11-12. “War and Aftermath,” Policy Review, Aug. 2003. Adam Brate, Technomanifestos, 128. Ibid., 113.
12 13 14 15
16 Griffith, Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 77, 87. 17 mith, “Communicating for Effect: Operationalizing and Analyzing Weapons of Mass Influence”, 7. 18 Gebara, “Damage Control: Leveraging Crisis Communications for Operational Effect”. 19 Ibid. 20 “Media Impact on Military Operations, Falluja in 2004” aired 19 June 2007 on the Public Broadcasting System’s Frontline. 21 Gebara, “Damage Control: Leveraging Crisis Communications for Operational Effect”. 22 Phrase first learned by author during interview with Robert “Bob” Potter, Col, USAF (Ret.) 23 November 2009. Phrase also found in Smith’s “Communicating for Effect: Operationalizing and Analyzing Weapons of Mass Influence”. 23 Brate, Technomanifestos, 317-318. Excerpted: Bill Joy, cofounder and chief scientist of Sun Microsystems. Identified by Brate as a technologist and prominent leader of the Information Revolution. A wild-haired and brilliant hacker. Put together software version of Unix operating system that eventually enabled computers to be networked worldwide. Designed company’s advanced networking architecture, which escalated the company to fame and fortune. Co-developed Java and Jini, two of the most powerful programming languages to date (2002). In 1997, President Clinton appointed Joy co-chairman of the Presidential Information Technology Advisory Committee. 24 Ibid., 320. 25 Robert “Bob” Potter, Col, USAF (Ret.), electronic correspondence 15 December 2009. 26 Smith’s paper, “Communicating for Effect: Operationalizing and Analyzing Weapons of Mass Influence”, provides definitions and assessments of the different kinds of communication types/categories. 27 Trent and Doty, “Marketing: An Overlooked Aspect of Information Operations”. 28 Stavridis, “Strategic Communication and National Security”, 6. (Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN , at the time of publishing was Commander, U.S. Southern Command and is Supreme Allied Commander, Europe at the time of this paper.) 29 Caldwell, “Reflections by Frontier 6: What’s the Hubbub About Strategic Communication?”, blog accessed 9Novemeber 2009. (LTG Caldwell currently serves as the commander of the Combined Arms Center at Ft Leavenworth, Kansas. The command oversees the Command and General Staff College and 17 other schools, centers, and training programs. US Army equivalent to US Air Force Air University.) 30 Ibid. 31 Sea Aerospace Ground Evaluations (S.A.G.E.) Corporation 32 Chuck de Caro, Lecture/Presentation, “Killing Al Q’aida”, www. dodccrp.org/events/12th_ICCRTS/CD/html/presentations/031. pdf. 33 Lind, et al, FMFM 1-A, Draft 4.2 18 June 2007, Formatted 30 October 2007, 6. 34 Stovicek, “Strategic Communication: A Department of Defense Approach”, 14. 35 Unsourceable Strategic Communication conference/presentation material that provided concise summary statements regarding authors learnings. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 The nine principles are, in no order of precedence: Leadership-driven communication process; Credible: Perception of truthfulness and respect; Understanding: Deep comprehension of others; Dialogue: Multi-faceted exchange of ideas; Pervasive: Every action sends a message; Unity of Effort: Integrated and coordinated; Results-based: Tied to desired end state; Responsive: Right audience, message, time and place; Continuous: Analysis, planning, execution, and assessment.
IO Journal | May 2010
Table of Contents for the Digital Edition of IO Journal - May 2010
IO Journal - May 2010
Computers as Weapons of War
Burn the Books: What China’s Decision on Google Reveals about the PRC
Active Defense of Corporate Information Systems
“Why do I need to understand Information Employment?”
Some Misconceptions Regarding Information Operations
Electronic Warfare and Cyberspace Operations: Where is the Convergence?
DIME is for Integration: Strategic Communications as an Integrator of National Power
IO Journal - May 2010